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MARSHAL BUGEAUD, THE JULY MONARCHY AND THE QUESTION OF 
ALGERIA, 1841-1847: A STUDY IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION
On 14 June 1830, a French expeditionary force made a 
successful landing on the coast of North Africa within a 
few miles of the city of Algiers. This marked the begin­
ning of the French conquest of Algeria. The conquest and 
subsequent colonization of Algeria extended over several 
decades and a monarchy, a republic, and an empire continued 
the mission initiated by the last of the Bourbon kings of 
France, Charles X.^
Pirates of the Barbary Coast had long jeopardized 
shipping in the Mediterranean and the French hoped that the 
major powers of Europe would welcome the subjugation of a 
source of the piracy. Furthermore, the French had been en­
gaged in a long-standing quarrel with the Dey of Algiers 
regarding commercial transactions between France and Algiers 
The argument reached a peak in 1827 when the Dey struck the 
French consul with a "fly-flap" following a heated discus­
sion over the refusal of the French government to pay the 
full amount demanded by the Dey in payment for shipments of
^For an account of the decision to invade Algeria, see 
J. Lucas-Dubreton. La Restauration et la monarchie de 
Juillet (Paris: Hachette, 1926 ), plp5.5-]£5S.-58 .
2corn from Algiers. France declared war on the Dey in 1827
2
and established a blockade which proved to be ineffective.
The decision to attack Algeria was the idea of the 
chief minister of Charles X; comte Jules-Armand de Polignac 
a mystical, ultra-royalist who believed a military expedi­
tion would distract the French people from increasing domes­
tic disorders at home. Royalist supporters believed that a 
military victory would pacify the opposition, and of all the 
areas considered, it was believed that an expedition against
the Dey of Algiers would less likely cause international 
3repercussions.
Three weeks after the invasion of Algeria, the city of 
Algiers fell. The French military commander. Marshal Louis 
de Bourmont, reflected the ignorance of Frenchmen about 
Algeria when he commented on the victory at Algiers: ". . .
the whole kingdom of Algeria will probably surrender within 
fifteen days without our having to fire another shot."^ 
Algerian natives proved to be no more willing to accept 
French domination than Turkish suzerainty, and began a holy 
war against France.^
A^nnual Register, LXXI (18 29), pp. 172-73.
3
James E. Swain, The Struggle for the Control of the 
Mediterranean Prior to 1848: A Study in Anglo-French Rela­
tions (Boston: Stratford Co., 19 33), p. 57%
ii
Edward Behr, The Algerian Problem (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1962), p. 17.
^The Ottoman Empire had a nominal suzerainty over 
Algeria since the Sixteenth Century.
The first ten years of the Algerian campaign was 
especially burdensome and frustrating for France. Tradi­
tional continental military tactics and strategy were 
ineffective against bands of Moslem warriors and the rigors 
of the North Africa climate, and the French expeditionary
C
force stumbled from one blunder to another.
In 1832, the divided Moslem tribesmen accepted the 
leadership of Abd el Kader ibn Muhyi al-Din, Emir of Mascara 
(1807-1883), a twenty-five year-old Arab who had already 
made his pilgrimage to Mecca. This young chieftain was des­
tined to help lay the groundwork for modern Arab nationalism 
by urging his people to unify not only to expel the invader, 
but also to create a Moslem state on the southern shores of
7
the Mediterranean.
France made Algeria a possession in 1834, but in the 
same year, the inconsistent French government chose to cut 
short the conquest and made peace with Abd el Kader 
(February 26, 1834), Substantial differences appeared in 
the French and Arabic texts of the treaty, however, and the 
peace hardly lasted one year. With the renewal of the war, 
France appointed (June 1835) another in a long line of 
governor-generals, comte Bertrand Clauzel (1772-1842). 
Clauzel, who often exaggerated the importance of his
C
Behr, p. 17.
7
For a satisfactory account of Abd el Kader see Joseph 
le Gras, Abd el Kader (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 19 29).
operations, won the support of Adolphe Thiers' ministry and 
received consent of the Chamber of Deputies for expansion
O
of the war and French commitment to total occupation.
Thiers' government fell in September 1836, and comte 
Louis Mathieu Mol^ (1781-1855), formed a government and cut 
back on troops and appropriations to Algeria. Clauzel, 
determined to make his point with the French government by 
expanding the theatre of war, hastened his demise by march­
ing on Constantine without sufficient troops and was 
thoroughly defeated. Mol^ then appointed a new governor- 
general, Charles-Marie-Denys, comte Le Damr^mont (1783- 
183 7), and instructed him to make peace with Abd el Kader. 
Damremont chose General Thomas Bugeaud to negotiate the
Q
peace of Tafna with the Moslem leader.
Thomas Robert Bugeaud de la Piconnerie, the due d'Isly 
(1784-1849), played a crucial role in both the conquest and 
colonization of Algeria. During the reign of Louis Philippe, 
he was one of the few active soldiers with the distinction 
of having served in la grande arm^e of Napoleon Bonaparte.
As a corporal, Bugeaud had participated in the Battle of 
Austerlitz and later served as a colonel in the Peninsular 
Campaign. After Waterloo and the return of the Bourbons to 
France, Bugeaud was forced into retirement. From 1815 to 
1830, he lived on a small family estate, "La Durantie," in
Q
Behr, pp. 19-20.
^Ibid.
Périgord. He enjoyed the life of a modest country squire 
and his closeness to the soil profoundly influenced his 
thinking throughout his career.
After the July Revolution of 1830, Bugeaud left retire­
ment for the active life. He was elected to the Chamber of 
Deputies in 1831 as a representative of his native Excideuil 
and remained in that capacity until his death in 1849. He 
was also recalled into the military and in 18 33, Louis Philippe 
placed the Duchess de Berry (1798-1870), the niece of Louis 
Philippe's wife, under Bugeaud's supervision. She had been 
taken into custody for treasonous activity in the Vendee 
counter-revolution against the July Monarchy and confined 
to the castle of Blaye under the martial care of Bugeaud.
The colonel did not enjoy the reputation he earned as jailer, 
but his acceptance of this unpleasant task convinced Louis 
Philippe of his loyalty to the government.
By 1836, Bugeaud was a Lieutenant-General in command 
of a brigade in Algeria. The Algerian campaign had suffered
^^Henri Amedëe le Lorgne, Comte d'ldeville (comp.). 
Memoirs of Marshal Bugeaud from his private correspondence 
and original documents, 1784-18491 Edited from the French 
by Charlotte M. Ÿonge (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1884),
I, 189. Hereafter referred to as Ideville.
^^For a^complete account of Bugeaud's role as jailer 
see Prosper Meniere, La captivité de Madame la Duchesse de 
Berry à Blaye, 1833: Journal du docteur P. Méni&re. I I
publié par son fils le docteur E . Manière avec deux lettres 
Inédites de Balzac et du Maréchal Bugeaud (2 vols; Paris:
C . Lévy, 1882).
from the lack of leadership until Bugeaud entered the arena 
and put to use his knowledge of guerilla warfare in Spain.
The result was a revolution in French military tactics and 
strategy in North Africa. Good communication links with 
other units and troop mobility were Bugeaud's innovations.
The general felt that the individual soldier should not be 
burdened with heavy equipment, for artillery and baggage were 
of little use in the Algerian terrain and only restricted 
troop movements. "Our soldiers, like the soldiers of Rome, 
should be free in their movements and unencumbered. . . . Our
mules and horses must carry the food and ammunition, and the
12tents answer the purpose of pack-saddles and bags. . . . "
He requested mule brigades and young strong soldiers, com­
manded by young, energetic officers. Soldiers who previously 
had been loaded with provisions, ammunition, and clothing
for eight days should carry provisions for only four days,
13while mules should carry ten day’s provisions. He also
adopted the razzia, or scorched earth policy in dealing with
the enemy. The razzias were denounced by many in France as
barbaric, but they were highly effective. Bugeaud answered
those who criticized the razzias by saying, "Messieurs, on
14ne fait pas la guerre avec la philanthropie."
l^ideville. I, 182-83.
13Bugeaud to Marshal Maison, Minister of War, 16 June 
1836, Ideville, I, 218.
^^Ibid.: 211-12, and Paul Azan, L ’armée d ’Afrique de 
1830 à 1852 (Paris: Pion, 1936), pp. 187-88.
7In July 1836, Bugeaud, by now in command of the Tafna 
Division, won the first decisive victory of the campaign 
since the capture of Algiers in 1830. Abd el Kader pitted 
his force against Bugeaud’s at Sickack in Oran province. 
Although the Algerian chieftain was not captured in the 
battle, his army was decisively defeated, and Abd el Kader 
decided to come to terms. In May 1837, the Treaty of Tafna 
was negotiated. Abd el Kader received the province (but 
not the town), of Oran and the coastal ports of Arzew and 
Mostaganem.
The Treaty of Tafna was not favorably received in 
France for French troops were withdrawn from territory in 
Oran province which they had found difficult to capture, 
and in general, the treaty conformed too much to the desires 
of Abd el Kader. Bugeaud, who was responsible for the 
treaty, defended it because it limited the size of Abd el 
Kader*s army, thus making it easier to defeat. Furthermore, 
if complete victory over the Arabs was desirable (and 
Bugeaud was not convinced at this point that it was), an
16army of 100,000 would be necessary to complete the task. 
l^Behr, p. 20.
^^Azan, pp. 214-15, and Ideville, I, 297-98. In 1837, 
when the treaty was signed, there were only 42,600 French 
troops in Algeria. Paul Thureau-Dangin, Histoire de la 
Monarchie de Juillet (7 vols; Paris: E. Pion, Nourrit et
Cie, 1884-1914), V, 345.
8Western Algeria was temporarily pacified by the Treaty 
of Tafna and eventually, the unpopular aspects of the treaty 
were forgotten and Bugeaud rose in stature.
On 27 December 1840, Bugeaud was rewarded for his suc­
cess and travelled to Paris to accept the appointment as 
Governor-General of Algeria. He arrived in Algiers from 
Paris 23 February 1841, to assume his post and remained 
Governor-General until 1847. During that period, the mili­
tary conquest of Algeria was nearly completed and coloniza­
tion was initiated. When Bugeaud, the twelfth Governor- 
General since 1830, took command of French forces in North 
Africa, the destiny of Algeria was uncertain. The early 
years of French presence in Algeria were painful and barren; 
leadership had been mediocre and French political leaders 
inconsistent. Opinion in France was hesitant as to total 
or partial occupation, peace or war, and conquest by arms 
or by ideas. Because authority was divided between civilian 
and military officials with no clear-cut role differentia­
tion, the French administrative apparatus in Algeria was
17disorganized and inefficient.
This study will trace the tenure of Thomas Robert 
Bugeaud as Governor-General of Algeria, evaluating the im­
pact of his leadership on the conquest and development of
^^Le National, 8 juillet 1841; Ideville, I, 202-3; 
and, Thomas RobertBugeaud, Simple Document sur 1 'Afrique 
par un Officier Attache a 1*Armée, sous le Premier Comimande- 
ment de M. le Maréchal Clausel (Paris : Herhant et Bimont,
1838), pp. 3-13.
9French Algeria and assessing the conflicting views of 
Bugeaud, his officers, major officials of the July Monarchy 
and their opponents in Paris as to the future of Algeria.
Chapter II 
1841; BUGEAUD’S CRITICAL FIRST YEAR
When Thomas Bugeaud replaced Sylvain-Charles Valee as 
Governor-General of Algeria, he was fifty-six years old, 
tall and powerfully built with a plump face marked slightly 
by smallpox, his grey eyes small and piercing. His square 
chin and high forehead prevented a handsome appearance, 
although self assurance, remarkable energy, and an imperious 
will made him a striking individual, obviously accustomed to 
having his way. He spoke with strength and authority, but 
with the uncultivated, crude voice of a battle-hardened 
veteran with no formal education.^
His predecessor, Valee, had been a capable adminis­
trator, but a mediocre military leader, and officials of 
the July Monarchy hoped that Bugeaud possessed the neces­
sary qualities to be both an able administrator and military 
2
commander. To many, however, Bugeaud was a strange choice 
for he was a curious mixture of career soldier and yeoman
^Ideville, 1, 200-201; and Victor Démontés, La Colo­
nisation Militaire sous Bugeaud (Paris: Larose, 1917), p. 82.
^Ideville, 1, 442-43, and; Nicholas Anne Theodule 
Changarnier, Campagnes d'Afrique, 1830-1848: Memoirs du
général Changarnier (Paris: Berger-Lavault, 1930), p. 182,
and; E. Castellane, Campagnes d ’Afrique, 1835-1848, Lettres 
adressées au maréchal de Castellane par les maréchaux Bugeaud, 
Clauzel, Valée, Canrobert, Forey, Bosquet, etc. (Paris: E.
Pion, 1898), pp. 219-20.
10
IT
farmer, possessing the solid soldierly qualities of loyalty, 
resoluteness and common-sense, but lacking any of the quali­
ties of greatness. His subordinates admired him, but intel­
lectual writers and politicians of the day despised him for
3his conservatism and narrow breadth of vision.
General Nicholas Anne Thëfcdule Changarnier (1793-1877), 
a veteran of the Algerian campaign and one of Bugeaud's 
rivals for the position of Governor-General, believed that 
Louis Philippe and his sons chose Bugeaud because he had 
championed their cause since his service at Blaye.^ Cer­
tainly, Louis Philippe did believe Bugeaud to be unquestion­
ably loyal, but he also felt him capable of carrying out the 
task of conquering Algeria. By 1341, Louis Philippe was 
convinced of the necessity to completely subjugate Algeria: 
"On the land that has now become, and will for ever [sic] 
remain French, our brave soldiers are carrying on their 
noble labours which I am glad my sons have had the honor of 
sharing. France will carry civilization into Algiers as a 
sequel to her glory.
The king hoped that the Algerian conquest would pro­
vide some splendor to his regime and would later be pleased 
that Algeria became a showcase for his sons. Algeria 
proved to be difficult to subdue, however, and Louis Philippe
^Behr, p. 22.
Changarni er, p . 182.
^Ideville, II, 37. Official proclamation of Louis 
Philippe, 27 December 1841.
12
also had to be cautious in his public statements regarding 
his aspirations for Algeria because he did not wish to cul­
tivate any more suspicion from the English, with whom he was 
seeking closer ties. Britain had been suspicious of French 
objectives in Algeria since 1830, for French presence in 
Algeria threatened English supremacy in the Mediterranean.
There is strong evidence to suggest that Louis Philippe 
approved Bugeaud's appointment as Governor-General because 
he was the only general officer loyal to the Orleanists
n
with a definite plan for conquering Algeria. In December, 
1840, Louis Philippe called Bugeaud to Paris to ask his 
advice regarding the future of Algeria. Bugeaud replied 
that if the conquest were not accelerated, the French should 
evacuate Algeria the next morning. The king then asked 
Bugeaud if he would accept the leadership of such an enter­
prise and the latter replied that he would accept if an 
army of 100,000 men and a budget of 100 millions were placed
at his disposal. Shortly thereafter, Bugeaud was chosen to 
/ 8replace Valee.
Another official intimately connected with Bugeaud’s 
appointment was Francois Pierre Guillaume Guizot (1787- 
1874), Foreign Minister and actual head of the Ministry (the
0
James Swain, pp. 59-60.
7
See below, pp. 14-15.
p
Paul Thureau-Dangin, Histoire de la Monarchie de 
Juillet (7 vols; Paris : E . Pion, Nourrit et 1884-1914),
V, 267.
13
titular head of the Ministry was Marshal Soult). Guizot was 
one of the most important public figures to support the July 
Monarchy in the 1840's, and was certainly among the most 
influential policy-makers. Guizot had initially been luke­
warm to the Algerian conquest for he regarded it as a burden 
that would sap French strength for a half-century. The 
result at best would be another naval base, another Toulon.
9Algeria should be ”... l'affaire de nos temps de loisir....” 
or a concern when European affairs did not beckon. As the 
Algerian campaign continued, however, Guizot slowly came to 
recognize a potential value in Algeria. Although never as 
ardent as Bugeaud, he accepted the necessity of conquering 
Algeria, but only as a means of enhancing French strategic 
power in the Mediterranean and not for economic of imperial 
value. Therefore, Guizot believed that the conquest should 
progress slowly and deliberately since his primary diploma­
tic objective was to pull France and Britain closer together 
and Algeria could conceivably prevent this.^^
Although Guizot and Bugeaud did not agree on objec­
tives to be realized in North Africa, Guizot favored his
^Guizot à Bugeaud, 20 septembre 1842, in François 
Pierre Guillaume Guizot, Mémoires pour servir a 1 'histoire 
de mon temps (8 vols ; Paris : Michel Levy Freres, 1858-61),
VII, 140-41, and; Douglas Johnson, Guizot: Aspects of
French History, 1787-1874. (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1963), p. 273.
^^François Guizot, Memoirs to Illustrate the History 
of My Times. Trans. J . W. Cole (London: Bentley, 1858-l ___
1861)7 VI,~383 .
14
appointment as Governor-General, for he believed him to be 
the best q u a l i f i e d . T o  Guizot, the general had illus­
trated his ability and influence, had the support and loyalty 
of the army, and because of the razzias, the Arabs feared
him.
The two men developed a friendship after Bugeaud's
appointment and exchanged letters regularly from 1841 to 1847.
This friendship is illustrated by a letter from Guizot to
Bugeaud dated 21 September 1841, in which the minister assured
. 1 3the general of his confidence and friendship. Guizot 
pledged his full support to Bugeaud in the council and tri­
bune, and laid the groundwork for his views on colonization: 
two areas of colonization should be established— one for 
Europeans and the other, indirectly governed by France, for 
the Arabs. The details, such as the decision as to where 
to draw the boundary between colons (European colonists), 
and natives would be left to Bugeaud. The next step would 
be to determine how much territory should be colonized, and 
what type of colonization it should be. European colonists 
were a necessity because of their civilizing influence, and 
those colonists must be protected by the army.^^
^^Ibid. 
^^ibid.
^^Ibid., pp. 384-85.
14
Ibid., pp. 386-87. By "indirect government" in the 
Arab Zone, Guizot meant that France should simply oversee 
the Arab administration and accept tribute from the natives.
15
Marshal Nicholas Jean de Dieu Soult, duc de Dalmatie 
(1769-1851), titular head of the cabinet when Bugeaud was 
appointed, and Minister of War until 1844, did not like 
Bugeaud, nor did he approve of the Algerian campaign, but 
he yielded to the desires of Louis Philippe and Guizot and 
did not protest the appointment.^^
Because they were aware of Bugeaud's views vis-a-vis 
North Africa, Louis Philippe and Guizot must have been pre­
pared for commitment to total occupation and colonization 
of Algeria when they made Bugeaud commander of the Army of 
Africa.
Adolphe Thiers (1797-1877), a constitutional monarchist 
politically to the left of Guizot, and a critic of the Soult- 
Guizot Ministry in the 1840’s, considered making Bugeaud 
Governor-General when he formed a government in the spring 
of 1840. Thiers was more ardent in his support of conquest 
and colonization than Guizot, for he pressed for a more 
aggressive policy in the Mediterranean while Guizot was 
more cautious and concerned about British reactions. In the 
1830’s, Thiers had been the most ardent spokesman for state 
colonization in Algeria and held Bugeaud in high esteem, 
but the general's conservatism, his stubbornness and nega­
tive attitude in the Chamber of Deputies alienated the Left
16and Thiers decided not to make the appointment.
15
Ibid., p. 400, and; Thureau-Dangin, V, 348-50.
IS
Louis Blanc, History of Ten Years (2 vols; London; 
Chapman and Hall, 1844), II, 483-84. Thiers' 1840 Ministry 
lasted from 1 March to 29 October.
16
To leftists in the Chamber of Deputies, Bugeaud,
whether or not he intended to, personified the restless,
proud military party which remembered with pride Napoleon's
grand march across Europe in spite of the lesson of 1815 at
Waterloo. The Left opposed Louis Philippe’s policy in
Algeria and was critical of Bugeaud.
Le National, a leading journal edited by the moderate
republican Armand Marrast, commented extensively on the
selection of Bugeaud. In a series of editorials. Le National
argued that the real force behind the appointment of this
"monarchist fanatic" as Governor-General was Guizot, who was
anxious to withdraw from Algeria due to British pressure.
The Treaty of Tafna was the major cause of French problems
in Algeria and now its author, an adequate military subal-
17tern, was Governor-General.
To strengthen its case against the king and Bugeaud,
Le National, on 25 January 1841, published a letter allegedly 
written by Louis Philippe in which he promised to abandon 
Algiers in order to improve relations with Britain. The 
Orldanist Journal des Débats challenged the authenticity of
18the letter and labeled Le National's charges as ridiculous. 
Later, it was discovered that the letter was purchased by
^^Le National, 2-3 janvier 1841.
^®Le Journal des Débats, 25 mai 1841.
17
journalists from a prostitute named Eseline de Jough and
19that it was not authentic.
On 10 March 1841, Le National commented on Bugeaud’s 
speech to French Algerians on the necessity of colonization. 
Although he admitted that this was a worthy endeavor, the 
editor expressed little hbpe that this could be realized 
because the July Monarchy was far too concerned with placat­
ing the English. Shortly afterwards. Le National attacked 
Bugeaud in an editorial on why deputies should not also 
exercise public functions, citing him as an example of an
absentee deputy who could not attend to his legislative
2 0duties while in Algeria. While the editors supported the 
conquest of Algeria against critics who felt it was folly, 
they criticized the government for its lack of direction. 
They were highly critical of Guizot who felt that direct 
or indirect domination could be decided upon once the con­
quest was complete, for the editor felt the government
21should already have plans for the future.
Le National concluded that Bugeaud’s appointment as 
Governor-General represented the continuation of a negative 
and chaotic policy. Too many officiers de boudoir were 
being sent to Africa which only demoralized troops. Bugeaud
^^T. E. B. Howarth, Citizen-King: The Life of Louis
Philippe, King of the French (London; Eyre and Spottiswood, 
1961), pp. 279-89.
2 0
Le National, 19 mars 1841.
^^Ibid., 16 avril 1841.
18
could hardly be described as an officier de boudoir» but he
was the progenitor of the Treaty of Tafna and would likely
deliver a mortal blow to France's efforts in Algeria. Le
National argued that Guizot was much too intelligent to be
ignorant of the ramifications of sending Bugeaud to Algeria,
and concluded that the July Monarchy planned a complete
withdrawal from North Africa. Because Bugeaud had already
denounced the Treaty of Tafna as an illusion and obviously
had no intention of withdrawing his forces from Algeria, one
must conclude that the above was merely a flimsy attempt to
2 2discredit the Ministry. This conclusion is supported by 
the reaction of Le National late in 1841 when there seemed 
to be a possibility that Bugeaud would be replaced by 
General de Rumigny. The editors believed this to be impoli­
tic and heaped praise on Bugeaud for his conduct of the war
and his efforts to colonize. When the above proved to be
2 3a mere rumor, the attack on Bugeaud resumed.
The Ministry and Bugeaud did have support from some 
journals. For example, the Orleanist Journal des Debats 
argued that France should pursue an aggressive policy in 
Algeria and that a French population should be established 
there. Convinced that he was not appointed earlier only 
because of pressure on the War Ministry from leftist news­
papers, this journal approved Bugeaud's appointment, depicting
22
Ibid.a 8 juillet 1841. For Bugeaud's denunciation 
of the Treaty of Tafna, see below, p. 28.
^^Ibid., 5 decembre 1841, 3 janvier 1842.
19
him as a fine general who would not stop until the final vic­
tory was achieved. The Journal des Debats denied the charge 
that Bugeaud had betrayed France at Tafna and supported 
Guizot's cautious policy against critical journalists and 
deputies in the Chamber. Guizot was right when he said that 
when one has been in Algeria for only ten years, one has no 
right to talk of finishing the task immediately, for this
would be the work of a century. France would eventually
24
find glory and profit there.
Republicans and legitimists remained hostile to Bugeaud, 
and journalists reminded Frenchmen of Bugeaud's earlier
25statements on the necessity of abandoning North Africa.
In the 1840 session of the Chamber of Deputies,
M. Loynes expressed the views of many war critics in a 
speech on credits for Algeria. Loynes disapproved of con­
tinued French presence in Algeria for France had been asking 
for ten years whether or not she could preserve that posses­
sion. Although Loynes did not directly mention Bugeaud in 
his speech, he found fault with his policies, and at this 
early date in the history of the conquest, Loynes favored 
the replacement of military authority in Algeria by civilian 
authority. The army should concern itself with the conquest
24
'ideville. I, 345.
Le Journal des Debats, 6 janvier 1841, 15 mai 1841. 
25.
20
while a civilian government, with adequate funds, concen-
2 6trated on colonization.
Another critic of total conquest in Algeria was T. Massot, 
an assistant military intendant who was a prisoner of Abd el 
Kader from October, 1840, to May, 1841. After his release, 
he wrote a memorandum of his views in which he advocated equal 
negotiations for peace and called for respect of the Arab 
nationality and the Muslim religion. By making peace with 
Abd el Kader, Massot believed France could exploit the mineral 
and commercial resources of Algeria. Massot was quite im­
pressed with Abd el Kader's leadership and his desire for 
peace indicates that even Algerian administrators could not 
agree on the desirability of total conquest. Massot’s views 
were seconded by Monseigneur Antoine-Adolphe Dupuch, the 
first Bishop of Algiers, who voiced the opinions of Catholic 
missionaries in Algeria. Clergymen were preoccupied with 
conversion rather than domination or colonization, and
bàèieved they could function more efficiently in a peaceful 
27environment. Thus, at the beginning of Bugeaud’s term as
9 6
France 3 Chambre Des Deputes. Session 1840. Impres- 
sions Diverses et Feiulletons. "Opinion de M. de Loynes,
Depute du Loiret sur le paragraphe a du Projet d'Adresse au 
Roi concernant l'Algérie," X (1840), pp. 1, 4, 7, 22.
^^Paul Fournier, "L'Etat d'Abd el Kader et sa puis­
sance en 1841 d'après le rapport du sous-intendant militaire 
Massot," Revue djhistoire Moderne et Contemporaine, XIV 
(avril-juin 1967), pp. 122-23. Fournier maintains that 
Massot's report is extremely valuable, because unlike many 
officers who gave their views, Massot was not interested in 
military glory or decorations.
21
governor-general, France was far from agreement on princi­
ples to be followed in Algeria.
When he was appointed Governor-General of Algeria, 
Bugeaud's objectives for this North African land, which he 
would steadfastly maintain until 1847, were well established. 
These objectives resulted from the evolution of his ideas 
over a period of several years. Complete conquest and mili­
tary colonization, the core of his objectives, were the re­
sult of his dual interests in the military and agriculture. 
While he was a soldier, devoted to military discipline and 
the values of a soldier's way of life, he was also a conser­
vative yeoman farmer, convinced that virtue was synonymous 
to agrarian principles.
His love for the soil emerged during the Bourbon res­
toration while he was in retirement on his estate "La 
Durantie." Struck by the wretchedness of the people in his 
district, he established the first agricultural society in 
France to improve local cultivation practices because he 
believed agriculture to be a science of local practice, and
that clever men of a locality should select the processes
2 8most suitable to their own districts.
Most of his public speeches can be reduced to three 
maj or themes ; the encouragement of agriculture ; maintaining 
tke honor and strength of the army; and; tirades against 
rioters, republicans, secret societies, and opposition
^®Ideville, I, 108-9.
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journalists (he called the latter the "aristocracy of the 
ink bottle").
In a speech before the Chamber of Deputies in 1832, 
he said:
I am only a soldier labourer. Make agri­
culture flourish; turn in that direction a large 
proportion of the financial and intellectual 
power of the nation . . . .  Make agriculture 
become a profession, an opening for abilities, 
that for want of a career, are used to the injury 
of the country in composing bad writings. Saint 
Simonism, and a thousand other f o l l i e s . 29
In the same speech, he admitted that Algeria might be
colonized, but he preferred at that time to concentrate on
the transformation of wasteland in Brittany and Bordeaux
into cultivated land by using soldiers who could learn the
art of war and cultivation at the same time. In that way,
the army would not only contribute to the national prosperity,
30but would also bear a portion of its own financial burden.
In 1834, he again lectured the deputies on the subject
of agriculture by maintaining that if government subsidies
could be granted for art, music, the theatre, and trade,
support could also be given to a life-giving institution
such as agriculture and a special ministry should be esta-
31blished for the encouragement of agriculture.
29lbid., pp. 312-13.
30 Ibid. Use of the Army in transforming wasteland 
into cultivated land is suggestive of a Napoleonic idea.
See B. D. Goochgi The Reign of Napoleon III (Chicago: Rand-
McNally, 1969), pp. 20-21.
^^ Ibid.
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In 1839, he argued that improving the condition of 
French yeomen would improve morality, and the increased pro­
duction of grain and cattle would decrease the "crime" of
3 2importing cattle and grain into France.
Again in 1840, he told the deputies:
It [agriculture] certainly is an admirable 
institution; there cannot be a better or more 
popular; it unites the poor with the rich; it 
compels the rich to draw near to the poor for 
the encouragement of agriculture. I do not hes­
itate to say that it is the most progressive of 
all our institutions; and that it alone is worth 
more than all the political reform so noisily 
demanded.^3
Given his preoccupation with agriculture and his insis­
tence upon using it as a near panacea for societal short­
comings , it should have come as no surprise that he gave 
agriculture an important position in his scheme for Algeria 
cnce he was committed to shaping the destiny of that land.
As late as 1837, however, he had been opposed to coloniza­
tion in Algeria, that " . . .  great rock . . . unfit for 
34cultivation." Soon afterward, he decided that limited 
colonization would be possible by using the Spahis (native 
troops in the French service), in Oran province. These 
soldiers could marry, live with their families in a house, 
and serve the dual function of cultivator and warrior.
S^ibid., pp. 315-16.
^^Ibid., p. 314.
^^Ibid., p. 345.
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This was Bugeaud’s first official pronouncement for military
3 5colonies in Algeria.
After the Treaty of Tafna (1838), Bugeaud began to
play an active role in the discussions about France’s future
in North Africa. Concerned that colonists should not be
societal rejects, but good elements, he recommended military
colonies, staffed by men who had finished their term of 
36service.
In a polemic written in 183 8, Bugeaud demanded that 
France choose between civilian and military government in 
Algeria for the two could not exist side by side. He was 
very cautious about predicting the success of colonies in 
North Africa and even about the success of the military cam­
paign. The obstacles to French suzerainty in Algeria were 
surmountable, but they would demand much attention and a
successful government must be established before European
3 7colonization could succeed.
^^Bugeaud à Ministère de la Guerre, 12 novembre 18 37, 
in Paul Azan L ’armée d ’Afrique de 1830 à 1852 (Paris: Pion,
1936), p. 241.
Bugeaud, Mémoire sur notre Etablissement dans la 
province d ’Oran par suite de la paix (Paris: Gaultier-
Laguionie, 1838). In the same memoir, Bugeaud expressed his 
dislike of Jews and advocated their expulsion from Algeria.
3 7Bugeaud, Simple Document sur l ’Afrique par un offi­
cier attache^ à L ’armée d ’Afrique, sous le premier commande­
ment de maréchal Clausel (Paris: Herhan et Bimont, 1838),
p. 3, and; Bugeaud, Quelques reflexions sur trois questions 
fondamentales de notre établissement en Afrique (Paris; 2T~ 
Guyot et Scribe, 1846), p. 31.
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Bugeaud's decision to press for military colonies in
North Africa stemmed from earlier similar proposals for 
38
France. In 1840, he published a pamphlet in which he pro­
posed to establish cavalry farmers in France. France needed 
a large standing army for security. In peacetime, 45,000 
cavalrymen should be maintained because they could not be 
trained as quickly as infantrymen in case of a national 
emergency. The most economical way of maintaining a large 
peacetime cavalry was to place them on farms where they 
could work four or five hours per day. An agricultural 
specialist could be placed with the soldiers to teach them 
the essentials of farming. A little farming would be no 
great burden for such troops, for as Benjamin Franklin had
said, if everyone worked intelligently for two hours a day,
39they could produce everything necessary for life.
Just as Bugeaud had not originally approved of coloni­
zation in Algeria, he likewise had not believed that com­
plete subjugation was wise. By 1840, however, he was 
committed to total conquest. In a debate before the Chamber 
of Deputies, he argued that restricted occupation was chi­
merical; "While you stay in your little zone, you do not
40attack your enemy in the heart."
3 8
See above, p . 22.
39
Bugeaud, De 1'établissement des Troupes a Cheval, 
dans de grandes fermes (Paris : E. Briere 1840 ), pp. 5^7.
^^Ideville, I, 298-99.
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Bugeaud came to believe that France had three alterna­
tives vis-a-vis Algeria: abandonment, maritime occupation,
or total conquest. By presenting the above as the only 
alternatives, Bugeaud denounced his earlier policy of par­
tial occupation which he favored at the time of the Treaty 
of Tafna. Partial occupation was now denounced as an 
"illusion." Abandonment was impossible because too much 
energy had already been spent; maritime occupation was un­
feasible because there were no Gibraltars on the North 
African coast that could be guarded by a small number of 
men and supplied by sea. To seek mere maritime occupation 
would be to suffocate the European populations concentrated 
in coastal cities such as Algiers and Oran. The only feasi­
ble alternative, therefore, was absolute domination. "The 
possession of Algiers [sic] is a mistake; but as you choose 
to commit it, as it is impossible for you not to commit it, 
you must commit it grandly, for that is the only means of 
getting any profit out of it.
He then outlined his proposals. In wartime, after 
the enemy army has been defeated, it is natural to seize 
population, trade, and industrial centers. As none of the 
above existed in Algeria, the only thing worth capturing 
was the agricultural interest and this, he concluded, was 
the only way to subdue the country. Powerful troop columns, 
seven thousand strong, could be established near the desert
27
to keep the natives from sowing, reaping their harvests, 
and pasturing their cattle, and as there was no corn or
no
pasture in the desert, the Arabs would capitulate or starve.
To secure the conquest, the next step was to establish 
colonies. It mattered little whether the choice would be 
military or civilian colonies, but they must be under mili­
tary organization, for colonists must be great warriors in 
such a country. This proposal was a decisive factor in the 
ultimate decision to appoint Bugeaud Governor-General of 
Algeria, for although officials of the July Monarchy might 
not adhere to every aspect of his scheme, he was the only 
one of the generals in contention who was loyal to Louis
U 3
Philippe and had publicized a definite plan of conquest.
Six months after this speech, he was governor-general.
When the new commander arrived in Algiers (February 
1841) , he stressed again that he had initially opposed the 
complete subjugation of Algeria, but since France was com­
mitted to conquest, he was willing to conform to the desires 
of the nation. Military victory, however, was insufficient:
But the war now indispensable is not the 
object. The conquest will be barren without 
colonization. I shall therefore be an ardent 
colonizer, for I think there is less glory in 
gaining battles than in founding something of 
permanent utility for France.*+4
^^ Ibid.
‘^^Ibid., p. 301.
44 iIbid., p. 348, and; Moniteur Algerian: Journal
officiel de la colonie, 2 3 février lÔ4lT
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When asked why he moved from a lukewarm position to 
that of an ardent colonizer, he replied:
Sir, it is very agreeable and very pleasant 
for a man to marry a woman, young, rich attrac­
tive, with whom he is desperately in love. Where 
is the wonder if he behaves well to her? But 
what would you say of a man compelled to marry an 
ugly woman, poor, and uncomely, whom he could not 
abide; what would you say of that man if he . . . 
was never forgetful of any duty of any respect 
towards her? Well, sir! I will be that husband 
to Algeria, this new kind of gallant, and I will 
treat her so well, surround her with so much 
attention and love, that she shall be compelled 
to become young, attractive, and beautiful.
More interest in colonization for Algeria emerged in 
France in 1841 than ever before. On 13 August 1841, Soult 
wrote Bugeaud for advice on the subject of colonization, 
requesting the means of establishing a European population 
in Algeria with as many Frenchmen as possible, large enough 
to create economic interests and production which would 
compliment the security forces there. Soult then reviewed 
the various proposals which had already been made and re­
minded Bugeaud of the latter's opinion that military coloni­
zation could succeed and that it would prepare the way for 
true colonization. Soult was willing to agree to the ad­
vantages of this system, but dreaded the expense of such a 
project and warned Bugeaud against making commitments that 
the state could not keep. Soult then asked Bugeaud to write
h g
a detailed proposal for military colonies.
^^ideville. I, 345-46.
^Archives Nationales. Fond Colonial. Series F®®.
Soult MSS, "Sur le colonisation et l'assistance à lui prêter 
par 1 ^Administration," Soult à Bugeaud, 13 août 1841, carton 2
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Bugeaud's memoir on this subject, Des Moyens de Conser­
ver et d'utiliser Cette Conquête, included an argument for
4 7the use of both civilians and soldiers in colonies. In 
the interior and along well-established lines of communica­
tion (such as the cities of Oran and Algiers), he would 
place civilian colonists. In frontier outpost areas (such 
as Tlemcen, Mascara, Constantine and Medeah), military colo­
nists should be installed to establish an effective cordon 
which would make serious revolts almost impossible. The 
result would be an abundance of corn, fruit, oil, silk,
fuels, and cattle for colonists, and an excess for exporta­
istion to France.
Bugeaud prepared the way for his form of colonization 
through a propaganda campaign by writing pamphlets, journal 
articles, letters to influential people, and even proposing 
toasts at dinners on the benefits of his plan. The result 
of this campaign was a considerable interest in colonization. 
In ISil, a scientific expedition accompanied Bugeaud into 
the Medeah for the purpose of measuring the extent to which 
the natural resources of that area could be exploited. The 
expedition returned, praising the great forests, magnificent
U0
vineyards, and the richness of Algerian resources. In the 
*+7Bugeaud, Des moyens de conserver et d'utiliser cette 
conquête (Paris: Dentu, 1842). This is a 128 page memoir.
^^Guizot, Memoirs, VI, 396-97.
M-9Gory de Saint-Vincent, "Notice sur les travaux de la 
Commission scientifique de l'Algérie," Comptes Rendus hebdo- 
mandaires de 1'académie des sciences de Paris, XII (]uin- 
juillet, 1841), le, pp. 901-2.
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same year, three deputies, Claude Francois Philibert Tircuir 
Corcelles, Alexis Charles Henri Maurice Clerel de Tocqueville, 
and Gustave de Beaumont de la Bonninière, went to Algeria 
on a fact-finding mission. Tocqueville became ill in Algiers 
and Beaumont stayed behind with him, but Corcelles accom­
panied Bugeaud on the first expedition against Mascara, The 
two men became friends during the expedition, and Corcelles 
became a useful intermediary between Bugeaud and the Chamber 
by notifying Bugeaud who his supporters and opponents were.^^ 
Tocqueville and Beaumont, however, remained critical of 
Bugeaud's policies throughout his tenure in Algeria.
To enact his proposals for colonization, Bugeaud issued 
a circular in November, 1841, making land available to 
soldiers whose term of service was about to expire. He 
appealed personally to 800 men who were about to be dis­
charged, beseeching them to become colonists. Unfortunately 
for him, his plea was not very successful, for only 63 of 
the 800 asked to become c o l o n i s t s . B u g e a u d  justified the 
above action by stating that his predecessor, Val^e, had 
found no military colonists because he could promise them 
nothing. If a soldier had the opportunity to receive an
untransferable estate and a family, the idea of becoming a
5 2soldier-farmer might be more appealing.
^^Thureau-Dangin, V, 350-51.
S^Ideville, II, 35-6.
52
Bugeaud à Soult, 26 novembre 1841, in Démontés, p. 15.
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Undaunted by the small response, Bugeaud proceeded to 
a new colony at Harrach to inaugurate as he put it, "the 
feast of husbandry." He dismounted long enough to plow a
furrow to illustrate to the Arabs in attendance that this
5 3was not his first experience with a plow.
As soon as additional areas were conquered, steps were 
taken to establish an administrative system, build roads, 
and colonize. One good example of this in 1841 was Orle'ansville 
(El Esnam), where soldiers built roads connecting it with 
other outposts. Orleansville was established as both a mili­
tary and trading post. Natives in the area were contracted 
to build gardens, barracks, and the like, and soldiers culti­
vated the gardens.
Bugeaud had been highly critical of the administrative 
apparatus his predecessors had installed in Algeria at the 
time he became governor-general. He believed it to be dis­
organized and anarchistic. Furthermore, an administration 
based on the French one, which served a highly civilized 
society, was wrong for Algeria. There were not enough ad­
ministrators who spoke the native tongue or who understood 
Arab dustoms and laws. In the military administrative system, 
there were about thirty officers who were qualified, and in 
the civilian system, there were only four.^^
S^Ideville, II, 35-6.
^^Ibid., pp. 6 8-71.
 ^^ Bugeaud, Quelques reflexions sur trois questions . . .,
p. 28.
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In order to create a more effective administrative
system, Bugeaud re-established the Arab Bureau in August,
1841. The Bureau had been created in 18 37 by Governor-
General Damremont, but was abolished in 18 39 when it proved
5 6to be ineffective. Bugeaud looked upon the Arabs as a 
simple people to be treated kindly and equitably, forgetting 
that the conquered natives regarded Frenchmen as oppressors. 
Thus, the Arab Bureau would act in the native’s interest to 
protect them from land-hungry colonists. Besides, a direc­
tor was needed to coordinate relations among tribes and 
between the French and natives. Also, a hierarchy of command
was needed for efficiency because an effective bureau would
5 7illustrate the proof of conquest to the natives. The Arab
Bureau was to be a hierarchical system under Bugeaud's
command. Directly under the governor-general, a central
Director of Arab affairs was appointed, then provincial
directors, and on the local level, individual Arab bureaus,
first and second class, depending on the size and importance
of the district. A Code d'Indigenes was also to be drawn up
to outline procedure and complete the bureaucratization of 
5 8administration.
By 1844, Bugeaud had established Arab Bureaus in each 
division under the immediate authority of the general in
^®Azan, p. 371.
^^Ideville, II, 291, and; Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 534-35. 
5 8
Guizot, Meraîoirs, VII, 534-35. The code was put into 
effect on 1 February 1844.
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command. Duties of the bureau included settling tribal 
quarrels ; the administration of French and native justice 
(with native judges for the Arabs); the assessment and col­
lection of taxes; and, supervision of education. The army 
oriented bureaus were never popular with French colons who 
felt they were too arbitrary.
Bugeaud's tactical and strategic objectives for Algeria 
were initiated in 18*+1 and completed by 1847. They included 
the establishment of three lines of outposts. First, coastal 
ports were established for use as bases of operation for the 
army where reserves could be quickly transported from one 
province to another by sea. Second, manned posts were to 
be established in a central line between the desert and the 
coast. Third, line posts would be created in or near the 
desert to serve as bases of advanced operations for colonists, 
to aid transport to these areas, and to keep natives obedient 
in the southern r e g i o n . B y  the end of 1841, Bugeaud, in 
keeping with the above objectives, had established bases of 
operation in the central line at Medeah and Milianah in 
Algiers province, and at Mostaganem in Oran province. 
Furthermore, he improved communication links between camps, 
requisitioned mules from France, and increased the meat
g T
ration for his soldiers.
^^Azan, p. 371.
^^Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 518. 
^^Azan, pp. 212-13.
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The serious rift between Bugeaud and the War Ministry 
which plagued him throughout his tenure in Algeria was 
developing by the fall of 1841. Bugeaud complained to Guizot 
that Governor-General Valee had obtained everything he re­
quested, but that he had been unable to acquire anything. 
"People think that we have done little because we have not 
drawn up pompous reports of trifling engagements. But they 
ought to know that we cannot have battles of Austerlitz in 
Africa, and that the great merit of this war consists not 
in gaining victories, but in sustaining with patience and
6 2firmness, fatigue, inclemency of climate, and privations." 
Although Bugeaud denied it, his bulletins about the progress 
of the war were as exaggerated as his predecessor's.
Bugeaud complained to Soult of poor planning and little 
understanding of the Algerian campaign on the part of the 
French government, and that he could not carry out the mis­
sion of conquest and colonization without sufficient troops 
and money. The lack of understanding toward the natives had 
resulted in the emergence of Arab nationalism which made the 
conquest even more difficult. To achieve his mission, Bugeaud 
believed he needed a permanent army with military posts,
depots, money, a tax system, and a simply organized, but
6 3
functioning government for Algeria.
62 V
Bugeaud a Guizot, 6 novembre 1841, in GuizOt,
Memoirs, VI, 88-90.
^^Bugeaud a Soult, 26 novembre 1841, in Démontés, p. 23,
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Bugeaud and Soult often openly disagreed, and by 1842,
Soult warned Bugeaud that he was considering the reduction
of the Algerian force due to criticism from deputies and
journalists on expenditures in Algeria. Bugeaud reacted by
publishing a brochure arguing against the reduction of the
Algerian force. This pamphlet only served to intensify the
rift between Soult and Bugeaud, for the War Minister consi-
64dered Bugeaud's action an act of insubordination.
Despite the unfavorable reaction of many to his 
appointment, the lack of agreement as to long-range objec­
tives between Bugeaud and officials such as Guizot, and the 
ever-widening gap between the governor-general and the war 
ministry, great progress was made in Bugeaud's first year 
of command. The French army had taken the offensive and 
robbed Abd el Kader of the initiative.
On 27 November, 1941, Bugeaud wrote to Guizot that 
the campaign was far from finished, but he believed the 
most difficult work was accomplished. Most of the Arab 
depots of war had been destroyed, their best, most fertile 
districts had been captured, and firm bases had been esta­
blished by French troops in the interior. Bugeaud also 
believed that Abd el Kader, now on the defensive, had lost 
the respect of his countrymen. The French had proved 
false Abd el Kader's statement: " . . .  they the French
resemble fishes. They can only live by the sea; their war
^^Thureau-Dangin, V, 350.
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6 5has a short range and they cannot reach you."
Bugeaud responded:
We have this year penetrated to their most 
remote haunts, which has stricken the populations 
with, consternation. We are also beginning to 
find allies. . . .  We have reason to believe that 
the defection of the South will spread; the sub­
mission of that portion of the Douars and Smelas 
which had always remained faithful to the Emir, 
and was composed of the most fanatical families, 
is an important event, since in addition to four 
hundred horsemen which we have gained, it is an 
excellent symptom of the enfeeblement of the 
Arab chief.G6
Tackdempt, Saida, Boghar, and Thaza, all important
enemy holdings, were captured in 1841. Bugeaud had begun
the year with, sword in hand and ended it by driving a plow
6 7on the banks of the Harrach. The old warrior realized 
the task was far from finished, but he believed the worst 
was over. In fact, his struggle had only begun, for al­
though. many French military victories would follow, Bugeaud's 
plans for colonization would encounter stiff resistance in 
France.
®^Guizot, Meinoirs, VI, 39 3.
^^Bugeaud à Guizot, 27 novembre 1841, ibid.
G?Ideville, II, 35-6.
Chapter III 
1842: A NEW IMPULSE TO COLONIZE
Eighteen Forty-Two was a year of considerable impulse 
for colonization as more work was done in that year in the 
interests of colonization than in the previous twelve years 
of French presence in Algeria. Nine new villages were com­
pleted in 1842 and many more initiated.^ Moreover, Bugeaud 
presented his first formal proposal for agricultural colo­
nies in 1842 by expanding his reply to Soult's request in 
the previous year for advice on colonization in Algeria.
The result was the publication of 1*Algérie: Des Moyens de
Conserver et d ’Utiliser cette Conquête (Paris: Dentu, 1842)
It was also published due to a new source of concern for 
Bugeaud— the demand for the reduction of troop strength in 
Algeria. The feeling that the conquest was virtually over 
and that so many troops in North Africa were an unnecessary 
expense came from debates in the Chamber and was even evi- 
dent in the correspondence of the Minister of War.
Bugeaud’s pamphlet caused considerable reaction and 
prompted many to express their views on the type of coloni­
zation to be used in the new French territory. Soult was 
outraged by the publication for he considered it an act of 
insubordination on Bugeaud's part. Guizot felt that Soult's
^Ideville, II, 47.
2
See, for example. Le National, 31 janvier, 14 février 
1842; Ideville, II, 90-91; Demonte's, pp. 178-79.
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anger was justified, but did not reprimand Bugeaud in any 
way until late in 1842.^
In l'Algérie: Des Moyens de Conserver et d'Utiliser
cette Conquête, Bugeaud argued that the conquest had ad­
vanced to a point where it was essential to consider how 
best to profit from it. First, he argued with those wî^ 
would reduce the size of the army after the conquest w5s 
completed, for the natives of Algeria understood only force 
and would be in constant rebellion without the presence of 
a large army. While the army was providing this preventive 
service, it could prepare the way for colonization by con­
structing roads, railroads, and bridges. Each batallion 
could be given the task of constructing a village and pre­
paring land for cultivation which could be given to libera­
ted soldiers who wished to remain in North Africa. He also 
hinted that infantrymen in France not indispensable to the 
protection of the fatherland could be sent to Algeria to 
serve as auxiliaries in the villages. They could be sent 
back to France quickly if they were needed there.^
Bugeaud then presented the case for military over 
civilian colonists because the former were much better dis­
ciplined, an essential factor in Algeria. He promised not 
to impose Prussian military discipline on his soldier-faraers,
^Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 140. See below, p. 4 8 for 
Guizot's reprimand.
4Thomas Robert Bugeaud, L'Algérie: Des moyens de con­
server et d'utiliser cette conqulte (Paris: Dentu, 1842).
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but he did not feel it unreasonable in such a menacing land 
to place them under the command of an army officer, and to 
require them to be familiar with basic field tactics and be 
good marksmen. Moreover, military colonization need not be 
permanent, for by the time the original soldier-farmers 
retired, perhaps their offspring would not be threatened 
by the Arab. Algeria need not be colonized exclusively by 
the military, for civilians could settle in safe areas while 
military settlements could be located in areas most suscept­
ible to Arab attack.^
The type of government and administration chosen would 
also have a considerable affect on French Algeria. Bugeaud 
argued that he would favor the creation of a civilian govern­
ment if there were a half-million European settlers there, 
but only 40,000 Europeans resided in Algeria in 1842, and 
most of them were in Algiers and four other villages along 
the coast (Oran, Mostaganem, Philippeville, and B o n e ) O n  
the other hand, there were 75,000 soldiers in Algeria who 
functioned as warriors and laborers. Because the military 
was the only group capable of providing such services in the
foreseeable future, it was logical to have a military govern- 
7
ment,
A hostile native population was another reason for 
military government as such people could be controlled only
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
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by military men. A military governor, familiar with civil­
ian laws and needs could serve and protect civilian colonists 
as fairly and efficiently as a civilian governor.
In order to prove that his arguments were rational, 
Bugeaud undertook the first practical attempts at military 
colonization in Algeria in 1842 with the founding of nine 
villages. With the excuse that he had no civilians at his 
disposal, Bugeaud filled the new villages with soldiers.
Three of these villages were located near Algiers. Fouka 
was settled by soldiers whose service-term had expired while 
Mared and Maelma were populated with soldiers who still had 
three years to serve and who would be completely free at the 
end of the three-year period. While they remained in active 
service, they would do their work on a collective basis, the 
land being held in common. After their term of service ex­
pired, the land would be divided among them. General Bugeaud 
stressed communal farming because he believed that only a 
combined group effort could assure success. Rugged individ­
ualism in Algeria was not sufficient to guarantee a success-
9
ful colony.
Each of the villages established in 1842 was to be
self-sustaining. The ultimate objective was to cover the
country with small villages since massive concentrations in
10any one place were unnecessary.
^Ibld.
^Démontés, p. 353.
^°Ideville, I, 355.
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As soon as additional areas were pacified, more settle­
ments were established. Soldiers built roads connecting new 
villages with other outposts, and natives in the area were 
hired to clear land for gardens, build barracks and other 
essentials. Soldiers cultivated the gardens until the vil­
lage was ready for the soldisr-colcnists.
The Governor-General believed that a soldier-colonist 
with a family had the best potential for remaining on the 
land permanently. Therefore, while awaiting a general mea­
sure for putting his plan into effect, he created the mili­
tary villages mentioned above. He then asked the mayor of 
Toulan to find wives for his colonists. Soldiers would be 
allowed to go to France to marry, and as soon as they were
married, the government would pay the expenses for the return
12trip and provide the necessary household furnishings.
Critics of Bugeaud's plan appeared immediately. They
agreed that the family was paramount to the success of any
colony, but hasty marriages were not conducive to family
solidarity. Maréchal Soult and a majority in the Chamber
of Deputies opposed Bugeaud's experiments, but among the
most hostile opponents was the government loan commission
Ccommission des credits), which believed the plan to be
financially unsound. Even Guizot, the Governor-General's
13chief supporter in the ministry, opposed the idea.
l^Ibid., II, 68-71.
^ ^ Thureau-Dangin, VI, 368. 
l^Ibid., p. 369.
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Bugeaud’s experimental colonies put pressure on the 
Soult-Guizot Ministry to make a decision on colonization.
The result was the creation, in the Spring of 1842, of a 
Commission of Colonization, named by the Minister of War to 
consider military colonies as a possibility for Algeria.
The commission of six included four officers and two civil­
ians.^^ This appeared to be a fair and competent group to 
study and evaluate Biageaud’s proposals, especially since 
military men dominated the committee and would not likely 
reject the idea of military colonies without serious consi­
deration .
On 3 June 1842, the commission presented its first 
report, suggesting that Bugeaud's military colonization 
would have been fit for conditions the Romans might have con­
fronted or for contemporary Russian social conditions, but 
this type of colonization was incompatable to French civili­
zation. The commission admitted that it would be proper for 
the military to prepare the way for colonization by render­
ing land fit for cultivation, and that it would be appropriate 
to give such land to soldiers who had been released from 
active service as their military experience would help them 
to protect their colony. This however, declared the commis­
sion, was not the same as military colonization, and was as
^^Demont^s, pp. 167-68. The officers on the Commis­
sion were Generals Schramm, de Berthois, Lyautey, and 
Bellonet. The civilians were Desmousseaux de Givre, a 
deputy, and M. Lingay, a maitre des requêtes.
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far as they wished to progress toward it. Thus, the commis­
sion favored Bugeaud's suggestion of giving soldiers whose 
term of service was complete every opportunity to settle in 
Algeria, but they rejected Bugeaud's bid for military colo­
nies by refusing to sanction the use of soldiers or to any 
militaristic organization in the colonies.
The liberal press continued its barrage of criticism 
against governmental policy in Algeria throughout 1842. Le 
National called for a real plan of colonization to replace 
Bugeaud's speculative experimentation. There were many 
young, unemployed engineers and geographers in France who 
should be sent to Algeria to prepare the way for coloniza­
tion.^®
In February, two articles appeared in Le National by
General Franciade-Fleurus Duvivier (1794-1848), who suggested
that colonists should own the land and that the governor
should be a civilian. The army could remain in Algeria to
protect the colonist from the Arab because the latter would
never keep the peace without the presence of force. The
colonist should cooperate with the soldier to complete the
17conquest and to defend it afterwards. In the following
^®"Rapport du 3 juin 1842, fair par le Sous-Commission 
a la Commission plenière," as cited in ibid., p. 16 8.
^®Le National, 31 janvier 1842.
^^Le National, 14, 18 février 1842.
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month, Le National chided Guizot for allegedly gaining the
permission of the English to keep Algeria, and challenged
his right to seek British approval of a project that con-
18cerned only the French.
The editors of Le National rejected military coloni­
zation because of the problem of transferring ownership of 
the land to individual soldier-colonists once their term of 
service had expired, and even questioned the legality of 
taking land from the Arabs in order to establish colonies.
These journalists concluded that other means of colonizing 
19
must be found.
Several anonymous articles appeared in the reform-
minded journal. Le Siècle, in 1842. The author asked why
it was necessary to maintain an 80,000 man army in Algeria
if it were true as Bugeaud maintained that the Arabs had
been defeated. Now was the time to consider the question
of colonization and colonists would only suffer from military
rule since their civil rights were always cast aside under
such regimes. Hence, military and arbitary rule should be
20withdrawn from Algeria.
18Le National., 6 mars 1842. Apparently this charge re­
sulted from an article in Le Moniteur, January 20, 1842, in 
which Aberdeen was quoted as saying to Guizot: "I therefore 
look upon your position in Africa as a fait accompli, against 
which I have no further objection to make." Aberdeen to 
Guizot, as cited in Swain, pp. 126-27.
19
Le National, 21 septembre 1842.
o n
Demontd's, pp. 178-79 . Le Siècle supported the idea 
of constitutional monarchy, but stood for liberal reforms 
such as the extension of the franchise.
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Interest in colonization reached a point in 1842 where 
a number of men began openly to express their opinions about 
North Africa. For example, Lieutenant A. 6. Rozey, an offi­
cial of the Colonial Society and a member of the Algerian 
citizen militia, spoke to the Chamber of Deputies and blamed 
the failure of the French conquest on governmental instabil­
ity and so many new governors, each having a different sys­
tem. The Muslim would accept French suzerainty only when he 
became convinced of French determination to remain in Algeria.
He then denounced as unsound Bugeaud's plans for military 
21colonization.
In July, Le National published a letter written by a 
civilian colon in Algeria, Michot de Vernoux. Claiming to 
represent a great number of colons, he complained of Bugeaud's 
arbitrary rule in Algeria. He claimed that Bugeaud threatened 
Rozey with deportation if he did not refrain from his criti­
cal remarks. He went on to accuse Bugeaud of violating 
orders, laws and court decisions. The angry colon charged 
that Bugeaud was not satisfied to work for the general domina­
tion of Algeria, but that he wanted to take complete posses­
sion of the country through his particular scheme of
^^A. 6. Rozey, Memoirs aux Chambre Legislative;
Esquisse rapide et historique sur l'administration de 
l'Algërie depuis 1830, et sur la direction qu'y donne le 
Général bugeaud, etc. (Marseille, Marius Olive, 1842), 6-7.
In Tracts Relating to Algeria, 1834-1848, British Museum.
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cultivation and colonization and was willing to use arbi-
2 2
trary rule to achieve this.
Bugeaud was not without supporters in 1842. Jean 
Franqois Albert de Pouget, Marquis de Nadaillac, presenting 
his views on the subject, suggested that the chief respon­
sibility for failure to achieve objectives in Algeria was 
not the fault of the military or the governor. The fault
was the Chamber of Deputies because this body had not
2 3granted enough men or funds to assure the conquest.
Adolph Thiers, a critic of the Soult-Guizot Ministry, 
but a champion of Algerian conquest, broke his silence of 
more than one year on the Algerian question, and spoke to 
the Chamber of Deputies on 4 April 1842. He favored com­
plete conquest, the maintenance of existing troop strength, 
and colonization for he said he had always been convinced 
that the only way to seriously attack Arab nationalism was 
for France to become master of Africa. For the time being, 
Thiers chose not to become involved in the dispute over the 
type of settlements Algeria should have, and made no mention 
of military or civilian colonies. He was most concerned at 
the time with the_necessity of constructing a port at 
Algiers, This, he believed, would help the conquest by pro­
viding easy access to arriving troops and colonists and
9 9
Michot de Vernoux a rédacteur de Le National, 18 
juillet 1842.
95
elating to Algeria, 1834-1848, British Museum.
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would make Algiers easier to defend In case of attack from
the sea. Thiers also used the occasion of his speech to
condemn the ministry for Its Inertia In dealing with the 
24
war In Algeria.
Bugeaud, encouraged by Thiers ' speech, wrote to Thiers 
to convince him of the correctness of his campaign, and in­
vited the politician to visit Algeria. The Governor-General 
assured Thiers that his mobile warfare had triumphed over 
the Arabs and that the serious war was over. To conserve 
and utilize the conquest, military government was the only 
way to control a people whose customs and religion were so 
different from French practices. The army was the only In­
stitution capable of the great work of dominating the country, 
opening commercial routes, and accelerating colonization. He 
sought Thiers' help In assuring that this work would be con­
tinued .
The general also continued to seek the support of hla 
mainstay In the cabinet, Francois Guizot. Guizot wrote to 
Bugeaud in September 1842, and pledged his continued confi­
dence and support and stated his belief that the public was 
beginning to rely upon Bugeaud’s skill in conducting the 
African campaign (there is little evidence to support this).
24
Adolph Thiers, "Discours sur le Port d'Alger Pro­
nonces le 4 avril 1842 à la Chambre des D^put^s," Discours 
parlementaires de M. Thiers (Paris: Calmann, 1880), VI,
84-98. :
25
Bugeaud to Thiers, 27 juin 1842. Bibliothèque 
Nationale MSS. Nouv. Acq. fr. 20.616, folio Ë3.
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Guizot's letter reveals some impatience with the General for 
he scolded Bugeaud for publishing Des Moyens de Conserver et 
d'utiliser cette Conquête» and reminded him that deeds were 
more authoritative than words. Again, Guizot insisted that 
the work of securing and completing the military campaign 
should come first, then territorial establishments could be
considered. He was convinced of the necessity of military
* 26 action in Algeria while Europe remained at peace.
Bugeaud responded to Guizot's letter, maintaining that 
he wrote not to glorify his deeds, but to prevent the reduc­
tion of the army in Africa, and argued that Soult's indigna­
tion over the publication of such material was unwarranted
27and that Soult had no right to admonish him publicly.
To prevent the publication of subsequent polemics,
Soult ordered military personnel to refrain from publishing
2 A
their views in pamphlets or newspapers. Bugeaud avoided 
the ban, however, by publishing articles anonymously. For 
example, an anonymous letter appeared in Le National in 
December which disclaimed the accusations made against the 
Bugeaud administration in Algeria, and complained of the
2 6
Guizot to Bugeaud, 20 septembre 1842, in Guizot, 
Meirioirs, VII, 140-41.
^^Bugeaud to Guizot, 18 October 1842, in Ideville, II, 
50-51. Bugeaud's reference to Soult's public admonishments 
probably refers to an article in the Moniteur parisien 
accusing Bugeaud of being undisciplined and having little 
propriety. ' '
O Q
Le National, 28 decembre 1842.
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prejudiced views of Le National's North African reporter.
The arguments and style of this letter are unquestionably 
29
Bugeaud's .
On another occasion, Bugeaud openly defied Soult's 
orders by writing a letter to the editor of the Siècle, 
accusing Alexis de Tocqueville of presenting an unfair assess­
ment of the Algerian campaign. Since Tocqueville had 
appeared once only briefly on the coast of North Africa
(twenty days), he was incompetent to make public statements
30
about North Africa. Bugeaud believed that Tocqueville had
written a series of anonymous articles criticizing the
Algerian campaign. In fact, it proved not to be Tocqueville,
31but his colleague, Gustave de Beaumont.
As the debates over conduct of the war and the future 
of Algeria increased in intensity, Bugeaud lost an important 
supporter. More significantly, the security of the Orldanist 
dynasty was shaken by an unfortunate accident. The Crown 
Prince, Ferdinand-Philippe, due d'Orl^ans (1810-1842), was 
killed in a carriage accident on 13 July on the road to 
Neuilly. The due d'Orleans had been the most active and 
popular of Louis Philippe's children. A younger brother, 
Francois-Ferdinand-Philippe-Louis-Marie d'Orleans, Prince 
de Joinville (1818-1900), bemoaned the loss, suggesting that
^^ibid.
^^Bugeaud a rédacteur du Siècle, 14 decembre 1842.
^^Demontes, p. 180. See above, p. 44 for the content 
of de Beaumont's letters.
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the royal family had looked to Orle'ans for advice and hinted 
of the senility of his seventy-year-old father. The Crown 
Prince had been the chef de demain to all Orleanist suppor­
ters.^^
The death of the due d'Orleans was a loss to Bugeaud 
because the prince had championed the cause of the military.
He believed the military was the vanguard of French civili­
zation and colonization. The African army had seen him in
3 3action and regarded him highly.
With the death of the king's eldest son, two younger 
brothers, Joinville and Henri-Eugene-Philippe-Louis d'Orleans, 
due d'Aumale (1822-1897), partially filled the void, for 
both sought glory in battle. Joinville, an admiral in the 
French navy, would play a role in the bombardment of Tangiers
Oh
in 184-5, and Aumale saw considerable action in Algeria.
Both influenced the development of French Algeria, but they 
lacked the charismatic quality of their deceased brother and 
the royal family never regained the glitter d'Orleans had 
provided.
32 /François-Ferdinand-Philippe-Louis-Marie d'Orleans,
Prince de Joinville, Memoirs (Vieux souvenirs) of the Prince
de Joinville. Trans. Lady Mary Loyd (New York and London:
Macmillan, 1895), pp. 236-37.
^^Ferdinand-Philippe, due d'Orleans, cited in ibid., 
pp. 239-40.
34-See below, Chapters Four and Five, for the role these 
men played in the development of Algeria.
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Both Aumale and Joinville viewed Algeria as a place 
to win glory for themselves and their family, and thus to
q c
strengthen the foundations of the dynasty.
Although Aumale had seen some action in Algeria prior 
to 1842, he played no important role until he returned there 
in October 1842 as a general. Aumale favored military colo­
nies, for he believed that soldier-farmers, organized in 
legions and established in the heart of Algeria, could build 
roads, houses, and cultivate the land. The continued pres­
ence of such soldiers would maintain peace after civilian 
colonists came. Ultimately the best means of colonization 
would be to fuse military, civilian, and Arab colonists to­
gether.
Aumale depended upon his old tutor, Alfred-Auguste 
Cuvillier-Fleury to keep him informed of important events 
and opinion at home while he was in Algeria. Cuvillier- 
Fleury wrote to Aumale in 1842 and hinted at the royal 
family’s dissatisfaction with Bugeaud because he did not 
provide ample news of the campaign to the king or the minis­
try. Cuvillier-Fleury urged Aumale to provide good, objec­
tive news of the campaign and cautioned his pupil to be 
patient and to keep his ideas on colonization to himself
^^Henri Eugene Philippe Louis d'Orleans, due d ’Aumale, 
Correspondance du Duc d ’Aumale et de Cuvillier-Fleury (Paris: 
Pion, 1910), I, pp. v-vi. Alfred-Auguste Civillier-Fleury 
was Aumale’s tutor and adviser.
^ I^bid.
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since he doubted the government had the force to accomplish
such objectives, especially since the chances for success
37of such plans were so contestable. He also warned Aumale
that there was still a large opposition party to the grande
3 8
occupation in the Chamber of Deputies.
Aumale seemed anxious to get on well with Bugeaud
39and wanted to be treated as any other officer of his rank. 
Considering their temperaments and Aumale's status as a mem­
ber of the Royal Family, the two men got along quite well. 
Aumale, only twenty years old in 1842, realized that there 
was much to be learned from Bugeaud. He believed that Bugeaud 
had been the most successful of the governor-generals to date 
for he had accomplished more in his brief tenure than all of 
his predecessors. Aumale admitted that Bugeaud had his 
faults, that he lacked perspicacity and tact, but he was an 
active, energetic, serious man of integrity; ". . . j 'ai 
pour lui [Bugeaud] une haute estime et une affection sin­
cère.
^^Cuvillier-Fleury à Aumale, 26 janvier 1843, ibid., 
pp. 198-104.
go .
Cuvillier-Fleury a Aumale 16 février 1843, ibid., 
pp. 111-15.
39 V
Aumale a Soult, 25 septembre 1842, Nicolas Jean de 
Dieu Soult Maréchal Soult; Correspondance politique et 
familière avec Louis Philippe et la Famille Royale par Louis 
et Antoinette Saint Pierre (Paris; Pion, 1959), pp. 199-200.
40 N
Aumale a Cuvillier-Fleury, 2 janvier et 4 février 
1843, Correspondance du Duc d'Aumale, I, 91-95; 109-11.
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There was considerable friction between old and young 
officers in Algeria by 1842. The quarrel seemed to be based 
on age and experience, for while many of the elder officers 
had battle experience from previous campaigns, the young 
officers experienced their first combat in Algeria. One 
young officer. Colonel Francois-Joseph-Lucien de Montagnac, 
complained of these "famous relics" who were tormented by 
jealousy and would never consider following the advice of 
younger men such as Changarnier, Louis-Christophe-Leon 
Juchault de Lamoricière (1808-1865), and Marie-Alphonse 
Bedeau (1804-1863).
The animosity between old and young officers intensi­
fied during Bugeaud’s term as governor-general as the com= 
mander-in-chief was regarded as one of the "relics" while 
most of his subordinates were of the younger class. This
hostility was more obvious by 1843 and must be taken into
42account in considering the destiny of Algeria. The ill- 
will among the officers, instability of the Algerian mili­
tary administration, and the fact that patronage was still 
in existence caused significant changes of command for the 
French army in the various provinces of Algeria. This lack 
of continuity hindered the campaign. The turnover was so
^^Montagnac a Elizé^ de Montagnac, 22 novembre 1842, in 
François Joseph Lucien de Montagnac, Lettres d ’un soldat, 
neuf années de campagne en Afrique, correspondance inéditës 
du colonal de Montagnac publiés par son neveu E. de Montagnac 
(Paris: E. Pion, Nourrit et C^®, 1885), pp. 274-7 5.
42
See below, Chapter Four.
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considerable it prompted Montagnac to comment: "L'Afrique
Il 3
est un veritable kaleidoscope."
Despite the growing flood of criticism and signs of 
unrest among the officer corps, progress was made in Algeria 
in 1842. By the end of the year, the province of Tittery as 
far as the desert was conquered. In the Kabyles as far as 
Tenez, tribes were organized under a chieftain loyal to 
France, and in the Atlas region, Oran, Tlemcen, Mascara, and 
Mostagenem were secured. Newly built bridges, roads, and 
the like insured lines of communication.^^
Abd el Kader, the elusive Arab chieftain, had lost 
most of his strongholds by the end of the year, but he re­
mained at bay and continued to harass and frustrate the 
French.
Also, by 1842, some feared the symptoms of an oft- 
repeated phenomenon in French history were present— the 
possibility that a man on horseback would rebel against 
civil authority. General Duvivier warned:
Eat-il d ’un bon calcul politique de mettre 
une si grande armee k la disposition d'un gén­
éral investi, en ce qui le concerne, de tous les 
pouvoirs de Gouverneur et de tous ceux que les 
lois donnent dans de certaines circonstances?
Car ce n'est pas là une arm^e agissant prés d'une 
frontière territoriale, c'est une arme'e isolee 
de nous, couverte pas la mer, ayant à sa dispo­
sition un royaume inabordable, muni de tout ce
,^^Montagnac, as cited in Azan, L"Armee d'Afrique de 
1830 a 1852, p. 356.
44
Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 522-23.
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q u ’il nouvelles il pourrait répondre, quelles
alliances il pourrait accepter?
As the year came to an end, Bugeaud prepared for bat­
tle against what he considered the new enemy. The most 
formidable foes were no longer in Algeria, but in Paris. 
These opponents, in Bugeaud's mind, served no useful pur­
pose and cast shadows on everything he tried to accomplish 
by alienating the public and even inspiring doubts in the 
minds of Louis Philippe and his ministers. "These speeches 
come to me, and I sometimes see traces of them in the offi­
cial correspondence. I am in a rage; but what can be done? 
I console myself by thinking that generals have always been 
subject to such mortifications."^^
il5
Franciade-Fleurus Duvivier, Quatorze Observations 
sur le dernier mémoires du general Bugeaud (Paris; 1842), 
p. 82.
II, 52.
^^Bugeaud to Gardère, 12 November 1842, in Ideville,
Chapter IV
1843: THE ENEMY: ABD EL KADER OR LES BEDOUINS
DE PARIS?
II [Bugeaud] ne pouvait pas supporter les 
piqûres de la presse, et la presse, qui connais­
sait cette susceptibilité', en abusait. Que de 
fois l’ai-je vu, arrivant, le soit, sous la 
tente d'Yusuf, en froissant dans sa mains des 
coupures de journaux! La moindre attaque le 
mettait hors de lui. Ni prières, ni remon­
strances, ni ordres formels du ministre ne pou­
vaient l ’empêcher de sauter sur son encrier et 
de pepondre aux journalistes avec leurs propres 
armes.1
Bugeaud had become so vexed with opposition journalists 
by 1843 that he was convinced his most formidable enemy was 
not Abd el Kader, but the liberal and republican press in 
Paris, which he referred to as les Bedouins de Paris. Such 
journalistic critics only rendered Bugeaud more uncompro-
2
mising and more determined to see his objectives triumph.
Despite mounting criticism from the opposition and 
signs of disaffection within the Ministry, Bugeaud con­
tinued to press for military colonies. In Janjjary 1843, he 
proposed that 6,000 soldier-farmers begin the general pro­
cess of military colonization. One-half of these colonists 
would be sent to Oran province, rhe other half to Algiers
^François Charles du Barail, Mes Souvenirs (Paris:
Plon, 1894), I, 219.
2
Maurice Andrieux, Le Pere Bugeaud, 1784-1849)(Paris: 
Plon 1951 ), pp. 218-21.
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province. He estimated the cost per colonist and family
3
for a three-year period to be 1500 francs.
h
The military commission appointed by Marshal Soult 
condemned the proposal as impractical and unrealistic. It 
would be too costly and was premature in 1843.^ Bugeaud 
admitted that the members of the commission who rejected 
his proposal were men of spirit and talent, but none of them 
knew Africa as he did. He therefore denounced the committee, 
complaining that it was not enough that he had to struggle 
against material difficulties which dogged each step, he 
also had to struggle against superficial writers, orators 
and men such as the military commissioners who were not in 
a position to make realistic judgements on such vast and 
important questions. In the same letter, he admitted that 
perhaps the expression of such ideas were not proper for a 
Governor-General of Algeria, but he assured Soult that his 
views were based on profound convictions and ardent patri-
7
otism. He also warned Soult that he would continue the 
struggle despite all odds, for his convictions were so 
strong that he was prepared to make personal sacrifices and
^Démontés, pp. 166-73.
1).
See above. Chapter Three.
^Démontés, pp. 166-73.
^Bugeaud à Soult, 1 avril 1843, Archives du ministère 
de la Guerre. Section outre-mer. Algérie. Correspondance, 
carton 89.
^Ibid.
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g
endure a long struggle to achieve his objectives. In 
effect, Bugeaud served notice that he intended to besiege 
the War Minister until the latter granted his wishes.
Undaunted by the rebuff of the military commission, 
Bugeaud continued the fight for military colonies. In the 
Spring of 1843, he boasted to Thiers that he had already 
founded three new settlements in that year, the most signi­
ficant being Orleansville (El Esnam). He also tried to 
persuade Thiers that cutting back on troop strength in 
Algeria, a subject of much discussion in 1843, would be dis­
astrous . Many advocated the reduction of troops for pur­
poses of economy since so many troops were no longer needed 
for the military campaign, but Bugeaud argued that these 
troops could be used as soldier-farmers and would be the 
most economical form of colonizing and securing Algeria.
In the past two years, he had carried out a successful mili­
tary campaign, doubled the European population in North 
Africa, doubled colonial revenues, more than tripled trade 
and commerce, and built roads, bridges, and villages. To 
Bugeaud, this was ample proof of the efficacy of his system. 
He urged Thiers to speak out in favor of military coloniza­
tion and against the reduction of troops: "Vous vous melez
peu d'affaires publiques; vous écrivez. Si les affaires
®Ibid.
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sont priveras de votre intelligence, la France aura du moins
g
une bonne histoire de l ’Empire.”
He also wrote a lengthy letter to Soult to persuade 
the Minister that saving money was an inadequate justifica­
tion for the reduction of troops in North Africa. If the 
Algerian budget had been less, he argued, would the popula­
tion and revenues of Algeria have doubled in the past two 
years? Would several thousand Arabs have been obedient to 
the laws of France, and could colonies have been created to 
extend from Algiers southward to the desert? Such accom­
plishments would not have been possible without adequate 
funds and troops.
To critics who accused him of betraying public opinion 
by pressing for the unpopular military colonies, Bugeaud 
replied that it was he who had been betrayed many times for 
he knew Algeria a thousand times better than his critics and
was much better qualified to plan the future of this French 
11colony. To the charges of despotism in Algeria under his 
administration, Bugeaud maintained that liberty in Algiers 
was more real and positive than in Paris, since men were 
relatively free to create their own existence in Algiers and
g
Bugeaud to Thiers, 5 avril 1843. Bibliothèque Nation­
al MSS. Nouv. Acq. fr. 20.616, folios 151 a 153.
^^Bugeaud a Soult, 1 avril 1843, Archives du Ministère 
de la Guerre, Section outre-mer.Algérie. Correspondance, 
carton 89.
^^Demontés, p. 182.
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there was no need for anyone to be concerned with politics,
12or be tormented by false ideas and absurd theories.
In September 1843, Bugeaud informed Soult that sold 
âisuB should at least be used to prepare the way for civilian 
colonization. He requested that six batallions be placed 
at the disposal of a Director of the Interior for the pur­
pose of constructing villages, as soldiers could do this
13work more cheaply and quickly than civilian workers. Mili­
tary colonies were essential because the Arab would not re­
main peaceful unless soldiers were present: "A warlike
people cannot be influenced, or a portion of their land 
seized and kept, without keeping the sword in sight after 
it has been bravely used."^^
In considering why Bugeaud was so assailed by the press, 
it is important to remember that most of his opponents were 
journalists who were liberal or republican in sentiment.
Such men not only disapproved of Bugeaud’s policies in 
Algeria, they opposed the July Monarchy (liberals or the 
"dynastic left" advocated reforms ; the republicans wished 
to abolish the monarchy). Thus, much of the criticism heaped 
on Bugeaud by the opposition was because he belonged to the 
establishment, and as military commander of a campaign never 
supported in toto by the French people, he was especially
l^ibid.
^^Azan, I'Arm^e d'Afrique de 1830 à 1862, p. 367.
lU
Ideville, II, 90-91.
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vulnerable to attack. Furthermore, Bugeaud's personality 
made him more susceptible to criticism. Barail maintained 
that one of Bugeaud's greatest weaknesses was his belief in 
his incontestable superiority over o t h e r s . B e c a u s e  of 
this, he could not tolerate criticism from peers or subor­
dinates, much less from writers and politicians with whom 
he disagreed on ideological grounds. This intolerance led 
to a hatred of the liberal and republican press.
Bugeaud's fiery invectives to the press merely added 
fuel to the fire. When Le National charged him of writing 
brochures to justify his actions, Bugeaud wrote a letter to 
the editor of the Siècle denying that he ever responded to 
critics by writing brochures or by taking any other action,
and that he was responsible only to the Ministry for his ideas
16
for Algeria. This letter was published by at least three
newspapers. While Le National and Siècle interpreted the
letter as the action of a childish old man, the Journal Des
Debats supported Bugeaud and condemned the liberal press for
17its unfounded criticisms.
Guizot believed the press attacked Bugeaud as a means 
of criticizing the Soult-Guizot Ministry. He was particularly
ISgarail, I, 219.
^^Bugeaud à M, le Rédacteur en chef du Siècle, 10 
janvier 1843; Le National 19 janvier 1843.
^^Le Siècle, 10 janvier 1843; Le National, 19 janvier 
1843; Journal des Débats, 19 janvier 1843.
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vexed at the charge that Bugeaud’s primary objectives were
to declare his administration independent of the Ministry
18and to dismember the French Empire.
Other common charges included: the campaign was tak­
ing too long; Bugeaud did not delegate enough authority to 
his subordinates; and so much time with the army on campaign 
resulted in an ineffective administration.^^
Despite his infamous relationship with certain French 
journals, the Governor-General was occasionally praised for 
his actions in other journals. Two articles appeared in the 
Journal des Deiaats in 1843 supporting Bugeaud’s military
colonies and praising the general as an able administrator
20who combined a knowledge of war and agriculture.
Bugeaud also used certain publications to his advan­
tage. This was especially true of the official journal of 
Algeria, the Moniteur Algérien. In December 1843, a lengthy 
article bore only the signature, ”Un Touriste,” but is un­
questionably Bugeaud’s. Bugeaud used the Socratic method 
of asking questions and subjecting the answers to logical 
analysis. A tourist asked questions which were answered by 
an officer. When the tourist asked whether the war could 
not be won without the barbarous razzias, the officer replied
1 ft
Guizot, Mémoires, VII, 193-94.
^^Andrieux, p. 220.
^^Dureau de la Malle, ”Sur la colonisation de 1 ’Algérie,” 
Journal des Debats, 15 janvier 1843.
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that war did not merely involve the destruction of the oppo­
sing army, but always included an attack on the interests 
of the people. Because the Arabs were nomads, the French 
found nothing to destroy except their harvests. Thus the 
razzia was the most useful weapon the French possessed.
The officer alleged that it was cruel to accuse the Army of 
Africa of barbarous actions after all it had contributed to 
Algeria (courage, suffering of privations and fatigue). Of 
course, the tourist went away convinced of the usefulness
of the campaign, vowing henceforth to be a staunch defender
21of the French forces in North Africa.
It was evident by 1843 that not only was Bugeaud
opposed by many journalists, but also that many within the
military were hostile to him. Bugeaud and Soult had not
gotten on well. The old Marshal considered Bugeaud a soldier
of fortune, and too stubborn and independent to fit his
2 2stereotype of the perfect soldier. Bugeaud’s resolute 
insistence upon independence of command and his polemics on 
the value of military colonies both alarmed and embarrassed' 
Soult. When in a debate over the budget for Algeria in the 
Chamber of Deputies, a representative asked Soult why Bugeaud 
was allowed to continue to speak out in favor of military
Thomas Robert Bugeaud, Par I ’Ep^e et par la Charrue, 
écrits et discours, publiées par Paul Jean Louis Azan 
(Paris; Plon, 1947), pp. 161-63. Article from Moniteur 
Algérien, 25 decembre 1843 as cited in the above work.
2 2
Andrieux, p. 217.
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colonies, Soult could only reply that the government believed
civilian colonization to be the best system to adopt. He
assured the Assembly that Bugeaud had been informed of the
wishes of the government and was certain the Governor-General
2 3
would conform to those wishes.
Bugeaud, in turn, regarded Soult as a senile soldier 
who had been swallowed up by the bureaucracy, and the 
Governor-General abhorred bureaucrats. He also believed that 
Soult was too concerned with the question of decreasing the 
role of the army in Algeria in order to accelerate civilian 
control. This, to Bugeaud, would be a fatal mistake because 
French control over Algeria could be attained only when a 
military government and administration extended its domina­
tion over all Arabs in Algeria. Concern for civilian colo­
nization and the administration of Europeans could be dealt
2 4with later when the need arose.
The Governor-General felt there were already too many
civilian administrators in Algeria for such a small number
of Europeans:
On travaille tout juste comme en France, six 
heures souvent incomplètes ou mal employ d'à s , lors­
qu'il faudrait travailler au moins 15 heures pour 
rdpondre à cette ebullition continuelle d'un monde 
qui se cr^e. Et tout cela pour administrer une 
population europdene trente fois moins nombreuse 
que la population indigene et occupant un terri­
toire quatre cents fois puis petit.25
^^Soult à Chambre des Deputes, 23 mai 1843, cited in 
Le National, 24 mai 1843, and. Journal des Débats, 24 mai 1843
24
Andrieux, p. 217.
^^Bugeaud, as cited in ibid., 217-18.
65
There is also evidence of considerable animosity between 
Bugeaud and his military subordinates in Algeria. One of 
the most hostile was General Changarnier, whose profound 
hatred of Bugeaud stemmed in part from jealousy. Although
Changarnier had been in Algeria as long as Bugeaud, the lat-
2 6
ter had become his superior.
The two became implaccable enemies while on a campaign 
near Milianah. Bugeaud was personally conducting the cam­
paign; Changarnier was in charge of a brigade. In a con­
frontation with the enemy, Bugeaud was to give the signal 
for Changarnier to charge the Arab flank, but Changarnier 
charged before the signal was given. Although the maneuver 
succeeded in routing the Arabs, Bugeaud publicly reproached 
Changarnier for failure to follow orders, a shortcoming 
which the Governor-General condoned for himself, but would 
not tolerate from subordinates. Changarnier replied that 
six years of experience in North Africa made him qualified 
to judge the proper time for an attack and furthermore, he 
had never been reproached for his actions. Bugeaud replied: 
"Le mulet du Maréchal de Saxe avait fait la guerre vingt 
ans, et il ëtait toujours un mulet."
Changarnier also resented the rapid rise of the twenty- 
one -year-old due d ’Aumale to prominence in Algeria. Although
2 6 /Nicholas Anne Theodule Changarnier, Campagnes
d ’Afrique, 1830-1848: Mémoires du general Changarnier
(Paria: Berger-Levault, 19 30), p. 286.
2 7
Bugeaud, as cited in Barail, I, 118-19.
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2 8
he had little experience Aumale was a favorite of Bugeaud's. 
Because Bugeaud's military feats did not merit promotion, the 
only reason Changarnier could find for his promotion to com- 
mander-in-chief of Algeria was that Louis Philippe and his
29
sons saw in this opportunist a champion of the royal family.
Louis Eugene Cavaignac (1802-1857), a colonel in the
Army of Africa in 1843, was also hostile to Bugeaud.
Cavaignac denounced Bugeaud as an ego-maniac who was jealous
30
of his lieutenant's abilities. On one occasion, Cavaignac 
complained to his uncle (General Jacques Cavaignac), that
serving under Bugeaud made him detest his work and he would
31
retire if his grade would permit it.
Cavaignac's animosity toward Bugeaud can be attributed 
to the letter's haughtiness, the fact that Cavaignac be­
lieved his capacities to be fitted for greater tasks than 
Bugeaud had given him, and most of all, because Cavaignac,
a republican, saw in Bugeaud the epitome of monarchical con- 
32servatism.
2 8Changarnier, Campagnes d'Afrique, p. 2 89.
^^Ibid., p. 182.
^^Eugene Cavaignac à general Jacques Cavaignac, 18 
aout, 1843, in Jacques Marie Cavaignac, Les Deux généraux 
Cavaignac^ souvenirs et correspondance, 1808-1848 (Paris;
H. Charles-Lavauzelle 1898 ), p. 197-204.
^^Eugene Cavaignac à general Jacques Cavaignac, 2 
juillet 1843, ibid., 185-89.
32
Ibid., 184. In the Summer of 1843, Cavaignac was 
assigned the task of overseeing the construction of Orleans­
ville and policing the area around the villages. Cavaignac 
believed his talents could best be used in battle rather 
than in such a trivial activity.
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There were also signs of disaffection between the
Governor-General and his two most able generals, Lamoriciere 
3 3
and Bedeau. These two men chose not to publicize their 
disgruntlement in ld43, although they later publicly dis­
agreed with Bufeeaud and by so doing, dealt a catastrophic
3U
blow to his plans for military colonization.
It should also be mentioned that his subordinates held 
Bugeaud responsible for holding up their promotions. When, 
in July 1843, Lamoriciere, Changarnier, and Bedeau were ele­
vated to the rank of Lieutenant-General, they had only
q c
praise for their commander.
Despite this resentment and hostility, Bugeaud con­
tinued to hold sway over his officers, partially because he 
was the only active soldier in Algeria by 1843 who had 
served in la grande armee. That he participated in the
O g
Battle of Austerlitz was a feat they could not overlook.
While Bugeaud struggled with opponents, an event 
occurred in May 1843, which shortened Bugeaud's command in 
Algeria; Aumale proved himself on the field of battle. On 
18 May 1843, Aumale's force of five hundred troops captured
33
^See below. Chapter Five.
’Azan, 1 'Armee d'Afrique de 1830 a 1852, pp. 320-21. 
34,
3 5
Azan, p. 364.
3 g
Jacques Stern, The French Colonies; Paat and 
Future. Trans. Norbert Guterman (New York: Didier Publish­
ing Co., 1944), p. 131.
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3 7
the Smalah of Abd el Kader. The Smalah, the Emir’s pri­
vate retinue consisting of his family and personal troops, 
had evaded the French for years and provided a rallying 
point for warring tribesmen. A combination of good fortune 
and skilfull manoeuvre enabled Aumale to take 5,000 pri­
soners. Although the Emir escaped, the loss of the Smalah
seriously compromised his changes of victory, and French
3 8influence extended into the desert after this.
Louis Philippe, feeling it would enhance the dynasty,
expressed his delight at his son’s victory. He likened
Aumale’s victory to Condi's in 1643 at Rocroy for the great
Conde was only twenty-two years old when he won his great
39victory; Aumale was twenty-one.
Meanwhile, Bugeaud finally received the honor he had 
long sought. On 31 July 1843, he was awarded a marshal's 
baton. The honor was tarnished somewhat, however, by the 
attachment of a condition to this promotion. In a letter 
from the Minister of War, Bugeaud received news of the pro­
motion but was told that in order to receive it, he must 
agree to remain in Algeria as Governor-General and Commander- 
in-Chief for one year.^^
37
For Aumale’s official report on the capture of the 
Smalah, see Ideville, II, 8 5-86.
q q
Ibid., 74-93.
39 s
Louis Philippe a Soult, 30 mai 1843, in Soult, Cor­
respondance, p. 205.
40
Ideville, II, 94-95.
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Guizot believed the offer to be poorly presented, and
placed the blame for the faux pas on Soult. Guizot did
approve of the condition, however, for he feared that Bugeaud
would soon resign because of the opposition to his programs
and if his resignation came within one year, Aumale would
not have gained the experience necessary to merit the office
^1of governor-general.
The Journal des Debats accepted the official version
of Bugeaud's promotion: he received the baton in recogni-
42tion of military services rendered. Le National, on the 
other hand, expressed the cynical and unrealistic view that 
he was promoted because of services rendered to the monarchy 
in 1834 when his troops quelled a riot in the rue Transnonain.
A more realistic interpretation than either of the 
above is that Bugeaud received the baton partially in recog­
nition of his accomplishments, but also to persuade him to 
remain at his post until Aumale was ready to replace him.
If it had been merely a gesture of appreciation for services 
rendered, the promotion could easily have been granted 
earlier. It is highly unlikely that his promotion acci­
dentally came on the heels of Aumale's capture of the Smalah.
Bugeaud had been told in January that he was being 
considered for promotion, but was passed over in favor of an
^^Guizot, Mémoires, VII, 143.
ii 2 /
Journal des Debats, 9 aout 184 3.
U3
Le National, 10 aout 1843.
43
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associate stationed in F r a n c e . W h e n  he heard of the con­
dition imposed on his promotion, he wanted to resign his 
post immediately and only the intervention of Guizot and 
Louis Philippe caused him to accept the conditional promo­
tion. The king assured Bugeaud that he felt Algeria was in 
good hands and Bugeaud agreed to stay on.^^
Smarting from the blow to his pride, Bugeaud grumbled 
that he could overlook the idea that his administration was 
being menaced by Aumale and that he was looking forward to 
the time when he would be free of hostile journalists, depu- 
ties and bureaucrats. He soon recovered from the disap­
pointment, rationalizing that at least he would be replaced 
by a member of royalty. He preferred a prince as his re­
placement, not because it might enhance the constitutional 
monarchy, but because such a man would have more status and 
respect in governmental circles and consequently might
accomplish what Bugeaud could not. He also felt the capable
4-7young duke would become a very distinguished soldier.
iiii
Bugeaud to Gardere, 9 January 1843, Ideville, II, 60.
^^Louis Philippe to Bugeaud, ibid., 95.
l|. 0 ^
Bugeaud a Camille-Antoine Callier, 15 octobre 1843. 
Bibliothèque Nationale. Correspondance Bugeaud, Nouv. Acq. 
fr. 23.7 76, Folio 43. Callier (1804-1889)7 Bugeaud's friend, 
was Soult’s aide de camp and a valuable source of information 
for Bugeaud.
47 NBugeaud a Guizot, 23 octobre 1843, in Guizot, 
Mémoires, VII, 236-37.
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Knowing that his administration would soon end, the 
new Marshal was anxious to accomplish as much as possible 
while he remained at his post. His programs, however, con­
tinued to meet considerable resistance.
A major obstacle to the Algerian campaign was the 
control the Chamber of Deputies exercised over the budget.
The discussion of the credit extraordinaire for Algeria in 
1843 was heated and long (February to May). Although the 
budget was trimmed somewhat, there was at least evidence 
that the Chamber had finally accepted the conquest, for no 
one demanded the withdrawal of French forces from North
Africa as was the usual case when the budget was under dis-
4 8cussion. The Ministry was unhappy with the trimming of 
the budget, but was helpless to alter the decision. Louis 
Philippe could only denounce the reduction as "blindly de­
plorable" and called for a continued struggle so that the
49conquest would not be jeopardized.
Despite budgetary problems, the troop reduction which 
Bugeaud had feared did not materialize. In fact, the number 
of troops steadily increased in Algeria from 1831 to 1844.^^
48
Le National, 2 3 février 1843. Even Gustave de Beaumont, 
one of the most outspoken critics of the campaign, approved 
the budget though he favored conquest and colonization on a 
smaller scale than that advocated by the Ministry. See also.
Le National, 23 mai 1843.
49
Louis Philippe a Soult, 26 juin 1843, in Soult, 
Correspondance, p. 211.
^^Ideville, I, 354 and Thureau-Dangin, V, 345. In 1831, 
there were 17,9 00 French troops in Algeria and by 1843, there 
were 85,664. The number increased in 1844 to 90,562, dropped 
86,89,099 in 1845 and rose to a high of 107,688 in 1846.
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Although no conclusive decisions were reached as to 
the type of colonies Algeria should have, some positive 
accomplishments accompanied the heated debates of 1843.
Trade between the natives and the French increased to a point 
that Bugeaud happily announced at the end of 1843 that the 
natives of Algeria were beginning to prefer French cotton- 
goods to British goods (no doubt in part because of the res­
trictive tariff placed on British products in Algeria).
More easily measured, obvious achievements included the 
capture of the Smalah, the creation of four new bases of 
operation, and twenty-two newly completed villages in addi­
tion to sixteen other villages under construction or in the 
planning stage. The construction of nineteen major roads 
improved communication and transportation links. Further­
more, 65,000 European colons resided in Algeria by the end 
of 184 3 as compared to 44,531 one year earlier.
^^Guizot, Mémoires, VII, 523-24.
Chapter V
1844: A MOROCCAN CRISIS, VICTORY AT ISLY,
AND NEW PROJECTS FOR COLONIZATION
A Moroccan crisis in 1844 severely strained Franco- 
British relations and caused much concern in diplomatic 
circles. On the other hand, for Marshal Bugeaud, it must 
have been a year of considerable satisfaction for he suc­
ceeded in driving Abd el Kader out of Algeria and won the 
most significant battle of his career at Isly. As a result, 
his prestige reached an all-time high. Bolstered by this 
acclaim, Bugeaud decided to introduce another major scheme 
for military colonization.
The Moroccan crisis erupted in the spring of 1844, 
when Abd el Kader took refuge in Morocco, and from there 
with Moroccan aid, the Arab chieftain launched a series of 
border raids against the French in Oran Province.^ Bugeaud 
personally conducted the campaign to defend this area, but 
was constantly frustrated by his inability to pursue the 
enemy into their Moroccan sanctuary. The French Ministry 
helped cause this situation by following an extremely cau­
tious policy towards Morocco for fear of alienating the 
British.^
Britain had viewed the French occupation of Algeria 
with suspicion, but had gradually accepted the French fait
^Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 144-45.
2
Joinville, Memoirs, p. 313.
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accompli. They did wish, however, to prevent further French 
expansion into Tunis, Tripoli, and Morocco, for French domi­
nation of all of North Africa would threaten British strate-
3
gic and commercial interests in the Mediterranean. In 
addition to the desire to maintain her naval supremacy in 
the area, England considered her trade with Morocco to be 
crucial because the British stronghold at Gibraltar depended 
upon Tangier for many essential supplies, especially since 
British trade with Algeria had been effectively curbed by 
heavy duties placed on British products by the French.^ What 
the British feared most was that a French punitive expedition 
against Morocco might result in yet another conquest. Their 
fears were not totally unfounded, for the French had assured 
the British in 1830 that their expedition against the Dey of 
Algiers was merely punitive.^ In addition, by 1844, some 
Frenchmen openly advocated the annexation of Morocco because 
of the similarities and the geographic proximity to Algeria. 
Adolphe Thiers believed both states on the frontiers of 
Algeria, Tunis and Morocco, were natural enemies of French 
Algeria. Tunis was weak and posed no threat, but war with 
the fanatic and barbarous Moors was inevitable because the
^C. J. Battlett, Great Britain and Sea Power, 1815- 
1833 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 117. ,
Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 152; Joinville, Memoirs, p. 314; 
The (London) Times, 22 August 1844.
5Great Britain, Sessional Papers (Commons), L, n. 17 
(1839), p. 45.
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unlimited conquest of Algeria would not succeed until Morocco
0
was forced to cease the extension of aid to Algerian rebels.
After repeated border skirmishes in which Moroccan 
troops participated, Louis Philippe, acting on Guizot's ad­
vice, allowed his foreign minister to issue an ultimatum to 
the Emperor of Morocco, Abd el Rhaman. The Ultimatum, issued 
12 June 1844, demanded that Morocco cease sending her troops 
into Algeria, that she remove her troops from the Moroccan- 
Algerian border, and that Abd el Kader be banished from 
Morocco. Guizot assured the Emperor that France had no 
territorial designs on Morocco, but she would no longer 
tolerate such border raids.
To indicate the French intent to stand by the ultima­
tum, the Prince de Joinville was given command of a fleet of
twenty-eight warships and ordered to cruise off the Moroccan 
0
coast. With Bugeaud's troops massed along the frontier and 
a French squadron en route to the coast of Morocco, some
Q
Englishmen viewed this as a prelude to an all-out attack.
The selection of the arrogant young prince to command the 
French squadron annoyed the British for Joinville had just
0
Rey, "Le Morac et la question d'Alger," Revue des Deux 
Mondes, (1840), III, p. 17. Adolphe Thiers, "Discours dans 
la discussions du projet d'adresse (Maroc, Taiti, Droit de 
Visite) prononce^le 21 janvier a la Chambre des Deputes, in 
Thiers, Discours Parlementaires, VI, 574-77.
^Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 151-52.
g
Joinville, Memoirs, pp. 312-15.
g
Howarth, p . 296.
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published a pamphlet, Note sur les forces navales de la
France, which favorably compared the strength of the French
navy to the British.
The Emperor of Morocco, believing the English would
intervene to prevent a French invasion, chose to ignore
Guizot’s ultimatum. Morocco had earlier been guaranteed
English support by Palmerston in case of encroachment by a 
11European power. De Nion, the French agent in Tangiers, 
warned Guizot of the Emperor's attitude: "A single watch­
word circulates to-day throughout the whole [Moroccan] Empire
Disdain for the menaces of Spain, hate and vengeance against
12the French, confidence in the protection of England."
Thus, Abd el Éhaman gambled on English support and ignored
the ultimatum.
Britain, though alarmed at the prospect of a ^ull-
scale invasion, did not object to a French show of force.
Sir Robert Peel called the Moroccan actions against the
French ". . . a gross outrage coupled with gross indig- 
13nity." The British Foreign Minister, George Hamilton- 
Gordon, Fourth Earl of Aberdeen (1784-1860), wrote to the 
British representative in Tangier:
^^Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 152-53.
^^Francis Rosebro Flournoy, British Policy Towards 
Morocco in the Age of Palmerston, 1830-1865 (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1935), p. 90^
^^De Nion to Guizot, 13 May 1844, as cited in ibid.,
p. 89.
13
Howarth, p . 29 6.
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So long as Abd-el-Kader shall be permitted 
to take refuge in Morocco and there to recruit 
and organize his forces, the Emperor must not be 
surprised if he finds French troops are collected 
on the frontier and should the Emir use the 
Emperor's territory as grounds from wjhich to 
attack the French, Her Majesty's government is 
not prepared to say that the latter would not be 
justified in pursuing their enemy beyond the 
boundary of Morocco.
The British did dispatch a small naval contingent to
Morocco to observe any action which might take place, but
this could hardly be viewed as a show of force since only
theee ships were dispatched, including one ship of the line,
a frigate, and a steamer. Moreover, Aberdeen ordered the
commander in charge of the British contingent to make it
clear to the Moors that Britain had no desire to prevent the
15French from achieving their "just and moderate demands."
By early August, the French fleet lay at anchor near 
Tangier. The English made one last effort to mediate the 
dispute when their Consul in Tangier, John Drummond Hay, 
acting on orders from Aberdeen to establish personal con­
tact with Abd el Rhaman and to use all means within his
14
Aberdeen to John Drummond Hay, 15 June 1844, as 
cited in Swain, p. 130. Swain maintains this was a more 
serious crisis than commonly believed because Aberdeen dis­
patched three ships to observe the action. In fact, sending 
only three ships seems to indicate merely a watchful atti­
tude on the part of the British.
^^The (London) Times, 15 August 1844; Aberdeen to offi­
cials of the British Admiralty (Lords Commissaires de 
l 'Admirautié), 10 July 1844, as cited in Guizot, Memoirs,
VII, 157-58.
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power to prevent a war, attempted to extract a promise from 
the Emperor that he would meet the demands of the French 
ultimatum. The Emperor, however, was evasive, and on 6 
August, Joinville began shelling the fortifications at 
Tangier.
With the news that the bombardment of Tangier was 
underway, Bugeaud, poised on the frontier, led his troops 
across the border. The Marshal had been impatiently await­
ing the results of Hay’s mediation. Even before the ultima­
tum to Morocco, Bugeaud wanted to take action. Following 
an attack by Moroccan troops on a French force under 
Lamoriciere, Bugeaud had advocated immediate reprisals in­
cluding an attack on Morocco. This alarmed Louis Philippe
17at the time and he ordered Soult to temper Bugeaud’s ardor. 
There was, however, some inconsistency in Bugeaud's thoughts 
about invading Morocco, for while he appeared anxious to 
undertake such an expedition, he seemed to dread the task, 
fearing the enemy's superior manpower would result in defeat 
for the French forces. Under such circumstances, he won­
dered how the Chambers could even consider the reduction of
^^The (London) Times, 20 August 1844; Joinville, 
Memoirs, p. 332; Sainte-Aulare k Guizot, Guizot, Memoirs,
VII, 157-58. --------
^^Louis Philippe â Soult, 24 juillet 1844, in Soult, 
Correspondance, pp. 234-36.
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18French forces in North Africa. On the other hand, once
the French fleet arrived off the coast of Morocco, Bugeaud
constantly complained to Joinville of the prince's tergiver- 
19sation. Joinville replied to Bugeaud: "Well, General,
[sic] fire off your guns ! If you will begin the fighting
20I'll [sic] follow your example at once." Until the bom­
bardment of Tangier began, Bugeaud complainëd that his troops 
suffered from the heat and fretted because of the inaction.
In the face of pressure from Paris, however, he was clearly 
unwilling to initiate hostilities. When the conflict began,
Bugeaud quickly assured Joinville that the army would lose
21no time in taking decisive action.
There are conflicting reports as to the degree of 
success of the French bombardment of Tangier. The (London) 
Times correspondent, on a British ship observing the shell­
ing, described the French action as a "reckless and wicked 
connivance," maintaining that Joinville battered away for 
nine hours at the decaying walls of the Moorish fortress 
without quieting half a dozen guns and making only one
^^Bugeaud à Louis-Auguste Marcel d'Escliabes d'Hust,
24 mai 1844, in Bugeaud, Lettres inédites du maréchal Bugeaud, 
duc d'Isly, 1808-1849. Colligées et Annotées par M. le 
Capitaine Tattet et publiées par Mademoiselle Feray-Bugeaud 
d'Isly. Deuxième édition (Paris: Deslis, 1923), pp. 273-76.
19
Joinville, Memoirs, p. 321.
^°Ibid.
^^Bugeaud to Joinville, 11 August 1844, in ibid., p. 322.
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22breach in the wall. A British officer who observed the 
shelling proudly announced: "Though I am not a boaster,
. . . one regiment from Gibraltar and one hundred artillery­
men manning these forts would have sent Joinville and his
2 3gang to Davy’s locker."
In contrast to the British reports, Joinville recounts
that his admirable artillerymen quickly silenced the fortress
24-guns and that not a single shot went wide of the mark.
On the other hand, The (London) Times correspondent main­
tained that there was widespread damage within the city from
stray shells and that only the American and Sardinian
2 5
Embassies escaped damage. The accuracy of Joinville’s 
artillerymen is insignificant. The French had made their 
point. Moreover, Bugeaud’s victory at Isly was the deci­
sive event in the Franco-Moroccan conflict.
On 14 August, at Isly, Bugeaud's 95 00 troops defeated 
a Moroccan force six times larger and captured eighteen
flags, eleven guns, and the tent and personal papers of the 
2 6
Emperor's son. After the Battle of Isly, Abd el Rhaman 
understood that the French were determined to see their
^^The (London) Times, 23 August 1844.
^^"An Officer" to the editor of The (London) Times,
21 August 1844.
24
Joinville, Memoirs, p. 322.
25
The (London) Times, 21 August 1844.
^^Guizot, Memoirs, VII. 162-63.
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demands met and that he could expect no support from the 
British.
Guizot's friendship with Aberdeen helps to explain
27British inaction in the Moroccan crisis. Guizot had con­
tinually promised Aberdeen that France had no interest in
expanding her territorial holdings in North Africa beyond
2 8Algeria's borders.
The Treaty of Tangier, 10 September 1844, ended the
Franco-Moroccan conflict. The Moors agreed to remove their
troops from the Algerian frontier, to punish troops guilty
of aggression against France, and to outlaw Abd el Kader 
29in Morocco. France survived the crisis in excellent con­
dition. Although Franco-British relations had been strained, 
no serious rupture resulted. After the crisis had passed, 
one British reporter rationalized that the bombardment of 
Tangier must have been accidental. He cited as evidence 
the official Gazette of Gibraltar, which maintained that 
captured correspondence proved the Moroccans sincerely 
wanted peace and that inadequate communication channels
27This friendship is quite evident in George Hamilton- 
Gordon , Earl of Aberdeen, The Correspondence of Lord Aberdeen 
and Princess Lieven, 1832-1854. Edited for the Royal his­
torical society by E. Jones Parry (London: Royal Historical
Society, 1938-39), II.
28 \
For example, see Swain, p. 129, and; Guizot a
Sainte-Aulaire, 15 et 17 juin 1844, in Guizot, Memoirs, VII,
153-54.
29
The (London) Times, 12 October 1844.
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3 0between Joinville and Abd el Rhaman resulted in the attack.
After the Treaty of Tangier had been signed, Britain
continued to view Morocco with concern, for Aberdeen believed
the Emperor’s authority had been shaken. British policy
aimed at preventing the Emperor's fall and discouraging
31further French encroachments. It is certain that the 
British restrained French actions during the Moroccan cri­
sis, for both Bugeaud and Joinville wished to exact complete
3 2
submission from the Moors. In particular, Joinville felt
the peace terms were too moderate. Bugeaud, aware of the
British pressure for moderation, soothed Joinville by urging
him to be content in knowing that Abd el Kader had been
3 3
effectively curbed.
Bugeaud later did express his dissatisfaction with the 
limited conflict against Morocco, maintaining that after 
Isly, his troops could have marched to the gates of Fez 
without a serious confrontation with the enemy. The victor 
of Isly was also angry because he was not allowed to parti­
cipate in the peace negotiations. He advocated that Abd el 
Kader be taken into custody and that Morocco be forced to
3°Ibid., 18 October 1844.
^^Swain, pp. 131-32.
32
Bugeaud to Joinville, 3 September 1844, in Ideville, 
II, 134-35. Guizot also admits the British restrained the 
French. See Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 168-69.
3 3
Bugeaud to Joinville, 3 September 1844, in Ideville, 
II, 134-35.
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accept total responsibility for the conflict. The Treaty
of Tangier, however, was negotiated by civilian diplomats,
the comte de Nion and the due de Glucksberg, and Bugeaud
34was not even consulted.
The Moroccan crisis illustrates the complete commit­
ment of the July Monarchy to the successful conquest of 
Algeria. Even Guizot, who once regarded Algeria as an 
"affair of one's leisure," risked the shaky entente cordiale
with Britain in order to punish Morocco for her transgres- 
35
sions. As mentioned above, because of the French Foreign 
Minister's friendship with his British counterpart, Guizot 
realized there was little chance of a Franco-British con­
frontation. Aberdeen believed Guizot when he promised that
if war between France and Morocco should occur, the French
3 6
had no expansionist intent vis-a-vis Morocco.
The Moroccan crisis of 1844 proved to be the first 
real test of British willingness to recognize the French 
presence in North Africa. One British newspaper correspon­
dent maintained that the British attempt to mediate the dis­
pute was in fact a confirmation of the French possession of
^^Bugeaud a la Chambre des Deputes, 24 janvier 1845,
Le Moniteur Universal, 25 janvier 1845. Bugeaud did admit 
that the heat might have prevented a march to Fez even if 
the French government had permitted it. 
q K
Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 144-45.
^^Ibid., 158-59.
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Algeria. The Peel Government begrudgingly accepted that 
presence on the condition that France remain content with 
no more African soil than she already possessed.
Meanwhile, in recognition of his great victory over 
the Moors, Bugeaud received the title. Due d'Isly. His pres­
tige reached its peak after the battle and he was praised, 
not only in military circles, but also by civilians. When 
he returned to Paris to accept his title, acclaim and praise
accompanied him wherever he went, even in the legislative 
38chambers. Bugeaud became the moat illustrious figure in
39French military annals since Napoleon.
Ever mindful of the need to see his objectives realized, 
the hero decided to take advantage of his popularity to 
press for government approval of military colonies. He 
argued that his recent military victory resulted from the 
valor of his troops in spite of overwhelming odds. Here 
was a lesson for Frenchmen interested in the destiny of 
Algeria for only the brave, disciplined soldier could meet 
the challenges of colonization in North Africa.
^^The (London) Times, 11 July 1844.
^^Demont^s, p. 19 9.
39 .Brison Dowling Gooch, The New Bonapartist Generals 
in the Crimean War; Distrust and Decision-making in the 
Anglo-French Alliance (The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 19 59),
p . 6.
^^Bugeaud à P. Meni&re, 12 septembre 1844, in E.
Meniere, ÏI, 463-64.
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Because previous plans had been criticized as experi­
mental and poorly organized, the Marshal produced a scheme 
which he felt could not be denounced as easily as earlier 
ones. The new plan called for the establishment of 10,000 
colonists in Algeria each year for ten years, By the end 
of the period, 100,000 colonists would be settled in Algeria. 
This proposal included civilian colonists, who would be 
allowed to settle in areas along the coast where the threat 
of Arab raids would be minimal, while frontier areas would 
be occupied by soldier-colonists. The cost of this project, 
including household goods, guns, bayonets, and gunpowder, 
would be 1500 francs per colonist-family for a three-year 
period. The total cost of this scheme for the first three 
years would be 350 million francs.
During his visit to Paris to be honored for the vic­
tory at Isly, Bugeaud presented his scheme for military 
colonies to Soult. The War Minister reacted favorably to 
the principle of military colonies, but he thought the cost 
too great and the chances of success too questionable to 
give it his full support. Moreover, Soult believed the 
initiation of such a plan on his part would be unconstitu­
tional since only the French legislature had.the authority
to remove so many soldiers from active duty to place them on
M-2farms and to appropriate the necessary funds. Because he
41 /
Démontés, p. 19 3.
^^Soult à Bugeaud, 13 janvier 1845, ibid., p. 205.
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felt certain the Chambers would not approve this, Soult, 
with the assistance of his bureau chiefs in the Ministry of 
War, proposed a more cautious counter-plan, which utilized 
the principle of military colonies. Soult's project called 
for the establishment of three zones: (1) areas where civi­
lian Europeans could settle; (2) mixed areas where natives 
outnumbered Europeans and where military colonists might 
best settle; (3) areas where all France could hope for was 
political dominance.
As to the means of using soldier-farmers, Soult main­
tained that a soldier and his wife should not be assigned 
a plat of unimproved land as Bugeaud had suggested. Rather, 
the land should have been cleared and ready for cultivation 
and a house should have been constructed before assigning 
it to the soldier and his family. For the first three 
years, soldiers stationed in a given area could be required 
to construct buildings and clear the làad. Once the land 
began to produce, the surplus capital from the products of 
the land could be placed in reserve to pay for subsequent 
expenses when the land was ready for the true soldier- 
farmer (at the end of the three-year period). Soult estimated 
the cost of his project for three years to be 162 million 
francs in^contrast to Bugeaud's request for 350 million
ifii
francs.
^^Ibid., p. 200. 
uu
Ibid., pp. 200-03,
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Bugeaud, in his characteristically uncompromising way, 
rejected Soult's project, for he believed a sufficient num­
ber of partisans of military colonization would support his 
plan, including the king, a few ministers, and several peers 
and d e p u t i e s . B u g e a u d * s  rejection widened the gulf between 
the Governor-General and the War Minister. Both plans were 
presented to the Chambers and both were rejected. There 
were not enough advocates of military colonization in the 
Chambers to carry through such expensive plans. The 
victory at Isly proved to be insufficient to win over the 
opponents of military colonization.
Despite the rejection of his second project, the 
Governor-General continued to use soldiers to construct 
villages and cultivate land. Bugeaud was most proud of 
Orleansville and Tenes, where soldiers had constructed 
hundreds of homes, repaired Roman aqueducts, and planted scores 
of trees. Such improvements attracted civilians to these 
villages. By January 18*+M-, five hundred civilians resided in 
Orleansville. Bugeaud boasted of the rapport between civi­
lians and soldiers in these villages, arguing that this was
4* 5 X
Bugeaud a Soult, 14 decembre 1844, as cited in ibid.,
p. 204.
46
Ibid., pp. 213-14.
47 s
Bugeaud a Soult, 4 janvier 1844. Archives du
ministers de la Guerre. Section outre-mer. Algérie.
Correspondance, carton 89.
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only natural since the soldiers had prepared the way for
. 48civilians.
In contrast to the successful settlements at Orleans- 
ville and Tenes, Bugeaud pointed out that the disorganized, 
poorly directed civilian colony at Milanah had been in dan­
ger of extinction until the Governor-General sent soldiers 
there to aid in construction and to help with the harvest s.
Without military assistance, Bugeaud claimed Milanah would
49have been a deserted village within one year.
In villages sponsored by the army, there was order and 
respect for the law and no need for police because the in­
habitants respected authority. Such examples of cooperation
made Bugeaud even more certain of the usefulness of military 
colonization. "Qu’on vienne voir nos villes de l'intérieur,
on y trouvera l'ordre et la propreté, sans commissaires de 
police,...parce que chacun sait qu'il doit obéir. En un 
mot, il y a de l'autorité.
Although Bugeaud failed to convince authorities in 
Paris that military colonization should officially be insti­
tuted in 1844, he did succeed in furthering the development 
of an apparatus designed to institutionalize French-Algerian
^^ibid.
49 N.
Bugeaud a Soult, 15 juillet 1844. Archives du 
ministère de la Guerre. Section outre-mer. Algérie. 
Correspondance, carton 89.
S°Ibid.
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relations and relations among the natives. In 1841 he had 
re-established the Office of Arab Affairs and in 1844, he 
created the Arab B u r e a u . B u g e a u d  assigned an official of 
the Arab Bureau to each military division in Algeria. These 
officials were responsible to the division military commander 
and to the Director of the Arab Bureau in Algiers, who in 
turn was responsible to the Governor-General. Duties of the 
Arab Bureau included translating and editing correspondence 
in Arabic, transmitting orders to the Arabs, and sending 
periodic reports to the Governor-General on native condi­
tions .
Bugeaud's interest in such an organization stemmed 
from his belief that the French should interfere as much as 
possible in Arab affairs. By quietly proceeding to substi­
tute Frenchmen for native leaders, France would gradually 
achieve a moral authority over the natives. Thus, pacifi­
cation would proceed more smoothly and would be more com-
53
plete. The Arab Bureau developed as one of Bugeaud's most 
significant accomplishments in Algeria.
Although many Frenchmen rejected military colonization 
(at least a majority in the Chambers did), there was considerable
51
"Ibid., p. 372.
Azan, L'Armee d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852, p. 371. 
52.
5 3
Bugeaud to Aumale, January 1844, in Ideville, II, 105. 
^^Azan, L'Armee d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852, p. 372.
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interest in some form of colonies for Algeria. A number of 
reports in the Comptes Rendus Hebdomadaires de l'Académie 
des Sciences de Paris of 1844 indicate an interest in colo­
nization and agricultural development in Algeria. One such 
report discussed the great variety of agricultural products, 
including cotton, tobacco, opium, and grapes, which would 
thrive in Algeria.
As usual, military campaigns in 1844 constantly ham­
pered Bugeaud’s efforts to convince the government of the 
merits of military colonization. Thus, he did not have the 
opportunity to devote his full time to colonization. The 
July Monarchy did take some initiative in 1844 to institute 
civilian colonies when Guizot issued a ministerial order of 
18 April 1844, which connected the service of land allot­
ments with the Department of the Interior. The unstable 
military situation, however, served to discourage potential 
colonists and colonists already there. Even by 1847 when 
Bugeaud resigned his post, of the 109,000 European civilians
c c
in Algeria, only 15,000 were rural colonists.
"Rapport sur les travaux de M. Hardy, directeur de 
la pépinière centrale en Algérie," Comptes Rendus Hebdoma­
daires de l'Académie des Sciences de Paris XVIII (1844),n. 
2, pp. 887-904.
C C
Alphonse Juin et Amar Naroun, Histoire Parallel;
La France en Algérie, 1830-1962 (Parisl Perrin [1963], p. 
52; Thureau-Dangin, VI, 411. Although 15,000 rural colo­
nists sounds relatively small, when compared to the 1,500 
rural colonists there in 1840, it represented a significant 
increase.
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Military victories and enhanced prestige for Bugeaud 
characterized his fourth year as Governor-General. Several 
Arab tribes, including some of the fierce Kabyles tribesmen, 
submitted to French rule, the invasion of Morocco robbed 
Abd el Kader of a sanctuary and prevented his acquiring a 
useful ally, thus rendering the Algerian Emir virtually use­
less as a rebel leader. By the end of the year, France 
possessed a solid line of fortified camps in Algeria which 
guaranteed their military dominance over that North African 
state.
The rejection of Bugeaud's project for military colo­
nization, however, overshadowed the military victories. 
Bugeaud*s uncompromising attitude toward Soult's counter­
project caused an already small group of advocates of mili­
tary colonies to divide their l o y a l t i e s . T h i s  intransi­
geance made doubtful that a large-scale project for military 
colonies in Algeria would be approved.
^^Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 525-26. The entire Kabylia, 
home of the Kabyles, finally submitted to French rule in 
1857.
58Démontés, pp. 204-06.
Chapter VI
1845: THE TURNING POINT— PARTIAL ALIENATION FROM THE
JULY MONARCHY AND COMPLETE RUPTURE WITH THE LEFT
On 24 January 1845, Bugeaud presented the most signi­
ficant public address of his career to the Chamber of Depu­
ties.^ This speech contained the essence of his philosophy 
of war, colonial government, the military's role in a colo­
nial society, and colonization. When the Marshal applied 
these views to Algeria, he saw no alternative to military 
colonization if France hoped to create a successful colony 
there.
As to his concept of war, Bugeaud reiterated the view 
that wars were not won merely on the battlefield, but by 
capturing or destroying the enemy's vital interests. In 
Europe, such interests might include capital, major cities, 
and communication links, but in Algeria, no such interests 
existed. Because agriculture was the only basic enterprise 
Algeria possessed, the razzia had been employed to destroy 
that interest. Furthermore, he rejected limited war and 
limited occupation as impractical, expensive follies which 
only resulted in frustration and failure. A nation should
 ^ "Discours du maréchal Bugeaud a la Chambre des 
Deputes, 24 janvier 1845," Le Moniteur Universel, 25 janvier 
1845.
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wage war with all the energy necessary to achieve complete
• u. 2victory.
Bugeaud's political philosophy revealed a preference 
for paternalistic, authoritative rule, especially for colo­
nial societies such as Algeria. He believed the French 
could learn much by studying the political system of Abd el 
Kader, un homme de g^nie, whose government was simply or­
ganized but very effective. A colonial populace, endowed 
with civil and municipal rights and administered by civi­
lians , behaved like badly-reared children, crying and com­
plaining at the least annoyance. Beside, "Que pouves-vous 
demander à la population administrée civilement et jouissant
g
de tous les droits civils et municipaux? Rien." On the 
other hand, disciplined colonists under military rule res­
pected and obeyed authority because they valued security 
more than civil liberties. Men did not fear a regime of
the sword if it provided security to them and their fami-
-. 4
lies.
The military had a special role to perform in colo­
nial society, for not only should the army provide security 
and order, it should also perform public service functions 
such as constructing roads, bridges, and even villages. In 
turn, such improvements encouraged commercial development
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
94
and permanent settlements. Thus, the army could serve as a 
civilizing force.^ Needless to say, Bugeaud wished to ex­
pand the functions of the Army of Africa to include colo­
nizing and governing. He justified the special role of the 
army in Algeria because of the nearly four million Algerian
natives, of which five or six hundred thousand were skilled 
6warriors.
Given the above, Bugeaud argued, the only rational form 
of colonies in Algeria would be a combination of civilians 
and soldiers. Civilian colonization might proceed in safe 
areas along the coast, and military colonization could be 
instituted in the more dangerous interior. To those who 
opposed military colonies because of the expense, Bugeaud 
maintained that although it would be expensive, in the long 
run the cost would be much greater without the soldier- 
farmer for if the latter were employed, the standing army 
in Algeria could be reduced by 40,000 men. Otherwise, a 
100,000 man protective force would have to be maintained 
indefinitely at a cost far exceeding the expense of using 
soldier-farmers. Civilian colonization would be just as
^Ibid .
Gjbid.
7
Ibid. Bugeaud’s estimate of the cost of instituting 
military colonies (300 million francs), differed from earlier 
and later estimates ranging from 350 million francs to 500 
million francs. He offered no explanation why this estimate 
differed from others. Also, he estimated the cost of main­
taining 40,000 troops (unnecessary if soldier-farmers were 
employed), at 40 million francs per year.
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expensive as his proposal since government aid would be re­
quired in both cases: "Je ne connais q u ’un seul bon entre­
preneur de colonisation, c'est le Gouvernement, parce qu'il 
a de l'argent qui lui donnent les Chambres, qu'il exige ni 
l'intérêt ni l'amortissement de ce capital, et qu'il à dans 
son armee des bras à bon marche'’."^
Bugeaud concluded his speech by stressing the funda­
mental necessity of military colonies. A force attached to 
the soil was essential for Algeria. A civilian populace 
would be insufficient for there must be a rural population 
obedient to military discipline. Such settlements would not 
automatically assure a successful future, but no other insti­
tution could meet such challenges as effectively. Because 
the conquest was all but complete, nothing remained but to
plan for the future, and military colonization was the best
g
formula for the creation of a prosperous French Algeria.
This speech had a profound impression on the Chamber 
of Deputies. While many deputies expressed their approval of 
the speech, the deputies of the left, appalled by its author­
itarianism, rejected it. Although the left had rarely 
approved of Bugeaud's actions, his speech represented a de­
finitive and complete rupture between the Governor-General 
and the left.^^
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
^^Demontes, p. 208.
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Though the oration stimulated discussions on the merits 
of military colonization, the Chamber took no steps to initiate 
such a plan and Bugeaud grew impatient with their inaction.
He therefore decided to institute military colonies without 
official approval. This decision constituted the greatest 
mistake of his career. By a circular of 9 August 1845, the 
urged his generals to collect lists of soldiers who 
wished to volunteer for military colonies. The soldiers were 
to be informed at once of the advantages of volunteering. The 
completed list would be presented to the July Monarchy as 
proof of the efficacy of Bugeaud's proposals.
According to the new project, non-commissioned officers 
and privates who volunteered would receive six months leave 
and could return to France to find wives. Travel expenses 
would be paid by the state, and a house, necessary tools, and 
private goods would also be provided. Each family would re­
ceive two oxen, two cows, ten sheep, a sow, two plows, a cart, 
trees, seeds "of all kinds." Colonists would receive food, 
wages, clothing, and all allowances for three years. Each 
colonist would receive ten hectares of land fit for cultiva­
tion. The soIdier-farmer and his wife would provide only 
their labor. At the end of the three-year period, the family 
would be given full ownership of the land. Until then, the 
land would be cultivated collectively. Bugeaud estimated the 
total cost of establishing 100,000 colonists in this manner
11Azan, L'Armëe d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852, pp. 385-86.
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to be 350,000,000 francs.
In seasons when soldiers were not occupied with culti­
vation, they would be required to participate in public work 
projects. In case of war, they would defend their settle­
ments . The Marshal believed this plan would solve the pro­
blem of military security and stimulate agricultural produc­
tion as well.^^
Officers responsible for directing the colonies would 
be compensated for their contributions according to their 
rank. Colonels and lieutenant-colonels would receive fifty 
hectares of land; captains, thirty hectares; lieutenants, 
twenty hectares. Officers would receive free housing, but 
no subsidy for agricultural implements or household goods.
Bugeaud undertook this project without consulting the 
Ministry or the Chambers, and when the news of the scheme 
reached Paris, it caused an uproar in political circles.
The opposition press joined the fray, and Le National's head­
line read, the "Pasha Revolts," suggesting that Bugeaud had
16gone too far even for the July Monarchy this time.
Le National had five major criticisms of the project: 
regiments in Algeria could not be kept up to full strength 
while men were on furlough seeking wives; a soldier's duties
12
The (London) Times, 30 August 1845; Thureau-Dangin,
VI, 367.
^^Thureau-Dangin, VI, 367.
14
The (London) Times, 30 August 1845.
^^Ideville, II, 178-79; Thureau-Dangin, VI, 370.
16
Le National, 1 septembre 1845.
98
should not include building houses and planting gardens; un­
employed carpenters and workers from France should be hired 
by the state to construct villages; the project was too ex-
17
pensive; and, Russia had made a similar attempt and failed.
The rebellious undertaking of this project without
prior consultation with government officials may be viewed
as a move of desperation by Bugeaud, for his relationship
with officials of the July Monarchy had steadily deteriorated
during the year. By mid-1845, the Ministry and Chamber of
Deputies had lost even the limited enthusiasm for military
colonies which they had exhibited after Bugeaud's 24 January 
18
speech. Opposition newspapers kept up a steady attack on
military colonies, and many politicians agreed with the
journalists that Bugeaud's proposals for Algeria were too
19authoritarian and militaristic.
Bugeaud responded to Le National’s charge that he had 
overstepped his authority by writing to Guizot. He said that 
everyone should be aware of the motives for his actions by 
now, for they were based on the conviction that he was render­
ing a great service to France. He believed all his actions
17Ibid. The reference to Russia’s attempt at military 
colonies no doubt referred to the experiment of Alexander I. 
There were some similarities between the two plans. For a 
study of Alexander’s military colonies, see Richard E. Pipes, 
"The Russian Military Colonies, 1810-1831," Journal of Modern 
History, XXII (1950), pp. 205-19.
^®Ideville, II, 178-79. 
l^ibid.
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20had been in keeping with the prerogatives of military command.
In (June, Bugeaud had asked Soult's approval for a grant
of 500,000 francs to be used for an experiment in military
\ 21
colonization and Soult flatly rejected the request. Follow­
ing this rebuff, the Governor-General sought Guizot's assist­
ance. Expressing the fear that Soult wished to dismiss him 
while pouring out all his frustrations, Bugeaud complained 
that civilian administrators had more authority over colonial 
matters than the governor-general. He then delivered a vehe­
ment attack against his opponents:
Dans tous les temps, les succès des généraux 
ont augmente leur crë'dit; le mien a baisse" dans la 
proportion du progrès des affaires de l'Algérie.
Je ne puis être l'artisan de la démolition de ce 
que je puis sans vanité appeler mon ouvrage. Je 
ne puis assister au triste spectacle de la marche 
dans laquelle on s'engage au pas accéléré. Exten­
sion intempestive, ridicule, insensée, de toutes 
les choses civiles; amputation successive de l'armée 
et des travaux publics pour couvrir de folles d'un 
personnel qui suffirait à une population dix fois 
plus forte; voila le système. Je suis fatigue de 
lutter sans succès contre tant d'idees fausses, 
contre des bureaux inspires par le journal 1 'Algérie.
Je veux reprendre mon indépendance pour exposer mes 
propres idées au Gouvernement et au pays. Le pa­
triotisme me le commande, puisque j'ai la conviction 
qu'on mène mal la plus grosse affaire de la F r a n c e . 22
Guizot, who had for years been patient with Bugeaud,
felt the Governor-General had surpassed his authority by
20,
^Ideville, II, 181.
Bugeaud à Guizot, as cited in Démontés, p. 222. 
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Bugeaud k Guizot, 30 juin 1845, Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 
183-84. The journal l'Algérie, staged a vigorous campaign 
against Bugeaud. L'Algérie, a liberal paper, hoped to see 
Bugeaud replaced by Lamoricière.
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attempting to implement military colonization without minis­
terial approval. He ordered Bugeaud’s scheme scrapped and 
wrote an article of reprimand for the Journal des Debats, re­
minding Bugeaud that he could not ignore the Ministry or the 
Chambers for these bodies possessed constitutional authority 
over such matters: "II y a des juges à Berlin, il y a à
Paris un gouvernement et des Chambres; et il ne s'agit de 
fonder en Afrique ni un nouveau royaume, ni une nouvelle 
dynastie.
Guizot also wrote directly to Bugeaud to remind him that 
he must not forget the strong opposition to military coloni­
zation in the cabinet, the Chambers and the commission des 
credits. Then the Foreign Minister expressed his own doubts 
as to the feasibility of military colonies because of the 
immensity of such an enterprise, the expense, and the uncer­
tainty of results. Guizot accused Bugeaud of imposing his 
system, with all its obligations, upon the state, and warned
him that arbitrary action would not be tolerated. He urged
24Bugeaud to write a public apology for his rash actions.
Bugeaud reluctantly yielded to Guizot's demand and wrote 
an article for the Moniteur Algérien which he believed would 
diminish what the Foreign Minister called the bad effect of
2 3 /
Guizot in the Journal des Debats, 30 aout 1845;
Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 19 3-94.
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Guizot a Bugeaud, 23 aout 1845, Guizot, Memoirs, VII,
194-96.
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the circular. By changing verb tenses and using conditional
2 5verbs, he had made his project a mere statistical report.
The article, however, failed to repair the damage that had 
resulted from his August circular.
Earlier in the year, the affair of the Dahra caves had 
severely strained relations between the Ministry of War and 
the Governor-General. In June, a rebel band had taken refuge 
from the French in the Dahra caves in the Mostaganem region 
of Algeria. Colonel Jean Jacques Pelissier (1794-1862), in 
charge of the force in pursuit of the rebels, ordered a fire 
started at the mouth of the cave, assuming the smoke would 
force the enemy from the cave. After several hours, Pelissier 
ordered the fire extinguished and his men entered the cave, 
only to discover that the entire rebel band had been asphyxi­
ated. This inhumane act (or unfortunate accident), aroused 
French public opinion, and the press demanded that Pelissier 
be punished. Bugeaud defended his subordinate and took the 
entire responsibility for the affair. He stated that he had
given Pelissier permission to use such methods and that the
2 6Colonel used this option only as a last resort.
Bugeaud scolded Soult for sympathizing with the press 
on this issue and supported Pelissier's actions, arguing that
^^Bugeaud to Guizot, 28 September 1846, Ideville, II, 
181-82.
Bugeaud, Par I ’epee et par la charrue, footnote, p. 
207; Bugeaud a Soult, 5 janvier 1846, in Canrobert, Le 
maréchal Canrobert. souvenirs d'un siècle (Huitième edition; 
Paris'! Plon-Nourrit et C^®, 1910, I, 444-45.
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philanthropy only increased the enemy's will to revolt. If
the enemy were treated kindly, the war would continue forever.
The Arab population had to accept French law before they could
be governed, civilized, or made colonial, and thousands of
examples proved they only accepted French law when compelled 
27to do so. In the same letter, Bugeaud expressed his anger 
to Soult for neglecting to deny a charge made by Le National 
that the Governor-General had demanded a 500,000 franc salary 
for services rendered in Algeria. The request had been made 
only to carry out an experiment in military colonies. Neither 
the commander-in-chief nor the army should be exposed to such 
slanderous charges and if such lies were to be the only re­
sults of his work and sacrifice in North Africa, he could no
2 8longer serve his country as Governor-General.
The Marshal also related his frustrations to a prominent 
figure who seemed to share his views on military colonies, 
Adolphe Thiers. Although Thiers had advocated total conquest 
and military colonization, he rarely spoke out publicly for
29them. His last public speech on Algeria had been In January.
^^Bugeaud à Soult, 18 juillet 1845, Bugeaud, Par I'ep^e 
et par la charrue, pp. 207-10.
2 8Ibid. Bugeaud believed Soult was trying to force him 
to resign. See letter from Bugeaud to Guizot, 30 June 1845,
In Ideville, II. 180-81.
29
Thiers, "Discours dans la discussion du Projet d'Adresse 
pronounce le 21 janvier à la Chambre des Députés," in Thiers, 
Discours Parlementaires, VI, 574-77.
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Bugeaud complained to Thiers that the government of Algeria 
had become so large and correspondence with Paris so dreadful 
that it would drain the energy of the most vigorous of men. 
Neither Ihis nor the Arab threat frightened him, for he was 
certain he could meet these challenges. What did concern him 
was the growing opposition to his policies in the War Minis­
try. He accused certain officials within that bureau of 
attacking him daily in the newspapers, and although he did 
not believe Soult to be personally responsible for this, he 
noted some resentment in recent official correspondence from 
the Minister of War. Bugeaud took comfort in knowing that 
Thiers shared his objectives for Algeria and urged the politi­
cian to speak out more often in favor of these common objec­
tives,despite the hostile atmosphere of the Chamber of Depu­
ties .
When Soult became aware of Bugeaud's circular of 9 
August, the War Minister wrote to Louis Philippe, dismissing 
the circular as whimsical and suggesting that if the Governor- 
General could not be convinced of the folly of his plan and 
allow legitimate authority to make decisions, he should be 
retired. Soult then suggested that Lamoricière would be a 
good successor to Bugeaud until Aumale was ready for the posi­
tion, since Lamoricière would consult the government before
^^Bugeaud à Thiers, 20 juillet 1844, in Bugeaud, Par 
I'epee et par la charrue, pp. 211-12.
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taking action. Subsequently, in a letter to Bugeaud, Soult 
warned his subordinate that the July Monarchy did not compel 
anyone to serve, but those who did serve were expected to 
obey orders.
The July Monarchy responded to Bugeaud*s independence 
of action by curbing his authority. He could no longer build 
a bridge, road, or village without the War Ministry's auth­
orization. One of Bugeaud'a admirers complained privately to
his brother that his mentor could not even name a street
* 33
without first consulting Soult. Bugeaud also lost the
arbitrary control he exercised over newspapers and journals in
Algeria and was ordered to cease using the Moniteur Algérien
34
for the publication of his personal views.
Earlier in the year, an ordonnance of 15 April had es­
tablished a Director-General of Civilian Affairs in Algeria 
to act in concert with the Governor-General in all civilian 
matters. In addition, the ordonnance divided Algeria into 
three administrative areas; Civilian territory, where 
Europeans were numerous enough to justify the organization of
^^Soult a Louis Philippe, 25 aout 1845, in Soult, 
Correspondance, pp. 281-86.
32 \
Soult a Bugeaud, as cited in Le National, 6 aout 1845.
33 V
Armand Jacques Leroy de Saint-Arnaud à Leroy de Saint-
Arnaud (brother), 18 aout 1845, in Saint-Arnaud, Lettres du 
Maréchal de Saint-Arnaud (Paris: Michel Levy Freres, 1855),
II, 39-41.
^^Soult à Bugeaud, 14 juin 1845. Archives du ministère 
de la Guerre. Section outre-mer. Algérie. Correspondance, 
carton 89.
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civilian governmentj Mixed territory where natives outnumbered 
Europeans and thus would be administered by military chiefs, 
and; Arab territory with no European population. The ordon­
nance thus established a dual administrative network, and 
while the Governor-General maintained his hold over the in­
terior, the Director-General of Civilian Affairs gradually
35
took control of the coastal area.
Bugeaud complained to Soult that such an ordonnance
creating civilian administration would not consolidate French
3 6
power in Algeria, but would only complicate things. Some 
weeks later, he again criticized the partisans of the exten­
sion of civilian institutions:
Si ces utopistes insensés pouvaient partici­
per le sac au dos avec huit jours de vivres, soi­
xante cartouches dans la giberne, k tout ce que 
nous faisons pour maintenir la securitd',... ils ne 
pousseraient pas le Gouvernement avec tant d'ardeur 
a annuler le pouvoir militaire.37
After the rejection of his August circular and the re­
sulting breach with the July Monarchy, Bugeaud's correspon­
dence became more bitter and bellicose. He denounced news­
papers such as Le National and 1 'Algérie as tools of the War 
38Ministry. He argued that nearly 10,000 young soldiers
^®Azan, I'^mee d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852, p. 388; 
Démontas, pp. 121-23.
Bugeaud au Soult, 27 avril 18*+5, cited in Azan, 1 'Aimi^e 
d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852, p. 388.
^^Bugeaud au Soult, 6 juin 1845, ibid., p. 389.
38 \
Bugeaud a Pierre Genty de Bussy, 30 aout 1845, in 
Bugeaud, Lettres ine^dite du maréchal Bugeaud, pp. 284-87.
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wanted to become aoldier-colonists: "If France was ill-
advised enough not to take advantage of this disposition, so
as to consolidate her conquest speedily and for ever [sic]
39her blindness cannot be too much deplored. . . . "  Shortly
thereafter he wrote: "My heart is riven by . . .  so much
blindness, on the part of our rulers and of the press, which
governs us much more than we are willing to allow.
Bugeaud's bitterness extended not only to the opposi­
tion, but to the Orleans dynasty as well. The Governor- 
>General*é most ardent supporter within the army, Armand Jacques 
Leroy de Saint-Arnaud (1789-1854), expressed his disillusion­
ment with the July Monarchy:
Et l'aveugle gouvernement, les Bourbons de 
la branche cadette, qui sont entrainWs par la 
fatalité comme les Stuarts, laisseraient arracher 
de leurs mains la seule arme qui peut les défendre.
Qui soutiendra la monarchie si on l'attaque à  la 
mort du roi Louis-Philippe? Qui? Qui? J'en 
nommerais mille et je n'en connais qu'un. Il n'y 
a qu'une epée pour les sauver et c'est celle du 
duc d'Isly.' Et on veut lui oter l 'Afrique I*+l
The Governor-General, though bitter and disillusioned, 
took comfort in a small group of supporters in Algiers. In 
September, a letter bearing three hundred signatures was pre­
sented to Bugeaud by the President of the Algerian Chamber of
3 9
Bugeaud to Guizot, 28 September 1845, Ideville, II,
182.
40
Bugeaud to the Prefet of the Dordoyne, 6 October 1845, 
as cited in the Annual Register,LXXXVII (1845), p. 257.
41 y.
Saint Arnaud a M. Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, 18 aout 1845,
Saint-Arnaud, Lettres, II, 39-41.
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Commerce. The address expressed continued confidence in the
Governor-General;
Restez au milieu de vos amis; ici, il n'y a 
pas de dissidence, ici tout le monde vous aime et 
vous admire ; et si ailleurs on méconnaît les 
immenses services que vous rendez au pays, souvenez- 
vous Monsieur le Maréchal, que 1 'Algérie vous place 
au premier rang de ses bienfacteurs, et que votre 
nom est dans nos coeurs, comme il le sera dans 1' 
histoire, inséparable de cette contrée.42
Although this address could by no means be interpreted 
as representing the views of the majority of Europeans living 
in Algeria (approximately 80,000), Bugeaud responded warmly 
to this gesture of confidence. He admitted that colonization 
had not proceeded as quickly as he had hoped for two reasons: 
obstruction in Paris and the continued Arab threat. The lat­
ter, however, could eventually be overcome, for colonization 
was the best means of achieving security. The real problem 
was how to convince officials in Paris of the necessity of 
colonization. He also complained that too much of his valu­
able time was spent handling minor administrative details:
"Estccseqpie, d'ailleurs, on n'administre, on ne colonize, on
4- 3ne gouverne qu'a Alger?"
In November 1845, an event took place which gave Bugeaud 
a glimmer of hope, Soult, the aging Minister of War, resigned
^^"Une adresse présentée par des Notables Civils à 
Alger," Moniteur Algérien, 4 septembre 1845.
^^"Discours de Bugeaud en réponse a une adresse presen­
tee par des Notables Civils à  Alger, le 3 septembre 1845," 
Moniteur Algérien, 4 septembre 1845.
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that position for health reasons. Bugeaud hoped the new 
War Minister, General Alexandre-Pierre Moline de Saint-Yon 
(1786-1870), a less distinguished man, would have more res­
pect for the veteran of Algeria and would be more sympathetic 
to military colonization. The Governor-General wrote a 
letter of congratulations to Saint-Yon and brought up the 
question of military colonies, charging that bureaucrats in 
Paris who knew nothing of Algerian affairs had negatively 
influenced Soult. He professed hope that Saint-Yon would not 
yield to such p r e s s u r e s . S a i n t - Y o n  did prove to be more 
sympathetic to Bugeaud than Soult had been, but he had less 
prestige and influence in the Ministry than his predecessor. 
Saint-Yon had been chosen to succeed Soult only after Hubert 
Rohault de Fleury (1779-1866), refused the position because 
of his health and age. Fleury had been the choice of both
If g
the king and Soult. The new Minister of War proved unable
If 7
to assist Bugeaud in achieving his objectives.
Contrasting schemes for Algerian settlement devised by 
other army officers also complicated matters and hindered
lili j
Bugeaud, P ^  I'epee et par la charrue, footnote, p. 245; 
Alphonse Marie Louis de Lamartine, "La retraite du maréchal 
Soult," in Lamartine’s La France parlementaire (1834-1851); 
Oeuvre oratoire et écrits politique (deuxième serie; Paris 
[etc.] A Lacroix, Verboeckhoven et C^®, 1864-65), IV, 251-52. 
This is an especially interesting, though critical appraisal 
of Soult’s career.
^^Bugeaud au Saint-Yon, 21 novembre 1845, in Bugeaud,
Par I ’epee et par la charrue, pp. 245-46.
^^Soult à Louis Philippe, 25 et 28 aout 1845, in Soult, 
Correspondance, pp. 281-88.
47
See below. Chapter VIII.
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Bugeaud’s projects, General Eamoricière, a distinguished 
veteran of the Algerian campaign, felt that state or military 
colonization would be too expensive. Instead, wealthy capi­
talists should either be encouraged to purchase large tracts 
of land by auction or should be given land. Massive land 
confiscations would serve to drive the natives further into 
the interior or into mountain regions where they would not 
threaten the European settlers. Once a given area had been 
cleared of natives, private individuals or groups would be 
responsible for installing settlers on the land and handling
no
the problems of administration.
Although he did not publicly take part in the debate 
on military colonization. General Cavaignac also had a scheme 
for colonial settlements. Cavaignac made a fundamental dis­
tinction between industrial and agricultural colonies. In­
dustrial colonies, such as factories and mines, could be 
organized by private capital through concessions from the 
state while agricultural colonies could be state-organized. 
Discharged soldiers and civilian farmers could be recruited 
and placed on agricultural settlements together. These quasi­
military colonies would be especially effective in areas not 
completely pacified. The colonies at Orleansville and Tlemcen, 
populated by French peasants who were veterans of the Algerian 
campaign, pleased Cavaignac because of their good relationship
^^Pierre Emile Ibos, Le general Cavaignac: Un dictateur
républicain (Paris; Hachette, 1930), p. 113; Thureau-Dangin, 
VI, m e .
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with the natives and their service to the garrisons in times 
of crisis. Although Cavaignac and Bugeaud might have 
agreed on the use of ex-soldiers in the settlements, they 
agreed on little else, for while Bugeaud's colonists would 
work communally for a few years, Cavaignac's settlers would 
be individual proprietors from the beginning. In addition, 
Bugeaud proposed to use men still on active duty, while 
Cavaignac opposed this.^^
General Bedeau presented an eclectic plan for coloni­
zation. While Bugeaud's military colonies could be employed 
along the frontier, in other areas large plots could be sold 
to private investors and small plots could be reserved for 
individual settlers who wished to purchase land directly 
from the state.
Although the above plans did not appear simultaneously, 
they were known by 1845, and manifested the dissatisfaction 
of some officers of the African Army with Bugeaud’s scheme.
As expected, Bugeaud denounced all of the alternate proposals 
as unsound and argued that confiscating large tracts of land, 
as Lamoriciere and Bedeau advocated, violated the rights of
5 2the Arab tribes and would cause a tremendous refugee problem.
49Ibos, p. 113. Ibos suggests that Cavaignac's ideas 
might have born fruit had not the February Revolution intervened,
^°Ibid., p. 117.
51
'Ibid. , p. 24.
Démontés, pp. 86-92. 
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Furthermore, it would be in the beat interests of France 
" . . .  not to make large landowners but a great many little 
ones, to increase the population . . . /fo:^ the best capi­
tal is a pair of arms fixed to the soil by right of owner­
ship. Capital does not fix anyone; men pass over its property
c q
like the figures in a magic-laAtern, "
Of all the alternate projects, Lamoriciere’s had the 
greatest impact, in part because he had become a hero not 
only to his soldiers, but to many civilians in France. In 
addition, Lamoriciere's views received much publicity in the 
p r e s s . T h u s ,  he became Bugeaud's chief military rival. 
Saint-Arnaud, Bugeaud's admirer and subordinate, summarized 
the rivalry between Lamoriciere and Bugeaud. He denied that 
the Army of Africa was divided into two camps, but admitted 
the presence of two dominant men with different points of 
view. While Bugeaud believed in continued military control 
over Algeria, Lamoricière believed civilian administration 
would and should eventually replace the military. Saint- 
Arnaud also admitted that several officers preferred 
Lamoriciere because they believed that the younger of the 
two rivals had a better future than "... un vieillard illustre
53
Bugeaud to Aumale, January 1844, Ideville, II, 105.
^^Both Le National and L ’Algérie supported Lamoricière 
and published a number of articles by the general on the sub­
ject of colonies.
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dont la carrière ne peut plus être bien longue.
Eighteen Forty^Five had been the most critical year of 
Bugeaud's tenure as Governor-General of Algeria. His elo­
quent plea to the Chamber of Deputies in January impressed 
some, but the speech did not leave a favorable lasting impres­
sion. During the spring and summer of 1845, relations between 
the victor, of Isly and officials of the July Monarchy became 
more strained until the breaking point occurred with the 
issuance of the circular of 9 August. This action could well 
be interpreted as rebellious. Bugeaud's self-righteousness 
left him no alternative but to defy the French government.
This rash action resulted not only in alienating former 
supporters such as Guizot, but it also caused Louis Philippe 
to have serious doubts about the loyalty of his commander-in­
chief. If anything, the circular rendered the adoption of 
military colonization in Algeria less likely, for the Governor- 
General 's powers were curbed in 1845 and limited even more by 
1847.57
The failure of small-scale military colony experiments 
in 1845 also made Bugeaud’s argument less effective. Wretched 
conditions characterized the two military colonies in the 
Sahel, although the situation in nearby civilian villages was
55Saint-Arnaud à Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, 10 janvier 1846, 
Saint-Arnaud, Lettres, II, 71.
5®Louis Philippe à Soult, 11 novembre 1845, Soult, 
Correspondence, pp. 292-93.
57see below. Chapter VIII.
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no better. In 1845, only six hundred eighty-nine new colo­
nists moved to villages Bugeaud had created, while seven 
hundred fifteen left because of the deplorable living condi­
tions and the Arab menace.  ^^
By the end of the year, the hostility between Bugeaud 
and his most illustrious general not only divided the offi­
cer corps into opposing groups, but also adversely affected 
th.e military campaign against the Arabs. Montagnac complained 
that if Bugeaud and Lamoriciere continued their ridiculous 
polemical debates, the enemy would regain the initiative 
while they q u i b b l e d , I n  fact, Abd el Kader, who had been 
outlawed by the Treaty of Tangier in the proceeding year, re­
appeared in 1845 to lead a massive revolt which, was repressed 
only with the greatest difficulty
The events of 1845 must be regarded as having resulted 
in a turning point in Bugeaud's career. Bugeaud was certain 
that his scheme of military colonization would be as success­
ful as his military tactics had been. The years of popular­
ity and acclaim were over, however, and after 1845, Bugeaud 
had little chance of implementing his project. Only bitter­
ness and frustration lay ahead for the old soldier who now 
interpreted every rebuff as the ingratitudéâof a nation for 
which he had sacrificed much.
CO
Thureau-Dangin, VI, 36 8, 411.
^^Montagnac à Elize^ de Montagnac, 22 juillet 1845, Montag­
nac, Lettres d'un soldat, p. 492.
^^Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 527-29.
Chapter VII
1846; J'AIMERAIS MIEUX COMMANDER L'ARMEE DE XERXÈS
Mounting opposition to his colonization schemes, another 
insurrection led by Abd el Kader, and administrative complica­
tions made the sixth year of Bugeaud's leadership in Algeria 
his most disappointing and caused the Marshal seriously to 
contemplate retirement: "C'est un rude metier ... que de
gouverner l'administration civile, j ’aimerais mieux commander 
l'armée de Xerxès,"^
Abd el Kader regrouped his forces and led another native 
insurrection in the winter of 1845-1846 stifling Bugeaud's 
efforts to work for military colonization. Coupled with the 
insurrection, which took until the spring to subdue, a "mas­
sacre" of French prisoners of war took place in Morocco. In
the winter of 1846, French troops taken prisoner by Arab 
tribesmen were taken into Morocco and shot. Although a shroud 
of mystery surrounds the death of these prisoners —  it was 
not known whether Algerian natives or Moroccans actually 
carried out the executions —  Bugeaud believed that since his
men were killed on Moroccan soil, an invasion of Morocco was 
justifiable. The desire to invade Morocco again was not merely 
a passing, passionate whim, for the evidence points to serious 
plans for such an expedition not only in Bugeaudfe correspondence,
^Bugeaud à Genty de Bussy, 8 février 1847, Bugeaud, Far 
1'Epee et Par la Charrue, p. 285.
l l S c x .
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but also in that of his loyal subordinate, Saint-Arnaud.
Guizot finally convinced Bugeaud that such an action would be 
politically impossible because of pressures at home and the 
possibility of a confrontation with Britain. Bugeaud wrote 
to Guizot, reluctantly assuring him that no action would be 
taken to invade Morocco.
During the native insurrection, rumors spread that 
another invasion of Morocco was imminent, and criticism of 
Bugeaud mounted. Opposition journals kept up their incessant 
attacks while distinguished deputies such as Tocqueville and 
Lamartine attacked the Marshal in the Chamber of Deputies, 
and generals Lamoriciere and Bedeau publicized their dis­
content with Bugeaud and proposed counter-schemes for coloni­
zation.^
By April, the native rebellion had been curbed and the 
decision made that no punitive expedition would be sent to 
Morocco. At this point, Bugeaud took a brief repose to review 
in writing his accomplishments since becoming governor-general. 
In a letter to an old friend, Pierre Magne, he admitted that
^Ideville, Memoirs of Bugeaud, II. 219-21; Saint-Arnaud 
a Leroy de Saint Aunaud, 17 janvier 1846, Lettres du Maréchal 
de Saint-Arnaud, II, 71-72.
^Bugeaud to Guizot, 30 April 1846, Ideville, II, 221.
4 sLamoriciere et Bedeau, Projets de colonisation pour les 
Provinces d'Oran et de Constantine, présentés par MM. leS~ 
lieutenants-généraux Lamoricière et Bedeau (Paris, 1847).
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future insurrections would be difficult to prevent, but be­
lieved that Abd el Kader's resources had gradually diminished. 
He expressed confidence that subsequent rebellions could be 
put down with ease, since all the Emir’s regular troops had 
been captured or killed in the winter campaign and tribes 
which had supported Abd el Kader no longer had confidence in 
him. He was equally convinced that rebellions would continue 
until a rational means of colonizing Algeria could be put 
into effect.^ The native populace could only be controlled 
and gradually assimilated into French society by military ini­
tiative. The use of native troops in the Armee d ’Afrique pro­
vided an example of how the army had already achieved the 
above. Native cavalrymen in French service were better horse­
men, better marksmen, and better warriors than the French, 
especially in the Algerian terrain. These native soldiers
g
were treated with respect and in turn, were loyal to France.
Bugeaud denied charges made by his opposition that 
European interests in Algeria had been adversely affected by 
the recent rebellion, for communication links had remained 
open and commercial transactions continued as always. Because 
he had earnestly worked to further European interests in 
Algeria, Bugeaud could not understand why the attacks against
Bugeaud à Pierre Magne, 3 avril 1846, as cited in 
Andre Lichtenberger, Bugeaud (Paris, Plon cl931 ), Appendix, 
pp. 255-60.
^Bugeaud à Saint-Yon, juin 1846, as cited in Azan,
1 ’Armee de Afrique de 1830 à 1852, pp. 189-90.
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him continued. He bitterly denounced the opposition press as 
"...parvenus à les faire croire dans les rangs les plus élevis 
de la société."^ Keenly irritated that several deputies had 
violently attacked him and accused him of being a poor admin­
istrator, he believed many opposition deputies were wrong in 
assigning first importance to the administration of 90,000 
European civilians when 100,000 soldiers and millions of Arabs 
demanded attention. He challenged his opponents to find any 
military leader in the past who had better led an army in time 
of war and at the same time, handled such complicated admin-
O
iatrative details.
He had conquered Algeria twice, but could not, with such 
limited forces at his disposal, conquer a scornful and blind 
French public. Twice he had made France mistress of Algeria 
and had created respect for and fear of the French flag all 
over North Africa. He had made more progress toward a per­
manent settlement in his five and one-half years as governor- 
general than had been accomplished in the ten years before his 
rule. But, as long as politicians in Paris continued to enter­
tain what he regarded as false ideas on colonization, the 
Arabs could never be completely conquered. If he were thirty 
years younger, he might complete his work, but at sixty-two, 
he wondered if time would allow it. He therefore expressed
^Bugeaud à Pierre Magne, 3 avril 1846, as cited in 
Lichtenberger, Appendix, p. 256.
®Tbid.
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his intention of retiring in July after the spring campaign
so that he could freely speak and write on the question of
Algeria. As a private citizen free from restraints, he might
g
be more effective. How, he rhetorically asked, could he be 
expected to vanquish the enemy in Algeria when journals in 
Paris such as 1*Algeria provided such a bad example for disci­
pline by their daily attacks on the leader of 100,000 troops?^^ 
Expressing his plan to retire might have been a means 
of testing sympathies within influential circles, or it might 
be interpreted as an ultimatum to the July Monarchy to yield 
to his demands for military colonization. He did write lengthy
letters to friends and men of influence in which he suggested
11
that he might retire if his projects were not adopted. In 
a letter to Guizot, he expressed his belief that his appoint­
ment should come to an end because the torrent of opposition 
had become too great. Because he did not wish to yield to 
the opposition, he preferred retirement. He mentioned having 
written to the Minister of War to request, because of bad 
health and age, that Saint-Yon suggest a replacement to the
^Ibid., p. 258.
^^Bugeaud au Ministère de la Guerre (Saint-Yon), 2 juil­
let 1846, Bugeaud, Par l'Epee et Par la Charrue, p. 275.
^^Jean Lucas-Dubreton, Bugeaud, le Soldat— le dWput^— le 
colonisateur; Portraits et documents inédits (Paris, A. Michel 
1931 5, pp. 248-49. Lucas-Dubreton' points out that by 1848, 
Bugeaud had become prudent enough not to voice his complaints 
in newspapers as often as before and complained in private to 
his friends.
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king. He told Guizot, however, that the real reason for con­
sidering retirement was that public opinion so obviously 
opposed his objectives, and he refused to promote what he con­
sidered to be prevalent mistaken notions about the future of 
Algeria.
Additional evidence that Bugeaud seriously considered 
retirement in 1846 is present in the correspondence of Saint- 
Arnaud, who mentioned in a letter to his brother that Bugeaud, 
tired of coping with journalists, civilians, and administra­
tive work would likely take the advice of his friends (Saint-
13Arnaud included), and retire after the spring expedition.
While Bugeaud prepared his last great offensive for 
military colonies, the mood of the Chamber of Deputies grew 
more intolerant of the governor-general. In 1846, Lamartine 
became an active spokesman of the opposition to Bugeaud’s 
Algerian policies, and on 10 June, the poet-politician for 
the first time publicly summarized his convictions regarding 
Algeria in a speech to the Chamber of D e p u t i e s . L a m a r t i n e  
believed that France had justifiably conquered Algeria and 
scoffed at those who advocated withdrawal, for if France were
T9
Bugeaud à Guizot, 11 avril 1846, in Guizot, Memoirs, 
VII, 223-25.
13Saint-Arnaud au Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, 17 janvier 1846, 
Lettres du Maréchal de Saint Arnaud, II, 71-72.
^^Alphonse Marie Louis de Lamartine, "Sur l'Algérie,"
10 juin 1846, in La France parlementaire (1834-1851): Oeuvre
oratoire et écrits politique (Paris [etc.] A. Lacroix, 
Verboeckhoven et Cie, 1864-65), IV, 402-39.
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to play a purely defensive role within the power structure of 
Europe, she would soon be relegated to the status of a second- 
rate power. Therefore, the French conquest of Algeria had 
been desirable. Although he supported French presence in 
North Africa, he believed the official policy toward Algeria 
to be in error. For example, some would maintain that in 
time of war, the legislature should hold its criticisms of 
the army in order to prevent disruption of the military cam­
paign. On the contrary, Lamartine argued that the legisla­
ture must continuously review military actions during war 
time to prevent the misuse of power and to condemn inhumane 
acts. The annals of British Parliament provided scores of 
examples whereby legislators had prevented unnecessary mas­
sacres of natives at the hands of British troops. The French 
parallel to such military atrocities was the use of the razzia 
in Algeria. Although Lamartine praised Bugeaud as a bold, 
courageous, and capable soldier, he denounced him as an arbi­
trary military dictator in dealing with the natives and in 
administrative procedures. Aside from cruel treatment of the 
natives, the military administration of the Arabs was poorly 
organized; for an elaborate, hierarchical administrative sys­
tem could not be effectively directed toward a tribal popula­
tion. If administrators, tax collectors, policemen, and 
military patrols were assigned to a certain area, what did 
one do when the natives gathered their tents and moved to 
another area as was their nature? A more practical form of
120
administration would be to establish contacts with tribal 
chieftains, win their confidence, and rule through them.^^
In addition, Lamartine insisted %hat the military con­
quest had gone too far. No positive gains resulted from 
Bugeaud's victory at Isly, the only result being the acquisi­
tion of more useless desert. To continue to maintain a large 
army in North Africa and to allocate large sums of money for 
Algeria was a waste. Besides, directing so much attention 
and energy toward Africa might cause France to lose her in­
fluence in European affairs, a much more important concern. 
France could not remain secure from attack by one of the 
great powers if she persisted in expending all of her ener­
gies on a continent separated from Europe by the Mediterranean. 
Algerian desertland was being conquered at the expense, for 
example, of losing Italy to Austria. Lamartine believed 
there was considerable danger that France would become uniquely 
interested in Africa and abandon her European interests. As 
to the creation of military colonies, this would be feasible 
only given the existence of conditions dating from ancient
16
civilization; that is, slavery, and France had only citizens.
Perhaps Lamartine's fear that European interests would 
be entirely abandoned in favor of African interests was irra­
tional, but his defense of legislative review of the military
l^lbid., 403, 416-17. 
^^Ibid., 405, 417, 436.
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even during wartine, his criticism of faulty administrative 
methods vis=a-vis the natives, and his criticism of the ex­
pense of maintaining a large army in Algeria when it was no
longer needed, seemed to match the mood of French public
17opinion and a growing number of legislators.
Lamoricière, another opponent of Bugeaud's, had recently 
been elected to the Chamber of Deputies. The new deputy 
added his voice to that of the rising opposition to the 
governor-general. Lamoricière, who joined the liberal opposi­
tion in the Chamber of Deputies with such men as Alexis de 
Tocqueville and Gustave de Beaumont, was respected in the
Chamber not only because of his fame as a military leader, but
18also because of his skill as an orator. He had earlier pro­
posed a counter-scheme to Bugeaud's, and after his election 
to the Chamber of Deputies, he formally presented a complete 
plan of settlement for Oran Province without consulting 
Bugeaud. He proposed to call the attention of wealthy capi­
talists to the potential development of Oran Province and to 
sell them large tracts of land there through auction. Thus, 
the state would play only the limited role of stimulating in­
terests in the development of Algeria while the army would
19play no role at all. Bugeaud, resentful that his subordinate
^^Demontes, pp. 230-31.
Jacques Marie Cavaignac, Les deux généraux Cavaignac, 
f. n., p. 237.
19
Thureau-Dangin, Histoire de la Monarchie de Juillet,
VI, 416-17.
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had presented the scheme without consulting him, wrote a let­
ter of protest to the Chamber of Deputies, maintaining that 
Lamorici&re's "colonists in yellow gloves," would undermine 
all that he had achieved in Algeria and repeated his argument
that soldier farmers would be the quickest, best, and least
20
expensive means of colonizing Algeria.
Outside the Chamber of Deputies, Eugene Cavaignac, re­
cently promoted to the rank of general despite his consistent 
criticisms of the governor-general, lashed out at the Minis­
try for allowing Bugeaud to conduct the grosse affaire of 
pressing for military colonies while he ignored his proper 
role of conducting military campaigns. Cavaignac opposed the 
conduct of the war and complained that his superiors, Bugeaud 
and Lamoricière, spent more time in the Chamber of Deputies 
than on the battlefield, concluding that such men were oppor­
tunists who placed their own interests and hopes for personal 
gain above their sense of duty to the army or to France. He 
also complained that while he did the actual work, his imme­
diate superior, Lamoricière, received all the praise. Bitter 
at the lack of recognition extended him, the general main­
tained that he had not been given leave to return home in 
five and one-half years while Bugeaud and Lamoricière spent
21much of their time in France involved in ridiculous debates. 
^°Ibid., 418.
^^Eugene Cavaignac au general Jacques Cavaignac, 22 juil­
let 1846, Les Deux généraux Cavaignac, pp. 236-38.
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Although Cavaignac did not publicize them, he also had views 
on colonization which he reported to his uncle. He argued 
that Algeria was large enough to experiment with several sys­
tems , depending on the region- and the circumstances. He 
reproached Bugeaud for having a too systematic scheme and for 
insisting upon installing military colonists in areas where 
they were not needed. On the other hand, Lamoricière, by
proposing the complete exclusion of the military, offered an
2 2
unrealistic alternative.
By 1846, Saint-Arnaud was virtually the only officer in 
North Africa willing to speak out on Bugeaud's behalf. He 
denounced the opposition journalists for their odious attacks 
on Bugeaud and suggested that the Marshal was justified in 
contemplating retirement, given the newspaper articles, ad­
ministrative problems, and all the rest. Even Saint-Arnaud 
admitted, however, that all was not well in Algeria. At 
Orle'ansville, one of Bugeaud's model settlements, life was 
hard; "Le pays est mauvais, on manque de tout, on a I'air de 
ne rien faire.
In June the annual discussion of appropriations for 
Algeria took place in the Chambers. As usual, the debates 
were heated, but for the first time, they attracted considerable
22Eugene Cavaignac au Jacques Cavaignac, 28 mars 1847, 
ibid., pp. 239-55.
23 \
Saint-Arnaud a Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, 17, 24 janvier
1846, Lettres du Maréchal de Saint-Arnaud, II, 71-74.
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24public attention. At the beginning of the session, the 
new War Minister, Moline Saint Yon, presented an optimistic 
account of conditions in Algeria, but Alexis de Tocqueville 
immediately challenged this cheerful report and accused 
Saint Yon of creating a parliamentary comedy. As Tocqueville 
saw it:
II y a dans ce moment-ci un parfait équili­
bré entre le Gouverneur général et le gouvernement 
de France; l ’un veut la colonisation militaire et 
il faut reconnaître q u ’il ne peut pas la faire; 
l ’autre veut la colonisation civile; il ne peut pas 
non plus y réussir; de telle sorte que, comme je le 
disais tout à l ’heure, les deux pouvoirs soutiennent 
en échec et on arrive paisiblement à 1 ’impuissance.25
The Chamber had become less disposed to sympathize with 
heavy expenditures for Algeria, especially those which Bugeaud 
might use to establish more experimental colonies.
In discussing Bugeaud’s position in Algeria, the Chamber 
lauded the Marshal for his military successes, but criticized 
his work in administration and colonization. One deputy,
M. Dufaure, suggested that a civilian ministry should be es­
tablished in Algeria in which the governor-general would
merely be an agent. Tocqueville and Lamartine agreed with the 
2 6
suggestion. Nor was the dissatisfaction limited to the 
Chamber of Deputies. In the Chamber of Peers, the Marquis de 
Boissy called military colonization a ’’fatally sterile”
^^Demontés, p. 230.
2 5Alexis de Tocqueville, as cited in ibid., p. 231. 
^^Thureau-Dangin, VI, 40 3.
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alternative which, could only result in racial and religious
antagonism, inflexible discipline and the disorder and exac-
27
tions of a fuedal administration. Within the Ministry, even
Guizot questioned whether or not military colonization might
2 8not be a waste of time.
Bugeaud changed tactics slightly in 1846. Rather than 
continue to engage in journalistic polemics which had re­
sulted in essentially negative reactions, he decided to ac­
celerate his communiques with important personages and to 
invite them to visit Algeria to see for themselves the urgent 
need for military colonization. He drew a parallel between 
his letters and those of the Apostle Paul to the Romans. Paul 
had seen that his critics had formed false notions about his 
work in Macedonia and invited those critics to visit Macedonia 
to see for tïiemsèèves what problems, there were. He placed 
horses and soldiers at their disposal, declaring that he
listened only to the council of professionals who knew by
29
personal experience of what they spoke.
One of Bugeaud's compatriots in France, Hippolyte 
Lamarche, sought the support of Thiers and Ferdinand Barrot 
in the quest for military colonies. Using strategic reasons 
as a basis for his arguments, Lamarche maintained that a
27Lucas-Dubreton, Bugeaud, p. 244.
^^Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 190.
29Lucas-Dubreton, Bugeaud, p. 251.
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French colony in Algeria would create a French bulwark in
the Mediterranean against Britain; "L’Algérie, pour nous,
c ’est I'lle de France, c ’est le Canada, c'est l ’Egypte, c ’est
30
la frontier du Rhin.” A firm foothold in Algeria would
assure France of naval and political supremacy in the
Mediterranean and the means of achieving this foothold was
military colonization. Unfortunately for Bugeaud, Lamarche
31failed to convince Thiers and Barrot.
Despite the ever-increasing hostility to Bugeaud in
political and military circles, he persisted in his arguments
and won a few converts. In July, the Minister of Public
Instruction, the comte de Salvandy, went to Algeria on an
official visit and was duly impressed with Bugeaud’s work and
convinced of the superiority of military colonization over
other schemes. The Minister gave Bugeaud a glimmer of hope
by stating his belief that the French government would even-
3 2tually lend support to his plan.
During Salvandy’s visit, Bugeaud personally led the 
Minister on a tour of the interior, and when the Minister pre­
pared to return to France, Bugeaud offered a banquet in his 
honor. In a speech at the banquet, Bugeaud solicited Salvandy’s
30 y
Hippolyte Lamarche, A mm. Thiers et Barrot; L ’Algérie,
son influence sur les Destinées de la France et de l ’Europe
(Paris; Librairie Paulin, 1846), p. 18.
^^Ibid., p. 38.
32 /
Démontés, pp. 233-34.
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aid in convincing Frenchmen of the necessity of military colo­
nies . A vanquished people would not quietly accept domina­
tion. History was filled with examples of this, and he was 
certain that the "fierce, fanatic, bellicose Arab" in particu­
lar would never yield easily to French domination without 
the continued presence of the army. Colonization could only 
succeed with the support of the mother country and it was his 
duty and that of all who agreed with him to convince France 
that military colonization was needed. One had only to point 
to his experimental villages to view the success military 
colonies might enjoy:
Partout oïl une fraction notable de I ’armee 
s'établit, on voit se grouper autour d'elle les 
marchands, les industriels de toute sorte, et 
voilà une ville j mais bientôt on s '^ tend dans la 
campagne, et les intervalles se remplissent. Telle 
est la marche naturelle et inevitable.33
The above argument was inconsistent with previous state­
ments of Bugeaud on the subject for while he maintained that 
trade and commerce might flourish only if the military were 
in firm control of the area, he complained of conflicts which 
arose between army personnel and civilian merchants and indus-
Qh
trialists in many Algerian settlements.
^^Bugeaud, "Discours du maréchal Bugeaud dans un banquet 
offert par la population d'Alger au comté de Salvandy, min­
istre de l ’Instruction publique, le 16 juillet 1846," Moniteur 
Algérien, 21 juillet 1846.
34
Bugeaud au Ministère de la Guerre (Saint-Yon), 1 
septembre 1846, in Bugeaud, Lettres Inédites, p. 294.
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Bugeaud believed that the army by constructing, villages,
doing reclamation work, and building roads and bridges, had
already begun the work of colonization and it was only logical
that the army should continue its work by using soldier-
3 5colonists on a large scale.
In answering those who preferred private initiative as
a stimulus for colonization, Bugeaud maintained that only
state-sponsored colonies could succeed since only the state
possessed the capital to finance the operation and the army
to carry it out, in addition to all the other resources
36essential for such an endeavor.
In closing his banquet speech, Bugeaud again hinted
that his official work in Algeria was coming to a close and
expressed the hope that those at the banquet would complete
his work. Although his official duties in Algeria might be
terminated, he assured those present that as long as his
health would permit, he would use "... toutes les forces de
37l ’esprit et du corps..." to continue in private life to 
work for the realization of his objectives.
Bugeaud’s persistence, Lamorici&re’s counter-plan, and 
the public interest in Algeria, prompted the Chamber of
^^Bugeaud, "Discours du maréchal Bugeaud dans un banquet 
offert par la population d'Alger au comté de Salvandy, min­
istère de l'Instruction publique, le 16 juillet 1846,"
Moniteur Algérien, 21 juillet 1846.
. ^^ Ibid.
3?Ibid.
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Deputies to appoint a commission of four deputies to prepare 
a report on the principles of colonization. The Commission,
consisting of MMs. Tocqueville, Lavergne, Plichon, and
/ 38Bechamel, visited Algeria to study the problem first-hand.
This was Tocqueville’s third visit to Algeria since 1841, 
but all previous trips had been brief and Tocqueville had 
never, ventured into the interior.
Bugeaud, hopeful of winning the commissioners' confi­
dence, took them on a tour of model military colonies in the 
interior (Blidah, M^deah, Milianah, and Orleansville). He 
did not understand how to deal with politicians, however, 
and succeeded in little else than exhausting his companions. 
During the tour, he and subordinates committed many blunders 
which served further to alienate the already hostile commis­
sioners. At Milianah, when a deputation of colonists requested 
the recall of a military justice of the peace and a military 
commission in charge of municipal administration and their 
replacement by civilians, Bugeaud denounced the deputation in 
the presence of his guests. Saint-Arnaud, traveling with the 
group at the time, attempted to illustrate how ungracious the 
group was by pointing out all that Bugeaud had done for them 
and imprudently added that even civilian leaders would be
3 8Alexis de Tocqueville, Memoirs, Letters, and Remains 
of Alexis de Tbcqueville. Trans, from the French by transla- 
tor of Napoleon's correspondence with King Joseph (London: 
Macmillan, 1861), I, 53; Démontas, p. 235.
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thrown into a pit at the least evidence of negligence on their 
part.
One incident while in Orleansville no doubt left 
Tocqueville with a bad impression for he was stopped by a 
sergeant who threatened to force him to remain indoors if 
the deputy continued to roam about the village at will. 
Tocqueville and his friends only became more convinced that 
military colonization was too arbitrary and were more than 
ever sympathetic to Lamoricière's scheme.
Tocqueville had definitely decided against military colo­
nization before his trip to Algeria, and Bugeaud could have 
done nothing to change that attitude. Before leaving France, 
Tocqueville wrote to a friend that he wished only to spend 
about one month in Algeria and would spend all of his time 
in Algiers because of poor health. Although he maintained 
that he would go to Algeria perfectly unprejudiced, his 
earlier statements plus his resolve to spend only one month 
in North Africa and all that time in Algiers, causes serious 
doubts about his sincerity in claiming to be free of preju­
dice . Tocqueville also mentioned that he was certain Bugeaud 
was still anxious for war against M o r o c c o . B y  October when 
the visit was made, this was an unfair estimation, for although
39Lucas-Dubreton, Bugeaud, p. 246.
40
Thureau-Dangin, V, 412-14; Lucas-Dubreton, Bugeaud,
p. 246.
41
Tocqueville to M. de Corcelle, 11 October 1846, in 
Tocqueville, Memoirs, Letters, and Remains, II, 78-79.
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Bugeaud had favored an invasion, he had taken no action to
illustrate that he would defy orders and invade Morocco.
The tour had lasted eleven days. Mid-way through it.
Colonel de Saint-Arnaud wrote of the rigorous journey;:
Now for five days my mind, my legs, and my 
horses have not been out of a harness. My body 
is less weary than my mind; but to hold ore's own 
with a marshal, who likes talking, with four depu­
ties and two journalists [from the Revue de deux 
mondes] who are always asking questions i Ü ! Is 
too much. . . .  We . . . dined and camped to­
gether. . . .' M. de Tocqueville went in for 
methodical, profound and analytical observation. . . .
We had three Homeric repasts, each laid for eight- 
teen, reception, and royal entry into Orleansville, 
guns, troops lining the road, illuminations, plays,
etc.42
At the end of the tour, Bugeaud's failure to communicate
with the commissioners in a positive manner was symbolized &y
Tocqueville's toast to better relations between civilians and 
U 3the army.
Bugeaud, anxious to win well-known allies from all 
walks of life, even sought the favor of Victor Hugo, He 
attempted to entice Hugo by comparing his plan of coloniza­
tion to a lance. Civilian colonists were the handle; soldier- 
colonists were the shaft and the two complemented one another 
without intermingling. Unimpressed with Bugeaud's metaphor, 
Hugo remained silent on the issue.
4 2
Saint-Arnaud to Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, 29 November 
1846, as cited in Ideville, II, 233.
^^Demont^s, pp. 236-37.
44Lucas-Dubreton, Bugeaud, p. 245.
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Alexandre Dumas père, more responsive than Hugo, agreed 
to visit Algeria when Bugeaud offered to dispatch his offi­
cial ship to Cadiz to carry the renowned author to North 
Africa. Dumas’ visit proved to be a fiasco, however, for the 
Minister of Marine and the Minister of War reprimanded 
Bugeaud for using a ship of state to transport a "... roman­
cier sans m a n d a t . A l t h o u g h  Dumas returned to France to 
support Bugeaud, he merely amused, but did not convert, the
kg
adversaries of military colonization.
Bugeaud also sought the aid of the new War Minister, 
Saint Yon. He found him to be more sympathetic to military 
colonies, but Soult's successor lacked prestige in govern­
ment circles and proved to be of little value. In July, 
Bugeaud wrote to Saint Yon to solicit his aid in silencing 
l ’Algérie, one of the more outspoken opposition journals.
He accused Soult of having aided the editors of this journal 
and urged the new Minister of War to have nothing to do with 
them. He believed such journalists should be punished for
u 7
their accusations.
Saint Yon could not decide whether Bugeaud’s plan for 
colonies was superior to Soult’s counter-project. He con­
cluded that it would be impossible to choose between them,
^^Ibid., p. 247.
47
y Bugeaud au Saint-Yon, 2 juillet 1846, Bugeaud, Par 
I ’Epee et Par la Charrue, p. 275.
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for while, he preferred Bugeaud’s plan, the cost of instituting 
it would be so great that the legislature would never approve 
it. On the other hand, Soult's project had no real substance 
to it and relegated an insignificant role to the army in colo­
nization. He therefore decided to postpone any decisions on 
ug
the matter.
Bugeaud hoped that Saint Yon would restore some of the 
governor-general’s powers which Soult had taken away. Before 
leaving office, Soult wrote a memorandum to Louis Philippe, 
voicing his dissatisfaction with the War Ministry's lack of 
control over Algerian affairs. For too long, the War Depart­
ment had had inadequate control over the government of Algeria. 
The Ministry was no longer adequately informed of Bugeaud's 
actions, and orders emanating from the Ministry to Algerian 
officials were often not carried out. Such conditions could 
not continue without dangerous repureussions. Soult then 
called for the limiting of the governor-general's jurisdiction. 
The governor-general should carry out only those orders re­
ceived from proper officials in Paris and in turn, these offi­
cials should always be notified in detail of the state and 
progress of the Algerian colony. Although the governor- 
general should be free to exercise some initiative in military 
operations, any matter affecting European colons should be 
beyond his jurisdiction. Colonization, to Soult, should be
Démontés, p. 224.
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beyond the governor-general’s domain. This memorandum had
resulted in an ordonnance of 1845 which curtailed Bugeaud's
49powers before Soult left office.
When Saint-Yon succeeded Soult, Bugeaud saw the oppor­
tunity to regain the authority he had lost, and traveled to 
France to make the new minister aware of the inconvenience 
of a highly centralized, Paris-based colonial administration. 
Any number of situations could best be handled by officials 
in Algiers rather than in the War Ministry. Consequently, 
valuable time could be saved and the chances of success and 
efficiency enhanced. Bugeaud admitted that it would be best 
to leave his successor with only the charge of keeping the 
Arabs under French domination and leave the problems of 
civilian administration and colonization to civilian offi­
cials. This, however, was not yet possible. The governor- 
general should remain in charge of all problems in Algeria 
until pacification had been completed and a scheme for c&&o- 
nization approved and initiated.
Saint-Yon agreed that his department's control over 
Algerian affairs was too rigid. This explained why "...dans 
I'annee 1848 le seule Direction de I'Algerie [a division 
within the War Ministry] ait reçu plus de 24.000 dépêches et 
en ait expédié plus de 28.000."^^ Pressures from legislators
49
Ibid., pp. 92, 101-2.
^°Ibid., p. 101-3.
^^Saint-Yon, as cited in ibid., p. 104.
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and bureau chiefs within his ministry, however, prevented
Saint Yon from providing Bugeaud with the expanded powers he
, . , 52desired.
Eighteen Forty-Six had been another frustrating year 
for Bugeaud. The new Minister of War proved unable to assist 
him in achieving his objectives, more army officers joined 
the ranks of the vocal opposition, and the legislature voiced 
its increasing displeasure with Bugeaud’s political tactics 
and objectives for Algeria. Unable to achieve his objectives, 
Bugeaud seriously contemplated retirement, but he remained at 
his post throughout 1846.
At the end of the year, Bugeaud wrote to Aumale asking 
the young prince to intervene with his father to push through 
additional subsidies for Algeria. Specifically, he requested 
funds for more roads and communication links. Aumale approached 
the king as Bugeaud requested, but replied that although Louis 
Philippe sympathized with the appeal for more funds, the king's 
advisers believed that the financial situation would not per­
mit the allocation of additional funds. Aumale seemed sin­
cerely remorseful that he was unable to send good news to 
Bugeaud; "Marshal, I am very sorry I could not get any more;
do not think it was my wish that was wanting if I was not a
53
better advocate."
S^Ibid., pp. 10 5-6.
53
Aumale to Bugeaud, 31 December 1848, in Ideville, II,
233-34.
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Meanwhile, Bugeaud wrote to Louis Philippe to remind 
him of an earlier conversation. In September, after an 
audience with the king, Bugeaud came away feeling that Louis 
Philippe shared his convictions regarding military coloniza­
tion. Louis Philippe had promised to support Bugeaud's scheme 
and asked him to contact Guizot so that the latter might 
personally introduce the project to th,e Chamber of Deputies 
as a governmental proposal. Guizot had promised to do this 
if the cabinet approved it. After much deliberation in the 
council, the question had been deferred and Bugeaud wanted 
to know why. He beseeched the king to allow him a great and 
decisive role in colonization for after having completed the 
tasks of conquest and organizing a government for Algeria, he 
did not wish to be part of an impotent form of colonization 
that would satisfy no one.^^
The year ended on this note. To be sure, certain ob­
jectives were realized in 1846, for Abd el Kader left Algeria 
in that year and several nomadic tribes in Oran Province were 
p a c i f i e d . T h e s e  were military victories, however, and such 
accomplishments had been made every year of Bugeaud's command. 
For military colonization, however, which was now Bugeaud's 
overriding objective, it was a year of defeat.
54
Bugeaud a Louis-Philippe, 30 décembre 1846, Bugeaud, 
Par I'Ep/e et Par la Charrue, pp. 283-84.
^^Guizot, Memoirs, IV, 529-31.
Chapter VIII
1847; DEFEAT AND RESIGNATION— A FRUSTRATED COLONIZER
Bugeaud's letter of appeal to Louis Philippe regarding 
the letter’s promise to press for military colonies bore fruit. 
On 11 January 1847, Louis Philippe, in an address to the legis­
lative chambers, remarked that the time had come to consider a 
form of colonization to be adopted for Algeria now that tran­
quility had been achieved in North Africa.^ The following 
month, Guizot notified Bugeaud that a proposal was to be sub­
mitted to the Chamber of Deputies, calling for an appropria­
tion of three million livres which would be used for an 
experiment in military colonization in Algeria. Guizot urged 
Bugeaud to return to France to be present for the formal 
presentation of the proposal, for while Guizot pledged his
support, he suggested that Bugeaud could best answer any
2 ' '
questions the legislators might have.
If Bugeaud experienced a moment of encouragement from 
this news, it was shortlived, for he soon discovered that the 
project to be presented only partially resembled his own.
The government proposal resulted from a carefully prepared 
study discussed in the cabinet two months before being sub-
3
mitted to the deputies.
^Louis Philippe aux Chambres, 11 janvier 1840, as citèd 
in Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 227.
^Guizot à Bugeaud, 19 février 1847, ibid., pp. 227-2 8.
^Demont^s, p. 257.
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Moline de Saint-Yon formally presented the proposal to 
the Chamber of Deputies on 27 February.^ The Minister of War 
began by reviewing the various projects for colonization 
which had been formulated in the years since Bugeaud became 
governor-general. He then listed the work already achieved 
in colonization, suggesting that although it had been more 
significant than generally believed, it was insufficient to 
achieve a French Algeria. Since the conquest had begun, a 
total of 33 new centers of colonization had been established 
in Algiers, Oran, and Constantine provinces, 12 old villages 
had been reconstructed, and a total of 107,000 European colo­
nists had settled in these villages.^ Now that French domina­
tion over Algeria had been definitely established, there was 
a great need for establishing armed colonists in the heart 
of the country and on the frontiers. Such colonists could 
curb the fanatic Arabs who were so capable as warriors that 
civilian colonists would be helpless in the face of an Arab 
attack. The presence of armed colonists would encourage 
rapid exploitation of the Algerian soil by European civilians 
who up to 1847 had timidly concentrated in groups along the 
coast. Such colonies would also provide a sense of satisfac­
tion to the Armee d'Afrique which had served France so effec­
tively in North Africa. Saint-Yon then proposed to establish
^Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 228.
^Saint-Yon a Chambre des Deputes, 27 février 1847, as 
cited in Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 228-29.
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experimental agricultural camps in Algeria and to place a 
total of one thousand soldiers in them. These agricultural 
camps were to be temporary and would serve until, by degree,
C
Algeria could be colonized strictly by civilians. Louis 
Philippe's ministers had decided to use the term "agricultural 
camps" rather than military colonies with the hope that it 
would not immediately prejudice the opponents of military 
colonies to the project. The plan also allowed for initia­
tive on the part of private capitalists in colonization, by 
allowing them to develop areas considered to be safe from 
enemy attack.
Following the proposal, a lengthy debate took place in 
which various alternatives were discussed. L^on Flee, a 
liberal republican politician, spoke in behalf of Lamoriciere, 
suggesting the superiority of colonization undertaken exclu­
sively by private entrepreneurs. Such a scheme would result 
in more than mere colonization, but would also help to intro­
duce French civilization to the shores of North Africa, there-
p
by accelerating the process of assimilating the natives.
Bugeaud denounced the government project because it 
offered military colonization on such a small scale and 
allowed private capitalists too great a role;
^Ibid., pp. ,229-30.
n
Démontas, p. 246.
^Ideville, II, footnote, p. 239.
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Le projet me paraîtrait bien malade; je n'ai 
rien vu de plus pâle, de plus timide, de plus 
incolere que ce discours du ministre de la guerre; 
on y a mélë" l'historique incomplet de la coloni­
sation. le système du général Lamoricière, celui 
du general Bedeau; enfin, le mien arrive comme 
accessoire.9
Although Guizot had urged Bugeaud to return to France 
to be present during the legislative discussion of the govern­
ment's project, Bugeaud refused to return to support the pro­
posal, justifying his absence by insisting that he was too 
old and tired to appear before the Chamber for such an ordeal.
Instead, he prepared an essay for the deputies, "De la 
Colonisation en A l g é r i e . In this essay, he presented his 
last formal appeal as governor-general for military colonies.
A French Algeria could not be realized until a European popu­
lace, numerous enough to dominate the natives and productive 
enough to justify its existence, became firmly entrenched in 
North Africa. Such a society must always be prepared to use 
force to keep the natives under the yoke. Colonization 
undertaken by private individuals, or even state-sponsored 
civilian colonization, could not achieve the above. Only a 
highly organized and disciplined group, capable of employing 
force against the natives could succeed in creating a French
9 s
Bugeaud a Guizot, 9 mars 1847, as cited in Guizot, 
Memoirs, VII, 231.
^°Ibid., pp. 231-32.
■'■^Later published by Bugeaud as De la colonisation de 
I'Algerie (Signé': Mare'chal due d'Isly), (Paris: Impr. de A.
ëïïyot, 1 8 4 7 ) .----- --------------------
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Algeria. Thus, the state had an obligation to establish a
12
powerful framework of colonization.
Bugeaud did not altogether oppose civilian settlements,
but felt they were not hardy enough to survive in the interior.
Besides, civilian colonists always expected civil liberties.
Such freedoms were appropriately granted in a highly developed
society such as France, but in North Africa, the first liberty
was security and it would be necessary to sacrifice other
rights in order to achieve it. Only soldiers understood the
need for the discipline and organization necessary to secure 
13
the colony.
The Marshal's critics in the Chamber of Deputies, pri­
vate financiers, and other opponents maintained that the cost 
of military colonies would be too great for a nation which 
had already sacrificed so much in the conquest of Algeria. 
Bugeaud admitted that the cost would be high and that con­
tinued sacrifices would be necessary after military colonies 
were established, but he reminded his readers that sacrifices 
did not cease simply because a conquest had been achieved.
If France had been a first-rate naval power, if the Arabs had 
been exterminated, if the North African climate had not been 
so rigorous, and if the continuation of present policies would 
not necessitate the maintenance of 100,000 soldiers at a cost 
of 100,000,000 livres per year, Frenchmen could afford to
^^Ibid., pp. 7-18.
^^Ibid., p. 13.
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secure their conquest in a more leisurely fashion. The above, 
however, was not the case. Therefore, military colonies on 
a grand scale should at once be established.^*^
In addition to writing the essay on colonization,
Bugeaud sought the assistance of several friends, including 
Adolphe Thiers. In a letter to Thiers, the Marshal cited 
three successful experiments in military colonization (Mered, 
Maehlma, and Fouka), already achieved in Algeria as an exam­
ple of how large-scale military colonization could succeed. 
These settlements were populated by young, vigorous soldiers 
in contrast to civilian settlements where the old, the infirm, 
and an abundance of children, all unable to work, contributed 
to the overall misery of the settlement. Such were the 
fruits of idleness.
In a letter to another friend, he stated that he had 
conducted the military campaign to a successful conclusion 
through tactics which he espoused as early as 1838 and was
convinced that his system of colonization would work as well
16as his system of war.
Two of Bugeaud's subordinates in Algeria also wrote 
essays in support of military colonies. Pellissier de Reynaud 
argued that it would be impossible to recruit enough civilian
^^Ibid.
^^Bugeaud à Thiers, 11 mars 1847. Bibliothèque Nationale 
Bib. Nat. MSS. Nouv. Acq. 20.617, folio 112.
16 \Bugeaud a Genty de Bussy, 8 février 1847, in Bugeaud, 
Par I'epee et par la charrue, p. 287.
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colonists to achieve the necessary assimilation of European
culture in Algeria for another twenty years. Therefore, it
was necessary to use soldiers until civilians had developed
17an interest in settling in Algeria. Another subordinate,
18Fabar, published a pamphlet duplicating Bugeaud’s arguments.
The pamphlet campaign failed to impress Alexis de 
Tocqueville. This respected politician spoke often to his 
fellow deputies following the government's proposal for agri­
cultural camps. He disagreed with the proposal and with 
Bugeaud's "De la Colonisation en Algérie," on many points. 
While Tocqueville praised Bugeaud as a capable soldier who 
had turned the tide in Algeria in France's favor, he criti­
cized Bugeaud's objectives for permanent settlement. Re­
jecting military colonization in any form, he argued that such 
settlements might be conducive to Russian or German authori­
tarian traditions, but were not in keeping with the French 
way of life. Moreover, military colonies would be too expen­
sive and probably would be ineffective. He also believed it 
unnecessary to maintain a large standing army in Algeria now 
that the conquest was all but complete. Furthermore, he ob­
jected to what he called the wholesale marriage of soldier­
ly Pellissier de Renaud, Quelques mots sur la colonisa­
tion militaire en Algérie (Paris, 1847), in Tracts Relating to 
Algeria, 1834-1848, British Museum.
18P , Fabar, Camps agricoles de l'Algérie ou colonisation 
i de l'arniée (Paris, 1847), in Tracts Rélat-civile par 1 Remplo
ing to Algeria, 1834-1848, British Museum.
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farmers as Bugeaud had suggested, for such marriages did not
contribute to family solidarity, an essential characteristic
19of a successful pioneer settlement.
Tocqueville also believed the size of the army in
Algeria should be reduced and small, well-organized units,
strategically located, could provide security and maintain
order. Moreover, while Tocqueville praised Bugeaud for the
creation of the Arab Bureau, calling it the most useful
branch of the Algerian administration, he did not approve of
the general character of the colonial government in Algeria,
feeling that it should be more civilian in character and less
complex in organization.^^
After considerable debate, the governmental projet de
loi regarding agricultural camps was referred to a committee.
Those who supported the project must have been alarmed when
they discovered that of the twelve men who comprised the
committee, five publicly opposed military colonies while the
other seven commissioners had little interest or knowledge
21
of Algeria or colonization.
^^France. Chambre des Deputes. Session 1847. Impres­
sions Diverse et Feuilletons. "Discours de M. de Tocqueville, 
dans la discussion relatives aux projet de loi sur l ’Algérie 
CSeance du 24 mai 1847)," XVIK1847), pp. 12-36.
"ibid., pp. 18, 32-55.
21
Démontés, p. 262.
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On 2 June, Tocqueville, spokesman for the committee, 
announced the unanimous rejection of the proposal. The com­
mittee believed a successful colony could best be assured by 
using civilians who enjoyed civil and religious freedoms, and 
individual independence. Such a system would best be regula­
ted by a simple, efficient civilian administrative system 
which meted out rapid and impartial justice, levied light 
taxes, and adhered to the principles of free trade in commer­
cial transactions. Complex formulas for colonizing were not 
22needed. In rejecting the proposal which would have allowed 
a predominant role for the military, the committee had adhered 
to nineteenth century liberal attitudes by suggesting that 
governments should do little else than protect private pro­
perty from civil disorder. Any formula which involved 
government initiative and extensive use of the army conflicted 
with the view that the functions of government should be kept 
at a bareminimum. Thus, the watered-down version of Bugeaud's 
proposal was rejected before it left the committee.
The poor reception given the proposal can partially be 
explained by the lukewarm support offered by the King's 
council of ministers. Bugeaud complained to Guizot of the 
hostile nature of the committee appointed to study the
2 2
France. C h a i r e  des Deputes. Session 1847. Imprés - 
sions Diverse et Teuilletonsl "Discours de M. de Tocqueville, 
dans la discussion relatives aux projet de loi sur 1 'Algeria 
(séance du 2 juin 1847)," XVII (1847), pp. 29-30. Also, for 
a discussion of the various committee members and their wives, 
see the Journal des Débats, 9 mars 1847.
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proposal, wondering why the cabinet had not sought to have
2 3more favorably-inclined deputies appointed. Guizot ex­
plained his reluctance to make the issue un question de 
cabinet ; "C'etait une de ces occasions dans lesquelles un 
gouvernement sense doit laisser à son propre parti une assez 
grande latitude, et si nous avions agi autrement, nos plus 
fidèles amis se seraient justement récriés." There is evi­
dence to suggest that a majority of the deputies, already 
hostile to the proposal, simply mirrored public opinion by 
rejecting it. Military settlements of any nature did not 
match the mood of the French pays legal. Even some colonists 
from Algeria had sent a delegation to Paris to prevent passage 
of the proposal and to demand Bugeaud's dismissal, thus illus­
trating that even the European inhabitants of Algeria could
25not agree upon a scheme of settlement.
The overwhelming rejection of the proposal for agricul­
tural camps made final Bugeaud’s decision to retire, a deci­
sion he had seriously considered since early 1846.
Before retiring, however, the veteran of the Algerian 
campaign had another serious clash with the Chamber of Depu­
ties. By the spring of 1847, only the Kabylia region of 
Algeria remained outside the French sphere of influence and
2 3
Bugeaud a Guizot, 9 mars 1847, in Guizot, Memoirs,
VII, 231.
2ii
Guizot, ibid., p. 233.
^^Journal des Débats, 9 mars 1847.
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Bugeaud, determined to complete the conquest before he re­
tired, announced that he would lead an expedition into the
Kabylia in the spring. Because Bugeaud had already announced
* . 26 
his decision to retire, some legislators felt it preferable
to cancel the expedition into the Kabylia until his successor 
had taken office. The Chamber of Deputies forwarded orders 
to that effect to Bugeaud, but he chose to ignore them, and 
in a final act of defiance, he began the expedition, explain­
ing to officials in Paris that his troops were already on
2 7the march when he received the order to cancel the expedition.
Following the expedition, Bugeaud explained that he felt 
a campaign into the Kabylia to be necessary as a reminder to 
the rebel tribesmen in that area that France was in Algeria 
to stay and that continued resistance would be futile. He 
had no intention of bringing the entire area under French 
dominâtn at the time for he believed only an extended expedi­
tion could accomplish this. His expedition, therefore, was
2 8intended merely to intimidate the Kabyles.
On 21 March, Bugeaud announced to Guizot his decision
to retire. Because of the hostile reception the Chamber of 
Deputies had given the proposal for agricultural camps,
2 6
See below, pp. 147-48.
^^The (London) Times, 9 June 1847; Azan, L 'Armée d 'Afrique
de Afrique de 1830 à 1852, p. 413.
^^Bugeaud à Thiers, 14 juin 1847 . Bibliothèque 
Nationale. Bib. Nat. MSS. Nouv. Acq. fr. 20.617, folios 
138-149 .
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Bugeaud preferred retirement rather than applying a system
of colonization repugnant to his sense of reason and patriotism.
He had finally succumbed to pressure from enemies and friends
2 9alike to resign.
Later, Bugeaud officially proclaimed his departure in a 
statement to the colonists of Algeria. In this leng&hy sum­
mary of his accomplishments, he asked his audience to recall 
the achievements in Algeria since he arrived there as governor- 
general slightly more than six years before. As he had 
announced in 1841, he had been an ardent colonizer, and had 
done more in the midst of an arduous war for colonization 
than anyone could have expected. Most of all, his army had
provided security, ”...ce qui est colonisateur et administra-
30tif au-dessus de tout...."
The Marshal explained why he had been an arbitrary 
governor and why he had so fervently advocated military colo­
nization. The European populationoof Algeria was forty times 
smaller than the Arab population. Immediate and complete 
reconciliation of the native populace to French civil and 
political institutions was impossible. Therefore, until such 
acclimation could take place in the distant future, military
29
Bugeaud to Guizot, 21 and 28 March 1847, Ideville, II, 
240; Saint-Arnaud a Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, 26 et 28 mai 1846, 
Saint-Arnaud, Lettres, II, 150-51.
Bugeaud, "Proclamation du maréchal Bugeaud (à son 
depart définitif de I ’Alge'fie," 30 mai 1847, in Bugeaud, Par 
l*ep^e et par la charrue, p. 295.
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discipline and order had to be imposed. He therefore urged
,, ,J:he colons to demand that the mother country continue his
policies by maintaining the army in Algeria and adopting a
31system of colonization which would include the military.
Due to the services he had rendered to Algerian settlers 
and because of his experience as military leader, colonizer, 
and administrator, Bugeaud believed he had the right to give 
the colonists some advice. Scolding them for their impa­
tience , he asked them to remember that Algeria could not be 
transformed into "un pays à l'image de la France" in a few 
years. This would be the work of centuries. Meanwhile, he 
asked the colonists to refrain from heaping injustices on 
their administrators, for such officials had to deal not 
only with a few thousand European settlers, but also with a 
native population forty times larger. Too often, critics of 
his administration had not taken into consideration the Arab 
problem, the climate, and all the miseries which accompanied 
pioneer agricultural settlements. Only when the above pro­
blems had been solved could the population justly demand in­
stitutions and liberties commensurate with an advanced society. 
The frustrated colonizer concluded his farewell speech by 
suggesting that his advice was not intended to offend;
Vous savez que, pendant les six années et 
plus de mon gouvernement, j 'ai mieux aim^ bien 
server vos intérêts que de flatter vos passions
S^Ibid., pp. 296-97.
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et votre amour-propre. Pour que je fusse moins 
franc en vous quittant, il faudrait que mon affec­
tion pour vous eût diminué. Il n'en est rien;
1'avenir vous le prouvera.3 2
In his farewell address to the Armee d'Afrique, Bugeaud 
praised^his men for their work. Virtually every road in 
existence in Algeria had been constructed by the army, not to 
mention bridges, a multitude of military structures, and many 
villages and farms which had been provided for settlers. The 
African Army had served France well: "Vous avez montre, par 
là, que vous êtes dignes d'avoir une bonne part dans la sol
conquis et que vous sauriez aussi bien le cultiver que le
3 3faire respecter de vos ennemis."
Bugeaud departed from Algeria for the last time on 5
3il
June 1847. Guizot, reflecting upon Bugeaud's career, ex­
pressed sincere regrets at the TMamshWfSs resignation, feel­
ing he knew the true motive for the action. After having 
accomplished the conquest of Algeria, Bugeaud had wanted 
quickly to establish a population of French soldier-farmers. 
This was too much, too soon, and evoked the reaction of the 
Chamber of Deputies. This, according to Guizot, left Bugeaud 
only one honorable alternative, resignation: "...il se reti­
rait dignement, car il emportait dans sa retraite la gloire 
de sa vie et 1'indépendance de sa pensée."
^^Ibid., pp. 29 7-98
33 X
Bugeaud, "Proclamation a 1^Armee d'Afrique," 30 mai
1847, ibid., pp. 29S-300.
^^Azan, L'Armée d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852, p. 415.
Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 234-35.
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The Prince de Joinville witnessed Bugeaud*s departure 
from Algiers and provides the following account;
[The squadron reached Algiers] . . . just 
when Marshal Bugeaud was giving up his position 
as governor-general of the colony. We rendered 
him viceregal honours at his departure, and I can 
still see his grand white head, as he stood un­
covered on the bridge of the ship which bore him 
away, and passed slowly between the lines of war­
ships, with their cannon thundering, drums rolling, 
bands playing the Marseillaise, and crews cheering 
wildly. He left that Algerian territory, which he 
had so largely contributed to acquire to France, 
with a sad heart and for ever [sic ].
According to Joinville, a French military leader who 
inspired his men was half the battle, and Bugeaud had pro­
vided that inspiration to soldiers in Algeria. Unfortunately, 
the " . . .  ruinous action of political forces. . ."?^'in 
Paris had deprived France of the full benefits of Bugeaud's 
leadership in North Africa.
During his voyage back to France, Bugeaud wrote two 
lengthy letters to his errant friend, Thiers, whose aid 
Bugeaud had constantly sought and rarely received. In these 
letters, Bugeaud carefully explained his reasons for retiring 
and his views of accomplishments made during his years of 
leadership. Thiers, upon hearing of Bugeaud's plan to retire, 
had accused him of succumbing to political pressure and urged 
him to remain at his post. Bugeaud explained why he could not. 
He could no longer tolerate the opposition press. Although
36
Prince de Joinville, Memoirs, p. 359.
S^ Ibid.
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he did not personally fear the journalists, he believed they 
had prejudiced so many, especially in the Chamber of Deputies 
and in the bureaucracy, that continued resistance would be 
useless. He denied Thiers* allegation that the king and his 
cabinet had abandoned him, but admitted that they neglected 
to defend him, probably because of doubts and fears culti­
vated by the opposition press. So, Bugeaud argued, he did 
not resign because of weakness or fear, but because he was 
completely helpless to do more in the face of the opposi­
tion . ^  ®
Some, he feared, would accuse him of resigning his
Algerian post in order to seek glory as a deputy. Bugeaud
denied this, stating that he knew only a few special men
could achieve everlasting fame in legislative halls and he
realized that he was not among them. The Marshal believed,
however, that he might best serve the interests of French
Algeria by serving as a deputy now that his effectiveness as
39governor-general had terminated.
A few days later, Bugeaud dispatched another letter to 
Thiers, listing his reasons for advocating military colonies. 
He believed many so-called false ideas as to the proper form 
of colonization in Algeria had been derived from brief visits 
by individuals who saw only coastal settlements and departed,
38 X.
Bugeaud a Thiers, 11 juin 1847 . Bibliothèque 
Nationale. Bib. Nat. MSS. Nouv. Acq. fr. 20.617, folios 
138-149. '
S^ Ibid.
153
convinced that they knew Africa. Such "tourists" were the 
type who returned to France to support Lamoriciere's project. 
Superficial visitations were insufficient, for how many had 
visited Saint-Denis^Bu-Sig, a settlement in Oran Province, 
sponsored by private entrepreneurs? Bugeaud had found only 
eleven families established there and ten more which had just 
arrived. This settlement lacked all the necessary facili­
ties, and after talking with each settler, he discovered that 
most of them had only four or five hundred francs at their 
disposal to use in developing their settlements. Bugeaud 
doubted if this would sustain a family for even one year.^^
On the other hand, how well his military colonies had 
succeeded. He denied the charges that military colonists 
left their farms as soon as their term of service expired:
"Ils sont presque tous libérés aujourd'hui, ils sont presque 
tous maries et non sont pas tentas d'aller se refaire pro­
létaires en F r a n c e . Also, most civilian colonists were 
not farmers by vocation, and consequently knew nothing about 
cultivating the land; nor were they accustomed to the Algerian 
climate. Colonists he met in Saint-Denis-du-Sig were li­
brarians, bankrupt merchants and the like. In contrast, 
although his young, vigorous, acclimated soldier-farmers had 
little or no experience in cultivating the soil before they 
came to Algeria, they received training by preparing the soil
un
Bugeaud a Thiers, 14- juin 1847 , ibid.
^^ Ibid.
154
for cultivation before they were allowed to settle on the 
land.^^
Bugeaud expressed his bitterness over the opposition's 
belief that the army was incapable of quality administration. 
Instead; his opponents wished to assign administrators who 
were " ni avocat, ni medicin, ni avou^, ni juge, ni notaire, 
ni négociant,, ni industriel, ni agriculteur...."^^ Yet these 
men, skilled at nothing, were supposedly more capable admin­
istrators than officers in the army who were accustomed to 
leadership and decision-making. Moreover, civilian adminis­
trators cost the government a great deal, whereas the army 
could provide them at no additional cost.
These arguments, as usual, were those of a man blinded 
to alternative programs because he was too certain of the 
legitimacy of his own scheme. He did not take account of the 
cost of maintaining an army large enough to provide both 
security and personnel for administration; nor did he consider 
that men were not always willing to relinquish their civil 
liberties in favor of a disciplinary, arbitrary military re­
gime.
No doubt, Bugeaud should be ranked among the most capable 
soldiers France had known since Napoleon, and he served well 
in this capacity in Algeria. He was also, however, an intoler­
ant, self-righteous man who struggled against the current of
^^Ibid. 
^ I^bid.
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opinion held by French politicians and journalists who, rather 
than meekly submitting to a system they believed improper, 
insisted upon having their way in determining the destiny of 
Algeria. When it became obvious that he could not dam up the 
current, even by insubordination, Bugeaud prudently retired 
rather than apply what he considered to be absurd ideas about 
colonization.
Although he neglected to list it among his specific 
reasons for retiring, the task of administering the civilian 
colonists must be regarded as an important factor in his 
decision to withdraw. As governor-general, Bugeaud complained 
that he presided over a council of administrators who acted 
like a miniature Chamber of Deputies, constantly involved in 
meaningless debates while precious time slipped away. Bugeaud 
believed the civilian administrative network to be too com­
plicated. While he wrestled with this impossible task, offi­
cials in Paris constantly harangued him for reports, memoirs, 
and justifications for actions t a k e n . A  veteran of many 
military campaigns, accustomed to the obedience of subordinates, 
he could not function well under such conditions. Bugeaud was 
not fitted for the position.
Meanwhile, an immediate problem facing the July Monarchy 
upon Bugeaud’s departure was the choice of a successor.
^^Bugeaud à general Viola Charon, 8 juillet 1847,
Bugeaud, Lettres inédites, p. 309.
 ^^^Bugeaud à Genty de Bussy, 8 février 1847, Bugeaud, Par 
I ’epee et par la charrue, pp. 285-86.
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Several of his subordinates were possibilities, including 
Lamoriciere, Bedeau, Changarnier, and Cavaignac.^® As Guizot 
expressed it, however, none of the above men had achieved the 
universal acclaim or incontestable preponderance which would 
have rendered them the logical successor. Besides, since 
Bugeaud had accomplished the conquest, the new regime need 
not have been essentially military in character. Guizot 
argued that Aumale was the logical successor who could pro­
vide an administration with a dual character; "Le jour était
venu ou le gouvernement de 1 'Algérie pouvait être politique
4-7et civil en meme temps que guerrier." Guizot denied the
charge that Louis Philippe forced his son's nomination on
the cabinet, arguing that the choice of Aumale was made in
the best interests of France, Algeria, and civilian and army 
48administration. It should also be remembered that when
Aumale first set foot on Algerian soil, everyone, including
Bugeaud, expected the prince to be the next governor-general.
49The only question was, when would he succeed Bugeaud?
Selecting Aumale as his successor must have pleased Bugeaud, 
for he earlier had said that if he could choose his successor, 
he would not hesitate to name Aumale since the young man
^^Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 235.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
49
See above. Chapter IV.
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possessed the qualities necessary to lead an army and to 
handle administrative affairs.
In turn, Aumale was quite willing to acknowledge his 
debt to Bugeaud. He readily admitted that the task of con­
quering and pacifying Algeria had been virtually completed
by the time Bugeaud left Algeria. To Aumale, Bugeaud had been
. 51
indispensable to the conquest.
The climax of the rejection of Bugeaud’s schemes for 
Algeria came in August, when an ordonnance was issued which 
placed Algeria under a government more civilian in character 
than it had ever been. The ordonnance created a Directory 
of Civil Affairs for each of the Algerian provinces. Direc­
tors of Civil Affairs were to keep in touch with the governor- 
general, but were nominated by the king and were beyond the 
jurisdiction of the governor-general. Simulataneously, 
another government order prevented the governor-general from 
making land grants without the government’s approval, thus 
further limiting the role of army personnel in creating settle­
ments. Only the king could, upon the advice of the Council
52of State, make grants of one hundred hectares or more.
^^Bugeaud, as cited in Azan, L'Arm^e d ’Afrique de 1830 à 
1852, p. 415.
^^Duc d ’Aumale, Les Zouaves et les Chasseurs a Pied; 
esquisses historiques TParîil M. Levy Frères, 1855), p. 75; 
Aumale a Cuvillier-Fleury, 12 novembre 1847, in Aumale, Cor­
respondance du duc d ’Aumale et de Cuvillier-Fleury , 1 , 395-96 .
^^Annual Register, LXXXIX (1847), 327-28.
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In 1847, the military edifice in Algeria, largely con­
structed by Bugeaud, crumbled as Frenchmen decided upon a 
system of colonization and administration for her North African 
colony which was more civilian in nature. Bugeaud had en­
visaged a military order for North Africa, complete with army 
administrators, judges, and colonists, but the more progres­
sive members of the Chamber of Deputies preferred development 
along the lines of nineteenth century liberalism— a laissez- 
faire government which guaranteed the rights of man to each 
settler.
Bugeaud left that alien land largely pacified. French 
authority had been accepted by fifty-five native tribes and a 
French administrative organization had been firmly entrenched
C Q
in Algeria. Proof that large-scale resistance had ended 
came when the great Emir of Algeria, Abd el Kader, finally 
surrendered to the new governor-general late in 1847. Few, 
including Aumale, believed the new governor-general had de­
served the honor of accepting the Arab chieftain’s surrender. 
Such a distinction rightfully belonged to Bugeaud.
^^Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 531-32.
^Vvimale à Cuvillier-Fleury, 26 decembre 1847; 10 janvier 
1848, in Aumale, Correspondance du duc d ’Aumale et de Cuvillier- 
Fleury , I, 396-97.
Chapter IX 
CONCLUSION
Despite his resignation as governor-general, Bugeaud 
remained active in French political circles until he died of 
cholera in 1849. He maintained a keen interest in Algerian 
affairs until the end, and was always eager to give advice 
to those who now would determine the destiny of that colony. 
In July 1848, following the revolutionary upheaval which over­
threw the July Monarchy, Cavaignac, representing the new 
republican government, asked Colonel Henry Feray, Bugeaud's 
son-in-law, to consult Bugeaud as to who; should be appointed 
Governor-General of Algeria. Interestingly enough, Bugeaud 
rejected his faithful subordinate Saint-Arnaud because his 
reputation for scandalous private conduct and his debts dis­
qualified him for such an austere position. He also passed 
over Pellisier and MacMahon because he believed they lacked 
perspective. He offered Canrobert, Bosquet, and Barrai as 
acceptable candidates. Then, never missing an opportunity 
to express his views, he turned to colonization in Algeria. 
Persistent in his belief that the army was the first element 
of colonization, he argued that it provided the most economi­
cal means of settlement while insuring the safety of the 
colony.^
^Bugeaud to Feray, 23 July 1848, Ideville, Memoirs of 
Bugeaud, II, 331.
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Although he stubbornly clung to the idea of military
colonies as the only practical means of settling Algeria, he
did alter his schemes somewhat after the February Revolution
in France, Fearing the advance of socialism in Algeria, he
decided against the collective ownership that he had earlier
advocated. It will be remembered that Bugeaud had believed
collective ownership to be preferable during the first few
years of settlement until agricultural colonies had been
firmly entrenched. By the summer of 1848, he had changed his
mind and published a treatise in Lyons, Les socialistes et le
travail en commun, in which he argued that men did not work
in the fields unless driven to it by personal interests, and
could not effectively produce in the absence of the profit 
2
motive.
On another occasion, he revealed not only a distaste 
for socialism, but also for urban life. Instead of settling 
in the crowded cities, the peasantry should be taught the 
values and benefits of rural life and urged to remain in 
rural areas. At least the residents of the countryside would 
not go hungry, nor would they be tempted by socialists who
O
stirred up idle and hungry townspeople.
2
Thomas Robert Bugeaud, Les socialistes et le travail en 
commun, (Lyons, 1849).
^Thomas Robert Bugeaud, Veillees d'une Chaumière de la 
Vendee, (Lyons, Guyot freres, 1849).
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In June 1849, Bugeaud wrote to Viala Charon (1794-1880), 
a former commander of the corps of engineers in North Africa 
who had been appointed governor-general in September 1848. 
Officials of the Second Rephblic had disregarded Bugeaud's 
candidates for governor-general in favor of Charon because 
he was believed to be more republican in sentiment. The new 
commander of Algeria had asked Bugeaud's advice in exercising 
the duties of his new post. In his reply, Bugeaud expressed 
his dissatisfaction with the civilian colonists of Algeria, 
charging that they preferred constructing barricades in Paris 
to building homes in Africa. He also expressed alarm upon 
hearing that socialism had made considerable progress in the 
ranks of the army in North Africa. He admitted that halting 
the advance of socialism in the army through disciplinary 
measures would be difficult, if not impossible, but disci­
pline and the distribution of anti-socialist propaganda might 
be effective. Bugeaud included a copy of an anti-socialist 
brochure he had just published, suggesting that copies might 
be distributed among the soldiers.^
The February Revolution had also forced Bugeaud to re­
consider his opposition to the granting of civil liberties 
to colonists. Since the colonists, like most of their country­
men in France; believed civil liberties to be a panacea for
^Bugeaud à Charon, 5 juin 1849 , as cited in Par 1'epee 
et par là charrue, 329-32. The brochure was entitled ‘'Veillees 
d'une Chaumiere de la Vendee." See footnote three.
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social evils, they should be granted them for moral satis­
faction, even though they were worthless.^
Finally, the demise of the July Monarchy forced Bugeaud 
to modify his demand for army colonization, though he con­
tinued to insist it was the best of alternatives. The pressing 
need, however, was not how colonization should be achieved; 
rather the crowded cities of France must be cleared of pro­
letariats . Such people would not likely be good colonists 
and their presence in North Africa would doubtless necessi­
tate an increase in troop strength since the Arabs would re­
sent the influx of such undesirables, but this was preferred 
to leaving such people in France. "We are condemned to rob 
in Africa, that we may not be robbed in France."
Bugeaud had failed to impose his entire system of con­
quest and colonization upon the French because his plan lacked
flexibility in execution, because of the open hostility of 
administrative bureaucrats and the Chamber of Deputies, and 
because even the cabinet of the July Monarchy had been luke­
warm to his proposals. Perhaps the lack of true interest in 
colonialism contributed to the failure of Bugeaud's dreams, 
for a key official of the government such as Guizot could not 
focus his attention away from the traditional interest in 
European affairs. The rejection of centrifugal interests was 
also expressed by Lamartine whose Chamber of Deputies speech
^Bugeaud to Feray, 2 3 July 1848, Ideville, II, 329-34.
^Ibid., 332.
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in opposition to an Algerian policy in 18^6 reflected the fear 
that a French Algeria meant the weakening of the French posi- 
tion in Europe. Moreover, French officials were not prepared 
to accept an almost purely military solution to the question 
of Algeria. Guizot summarized Bugeaud's career by saying 
that although the Marshal's ideas were sound, they were often 
exaggerated, and his frankness of expression often worked 
against him. "His zeal and spirit if initiative frequently 
urged him to speak and act too quickly. His speeches to the 
Chamber and his pamphlets sometimes offended and embarrassed
g
Marshal Soult in Paris." Bugeaud had not only insulted Soult, 
his demands and actions had also outraged Guizot and other 
policy-making officials.
If it is useless to seek rational explanations for 
Bugeaud's tactless, high-spirited temperament, it is worth­
while to seek the origins of his convictions. These roots 
may be traced to his two vocational interests— agriculture 
and the army. Denied even the rudiments of a formal education, 
Bugeaud devoted his talents to the plow and the sword. This 
mixture of soldier and farmer drove him to attempt to combine 
his passions in military colonization. While the grand jar­
dinier en chef from Périgord distrusted the new industrial 
age and its by-products, the career military veteran disliked
7See above, Chapter VII, for Lamartine's speech.
' g
François Guizot, The History of France from the Earliest 
Times to 1848 (8 vols; New York: John B. Alden, 1884), VIII,
156^
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the newly emergent and undisciplined masses whose demands for 
civil rights he could not comprehend. By envisaging a dis­
ciplined society of agrarian soldier laborers, he sought to 
combat both the Industrial Revolution and the liberal politi­
cal revolution. His dream had been to implant soldiers, the 
sons of peasants, on the soil of North Africa. Such men, he 
believed, would have taken the plow with pèèasure. The plow 
and the sword represented the best of two worlds. In this 
respect, Bugeaud belonged to an earlier age.
Despite his failures, Marshal Bugeaud had a lasting 
impact upon the development of Algeria during his tenure as 
governor-general. It is impossible to discount the contribu­
tions of the Army of Africa in creating and developing vil­
lages , roads, bridges, and preparing the land for cultivation.
Thanks to careful military supervision, these construction
g
projects were well-planned and successfully implemented.
Furthermore, under Bugeaud, the African campaign had 
been an ^cole primaire for French officers. Writing later in 
the century (18675, the Duke d'Aumale presented his views of 
the impact of the Algerian campaign upon the French military 
establishment. Aumale believed Algeria to be ". . . the great 
school of modern French arms. The loose formation and desul­
tory warfare of Africa . . . have given to men and officers a 
high degree of individual resource and self-reliance, but have 
weakened that severe discipline and close connexion which is
459.
^Paul Azan, L'Arm^e d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852, pp. 370,
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essential to regular movements against an enemy in line of 
b a t t l e . B u g e a u d  had been responsible for this type of 
warfare. It should be noted that by suggesting the lack of 
highly disciplined troop movements in the field against an 
enemy,,Aumale anticipated one of the fatal weaknesses of the 
French army in the Franco-Prussian War. Bugeaud never main­
tained, however, that the African campaign could definitively 
ppepare troops for a European campaign, although he believed 
North Africa to be an excellent preparatory school for offi­
cers and men alike.
Paul Azan, a specialist on the French conquest of
Algeria, maintains that a comaraderie was established among
the men who served under Bugeaud in North Africa which extended
12into the present century. This comaraderie did not prevent 
individual rivalries, but French officers who served in 
Algeria gave up the gay life of France for an austere exis­
tence under "Father” Bugeaud's leadership and believed their 
combat experience placed them a mark above the officiers de 
boudoir who served in garrisons in France. Even Cavaignac, 
who rarely agreed with Bugeaud, acknowledged his debt to him: 
"C'est au maréchal Bugeaud qu'on doit la réussite de cette 
grande entreprise [the conquest of Algeria]. Nous avons tous
le Duc d'Aumale, "Les Institutions Militaires de 
la France," Thé Edinburgh Review, CXXVI (1887), 294.
^^Paul Azan, L'Armée d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852, p. 362.
^^Ibid.
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ete formes à son école, et nos services se recommandaient des 
13siens." Canrobert, another Algerian veteran destined to 
play a significant role in the subsequent military history 
of France also paid homage to Bugeaud's leadership by stating 
that the Marshal was the man most useful to France given the 
special circumstances of the Algerian campaign. Ascribing 
a powerful intellectual faculty and an elevated character to 
Bugeaud, Canrobert acknowledged his debt to his superior in 
North Africa.
Bugeaud had wished to some day make the Mediterranean 
a French lake, and Algeria was a necessary step toward this 
o b j e c t i v e . H e  believed that complete conquest necessitated 
colonization, and he provided the first real impetus toward 
settlement. By proposing a military scheme for settlement, 
he stimulated interest in colonization and inspired a variety 
of experimental alternatives to his own. Despite its faults, 
his was the first genuine effort to solve the problem of 
Algerian colonization. Indeed, it was Bugeaud who first de­
cided that Algeria should definitely be colonized.
Another of Bugeaud's legacies to Algeria was his policy 
of cooperating with the Arabs through the Arab Bureau. By
13Cavaignac, as cited in Franchet d'Esperey, Bugeaud 
([Pari|l: Hachette & B 3 0 ) ,  p. 59. ^
Francois Certain Canrobert, Le Maréchal Canrobert, 
Souvenirs d'un Siècle, par Germain Bapst (Huitième édition; 
Paris : Plon-Nourrit et C^®, 1910), I, 451-52.
^^General du Barail, Mes Souvenirs (Paris: Plon, 1894),
I, 316.
16 7
1847, thirty Arab Bureaus had been established in the provinces
TR
of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine. In the areas where colo­
nization was to be stressed, an institutional framework existed 
for the enhancement of colon-native relations. By developing 
a system of dealing with the natives of Algeria which recog­
nized and respected their traditions, Bugeaud anticipated
17the Algerian policy of Napoleon III. Furthermore, Bugeaud’s 
view that the new colony should be administered by the army 
prevailed until the collapse of the Second Empire. The con­
cept of the French army as colonial administrator dates from 
18
Bugeaud.
Because of his philosophy of conquest and colonization, 
Bugeaud had found it necessary to involve the French army in 
politics and to impose judgment upon the July Monarchy. Yet, 
he should not be totally condemned for his actions, and it is 
doubtful that he made the French army a political force as one
^^Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 538.
17Thomas Robert Bugeaud, Quelques Reflexions sur trois 
questions fondamentales de notre établissement en Afrique 
(Paris: A  Guyot et Scribe, 1846), 2 ^  For a discussion of
the attitudes of Napoleon III vis-a-vis the natives of Algeria, 
see Brison D. Gooch, The Reign of Napoleon III (Chicago: Rand
McNally and Co., 1969), pp. 47-48.
18For discussions of the Administrative role of the 
French army in Algeria, see Marcel Èmerit, ”La Conversion des 
Musulmans d ’Algérie souffle Second Empire,” Revue Historique, 
vol. 223 (196d), 63-84, and Annie Rey-Goldzeiguern, "Les 
Plebiscites en Algérie sous le Second Empire," Revue His­
torique, vol. 229 (1963), 123-58.
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19author has suggested. An age-old problem of governments 
and French governments in particular has been, who determines 
military pplicy— the generals or the civilian government? It 
is to Bugeaud’s credit that he stopped short of rebellion and 
sacrificed his convictions by resigning his post as commander 
of the Army of Africa. Admittedly, the Marshal was guilty of 
defying the orders of his superiors in Paris, although when 
it became apparent that he could not have his way, he stepped 
aside.
Despite the rejection of his plan of settlement for 
Algeria, Bugeaud brought attention to the need for coloniza­
tion and this was his greatest contribution to the Algerian 
question. It is ironic that Bugeaud’s military victories 
contributed to the failure of his scheme for colonization, 
for by 1847, the army had been so successful in pacifying 
Algeria that even if his had been a satisfactory solution, 
there was no need for military colonization.
^^fatrick Keqsel, Moi, Maréchal Bugeaud, un soldat de 
1 ’ordre ( [Paris; Editeur français réunis, 1958J ). Kessel ’s 
thesis is that Bugeaud is responsible for having made the 
French army a political force.
APPENDIX
SPEECH OF PROCLAMATION 23 FEBRUARY 1841, 
ON ARRIVING IN ALGIERS.^
INHABITANTS OF ALGERIA: In the tribune, as well as
during my command in Africa, have I endeavoured to dissuade 
my country from attempting the entire conquest of Algeria.
I considered that a numerous army and great sacrifices would 
be necessary for the attainment of this object; that her 
policy might be embarrassed and her internal prosperity re­
tarded during the prosecution of this vast enterprise.
My voice was not sufficiently powerful to stop an im­
pulse that is perhaps the work of destiny. The country has 
committed itself; I must follow it. I have accepted the 
grand and beautiful mission of assisting in the accomplish­
ment of its work. . . .
But the war now indispensable is not the object. The 
conquest will be barren without colonisation.
I shall therefore be an ardent coloniser, for I think 
there is less glory in gaining battles than in founding 
something of permanent utility for France.
The experience gained in the Mitidjah has only too 
clearly proved the impossibility of protecting colonisation 
by isolated farms ; and that is almost the only method 
hitherto tried; it has vanished at the first breath of 
war. . . .
Let us begin the colonisation by assemblies in defen­
sible villages, convenient for agriculture, and . . .  so 
tactically constituted. . . as to give time for a central 
force to come up to their assistance.
Agriculture and colonisation are one. It is useful and 
good no doubt to increase the population of towns, and to 
build edifices there; but that is not colonisation. . . . The 
cultivation of the open country is in the forefront of colo­
nial necessity. The towns will be no less the subject of my 
care; but I shall induce them as much as is in my power to 
turn their industry and capital towards the fields; for with 
the towns alone we should have only the head of colonisation, 
and not the body. . . .
^Ideville, I, 347-9.
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